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Abstract 
Basically, the problems of Malayan education centred around the 
'language of instruction in schools' and its position in the national 
system of education. What invoked the controversy was over the claim 
of legitimacy each ethnic group had over their cultural and political 
status in the new polity. The philosophical differences that existed 
over these issues were further exacerbated when they became politicised 
and polarised along ethnic lines. 
The Report of the Education Committee, 1956 (the Razak Report) 
which attempted to reconcile these differences, especially over the 
question of 'language in schools' somehow had failed to reduce the 
controversy. The same fate was also inflicted upon the Education 
Review Committee, 1960. Under these circumstances, the linguistic 
controversy remained and this created a serious problem towards the 
full implementation of the national education policy as recommended 
by the Razak Report. Out of this controversy emerged the condition 
of 'stalemate' that stalled the progress and development of the 
national language but nonetheless paved the way for the continued 
retention of English in the educational system of the country. It 
was only in 1970, following the ethnic crisis of 1969 that the natio- 
nal education policy of which the national language clause was an 
essential part was fully implemented. 
As the study shows, the reasons for not implementing the national 
language policy in schools were many. Among them were the policy itself 
which was ambiguous and vague, the government who vacillated due to the 
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pre-independent political arrangement which easily succumbed to communal 
pressures, and the ruling elites who resisted the change and preferred 
the retention of the colonial language. 
This study thus attempts to provide an analysis on the development 
of Malayan education between 1955-1970. The emphasis is on the development 
that led to the implementation of the national language policy in schools 
following the ethnic crisis of May 13,1969. 
The first two chapters of the study provide the setting, both geog- 
raphical and historical, the ensuing demographic change, the emergence of 
ethnic nationalism and the growth of a plural school system. Chapter three 
explores the various alternatives that Malaya could choose in its effort 
of nation-building. In chapter four, the Report of the Education Committee, 
1956 is critically analysed. The contradictory political implications of 
the Report is specially elucidated in chapter five. In the final three 
chapters, attempts are made to provide the background that led to the 
1969 ethnic crisis and the impact it had upon the direction of the natio- 
nal education policy. 
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Introduction 
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When Malaya achieved its independence on August 31,1957, it inherited 
a polity which was ethnically, linguistically and culturally divided. This 
divisive structure was reinforced by a colonial system of education which 
was divided along ethnic lines (Loh: 1975). With these existing social 
conditions, the elements that could contribute towards national integration 
were few and education was assumed to be one. This was the perception of 
the government on the eve of the country's independence and the philosophy 
was henceforth enshrined in the "Report of the Education Committee, 1956" 
also commonly known as the "Razak Report". The Report (1956: para 12) 
recommended that: 
"the ultimate objective of educational policy in the country 
must be to bring together the children of all races under a 
national educational system in which the national language 
is the main medium of instruction, though we recognise that 
progress towards this goal cannot be rushed and must be 
gradual. " 
In 1960, four years after the publication of the Report, this same 
philosophy was expressed by Dato' Abdul Razak, the Chairman of the 
Education Committee, 1956 itself. In his speech to the Asian Regional 
Conference of the World Confederation of the Teaching Profession held on 
April 25,1960, he stressed that the system of education "must be keyed to 
national unity, and this unity in turn is integrated with the development 
of national language" ( ANM & JPM, 1975: 72). 
The Razak Report which became the Education Ordinance, 1957 is 
normally considered as a watershed in the development of education in 
independent Malaya. However, as a blue-print for the national system of 
education, the Report, although essentially accommodative in its philosophy, 
failed to satisfy the expectations of the various ethnic groups of the 
country. From the time of its official release until the trauma of the 
1 969 ethnic crisis, the Report did not receive sufficient support to 
overcome the ethnic divisions in Malayan society. Paradoxically, the crux 
of the controversy was not on the philosophy of the Report per se, and 
neither was it on the structure nor the content of the curriculum but 
rather on the means of achieving the objective. Primarily, the discord 
focussed on the role and position of the national language and other lang- 
uages in the educational system of the country. In the contradictions that 
developed over this issue lies the heart of Malaya's educational problems. 
This controversy was further aggravated by the dynamics of ethnicity and 
politics which in turn impeded its implementation process. 
As will be argued later, language, which is tied up to the concept of 
ethnicity and culture is one single divisive element in any plural society. 
In Malaya, the choice of Malay as the national language was in principle 
agreed by the various ethnic groups but nontheless it became controversial 
when it was translated into the educational frameworks where it was to be 
made the main medium of instruction in schools. The language issue was 
again in the midst of controversy when the Malayan constitution did not 
accord any official status to any languages other than Malay and English. 
Article 152 of the Federal Constitution for instance states that, "the 
national language shall be the Malay language" but English will remain 
the 
official language "for a period of ten years after Merdeka 
Day, and there- 
after until Parliament otherwise provides. " The position of the national 
language as defined by the constitution was crucial in this study for it 
was closely related to the linguistic objective as recommended 
by the Razak 
Report (op. cit. : para 12). 
Under these circumstances, it was unfortunate to note that from the 
time when the Report was made public until the national crisis of 
1969, 
education and language was a political issue that permeated through every 
stratum of Malayan life. The issue did not only result in ethnic squabbles, 
but more than that, created an ethnic disalignment within a community of 
similar ethnic base. By and large, these inter and intra-ethnic controversies 
resulted in a state of stalemate over the implementation of the language 
policy in the school system and it took a national calamity on a large 
scale for this important breaktrhough to take place. It is therefore the 
purpose of this study to analyse the problems and issues related to the 
national education policy as enshrined in the Razak Report and as re- 
emphasised by the Report of the Education Committee, 1960. The thrust of 
the argument centres on the implementation of the policy for it was in this 
vital area that a weak link in the whole system of national education was 
created. Other than that, the study also tries to reveal that the Razak 
Report itself, as a document of policy, was fraught with dubiousness and 
ambiguity which would have made it "unimplementable" even under normal 
circumstances. 
The study also explores the country's basic institutions in order to 
ascertain their responses towards the needs of the new nation and its nation- 
building process. It was therefore in this light that the May 13,1969 
incident was a significant demarcator between the politics of uncertainty 
and appeasement of old and the new realism of the future. The May 13 
tragedy, as we may call it, exposed the loose foundation upon which indepen- 
dent Malaya was built. It was after a thorough re-examination of the country's 
post-independent institutions that their re-orientation was made to suit the 
needs of the newly found realism. Among the first measures taken were in 
the realm of education. Hardly two weeks had passed when the Minister of 
Education announced the full implementation of the national language 
policy in the country's educational system, as had been recommended by the 
Razak Report. 
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At the same time, the analysis is not confined within the premise of 
policy making and implementation but rather presented within the broad 
framework of the country's historical background, colonialism and the 
emergence of the plural society, the salient of ethnic politics during the 
post -wcacld-war two period and the problems of de-colonization. All these 
factors contributed to the development of the national education policy 
and the subsequent failure of its implementation. 
Finally, the choice of the topic and the period of study is considered 
as important in two ways. In the first place, ethnicity is a recognised 
force that permeates into all spheres of life in which politics and educ- 
ation are among the most salient. The formation of the Alliance Party 
which was based on the principles of consociationalism was essentially in 
response to this ethnic influence. Secondly, the period of this study saw 
the implication of these political arrangements towards the development 
of institutions and the influence they had in relation to policy making and 
implementation. It was in this context that the process of policy implemen- 
tation became an issue as manifested in the area of education during the 
period 1955 to 1970. The significance of 1955 was that it was towards the 
end of that year that the Committee of Education was set up under Dato' 
Abdul Razak by the Federal Legislative Council, and 1970 was chosen as the 
end of the period of study for it was in this year that the national educ- 
ation policy was fully implemented following the ethnic riots of May 13, 
1969. 
Approach to the Problem 
Much has been written on the development of Malayan education during 
the colonial time and the policy and practice that accrued with it. Among 
them are the works by Chelliah (1940), Stevenson (1975) and Loh (1975). 
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Loh (ibid. ) for example, analysed how the British policy of "divide and 
rule" was strongly reinforced by the existence of the separate school 
systems in the colony. Stevenson (ibid. ) on the other hand mentioned the 
inter and intra-ethnic separation within and among the various communal 
groups created by the colonial administration. 
Other writers like Fennel (1967), Enloe (1970), and Osman Mohammed 
(1973) attempted an analysis on the development of Malayan education during 
both the colonial and the independent periods. Fennel (OP. cit. ) especially 
elucidated the educational programmes as initiated by the colonial admin- 
istratiors and compared them with a more committed policy by the newly 
independent government of Malaya. Enloe(op. cit. )on the other hand, 
approached the subject within the parameter of ethnic politics while 
Osman Mohammed (op. cit. ) attempted a philosophical interpretation over the 
concept of social integration and the function of education based on the 
pluralistic models developed by Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (ed. 1967). 
My interest in Malayan education is primarily focussed upon its 
development in relation to the policy implementation. As has been mentioned 
earlier, the first decade of independence saw a controversy developing over 
the proposed new educational policy which was characterised by intense pol- 
itical manipulation and communal bargaining. This in turn resulted in the 
adoption of the "ice-box policy'! (Lijphart, 1966: 177) by the government 
when treating the sensitive parts of the Razak Report. This Ijolicy of 
inaction" (ibid. ) was designed to bridge the differences among the members 
of the Alliance Coalition government. Here, the agreement to disagree 
allowed any controversial issue to be temporarily frozen (ibid. 164-177). 
The year 1967 saw the passage of the National Language Act by 
Parliament. The Act was significant in that it can be identified as marking 
the climax of communal bargaining over the national language issue. 
Related in importance was the fact that the Act was closely linked to the 
national education policy of the country. The May 13,1969 crisis thus 
ended the era of hesitancy, vacillation and compromise. Taking advantage 
of the "non-political" atmosphere following the outbreak of the crisis, a 
more pragmatic approach of governing was pursued. It was in this light 
that the national education policy which was delayed in its implementation 
finally took its proper course. 
The approach used in this study is mainly historical and philosoph- 
ical. In the first two chapters of the thesis the educational development 
that transpired during the period of colonial rule is analysed in relation 
to the historical, political and social background of the country. The 
rest of the thesis explores the evolution of the national education policy 
in relation to the nation-building process, the divisiveness of the language 
issue and the problems of implementation. It should be emphasised that 
there is no rigid demarcation as to the approaches used but rather each 
is integrated with the historical and philosophical arguments. 
Procedure and Resources 
The method used in this research was mostly interpretive and descrip- 
tive. The materials used were primary and secondary sources. These were 
in the form of official documents, statements of policies, published and 
unpublished dissertations, symposium papers on education, parliamentary 
reports, newspapers and various other literary documents that were relevant 
to the study and available to the author. At the same time, interviews 
were conducted with relevant personalities to elucidate some of the issues 
under discussion. 
Besides the various facilities provided by the University of Keele's 
Library, research was also carried out at the National Archive of Kuala 
Lumpur, University of Malaya Library, University of Science Library, 
Penang's Public Library, The New Straits Times Library, the Utusan Melayu 
Library, the Institute of Education Library (London), the School of African 
and Oriental Studies Library and the Insititue of Commonwealth Studies 
Library. 
Limitation of the Study 
The problems that arose out of the study were mainly in two areas. 
Firstly, the period of study is too recent so that many of the official 
documents are still considered as classified and under these circumstances 
are not allowed for public scrutiny. Neverthelss, it was possible to 
overcome these difficulties by scrutinizing the "press releases" issued by 
leaders from both inside and outside the government. Secondly, the contro- 
versial nature of the subject was such that many of the interviewees 
preferred to remain anonymous and this to some extent affected the credibil- 
ity of the issues that were being discussed. Nonetheless, it provided the 
opportunity to seek for alternative hypotheses to the ones being explored. 
Finally, in terms of the geographical area, the name "Malaya" is used 
throughout the thesis. The name "Malaysia" was coined after the establish- 
ment of the Federation of four states in 1963. These were the states of 
Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore (which left the Federation in 1965). 
Henceforth, Malaya was called "Peninsula Malaysia" and the states of Sabah 
and Sarawak were often referred to as "East Malaysia". So as to avoid 
historical and geographical ambiguity, the term Malaya is used in this 
text. Furthermore, it is this specific geographical area of peninsular 
Malaya that this research is confined to. 
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Chapter I 
Malayan Education in Historical Perspective 
The Setting 
Malaya is a former British protectorate situated between latitude 
one degree and seven degrees north. It is linked to the Asian mainland 
by the Isthmus of Kra which also forms its northern boundary with 
Thailand. To the south is the island of Singapore which is joined to the 
peninsula by a man-made causeway. The country is separated from Indonesia 
by the Straits of Malacca which forms its western boundary (see Figure 1). 
The country's location just above the equator determines much of its 
climate by the presence of high temperatures and the absence of any cold 
spells. As Ooi (1963: 27) explained, "Seasonality in the peninsula, as in 
other parts of the tropics, is a function of rainfall rather than of 
temperature. " 
With the abundant amount of rainfall (average 110 inches a year) and 
the amount of tropical sun it receives all the year round, the result is the 
lush green vegetation which characterises most equatorial countries. 
However, it is the relief of the country that to some extent has a major 
influence upon the distribution of population, the patterns of settlement 
and the nature of occupations. Physically, Malaya's land area of about 
50,700 square miles is punctuated by mountain ranges which divide the 
country between its western and eastern coast. These areas of highland of 
which the most prominent are the Main Range, the Kledang Range and 
the 
Trengganu Highland, occupy most of the central and northern parts of the 
country and are sparsely populated. The concentration of population 
is 
mainly in the lowland areas of the western coast and 
in the eastern part, 
and its distribution is mostly along the flat alluvial plain of the north- 
eastern region and the central eastern belt 
(see Figure 2). 
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In studying the population distribution of Malaya, it is more than 
the accident of geography that the concentration is on the western-coast 
rather than its eastern part. It is in the western part of the peninsula 
that the mineral assets of the country lie. To name a few, they are the 
Larut area, the Kinta valley and the Klang valley (Ooi, op. cit.: 10). 
Secondly, it was at the eastern coast area of the peninsula that rubber was 
introduced during the late nineteenth century. The crop soon became a large 
scale agricultural venture which henceforth dominated the country's export 
earnings. In fact until the sixties, both tin and rubber represented about 
80% of all the domestic exports (Ooi, op. cit.: 183). Apparently, these two 
items also paved the way for the advent of colonialism into the country. 
For the exploitation of these resources, labourers from alien countries 
were imported in large numbers and this, besides upsetting the delicate 
balance of the country's demographic structure, also created a social, 
political and economic dichotomy in the form of the indigenous-immigrant 
animosities which last until this very day. 
Politically, peninsu]ar Malaya is a Federation of eleven states 
(see Figure 3), nine of which are ruled by the hereditary Malay sultans. 
These monarchial states are Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, 
Perak, Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu. The remaining two states are the 
former Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang, each of which has its 
own appointed Governor as its head of state. Upon independence in 1957, 
Malaya adopted a system of Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional 
monarch known as the Yang Di Pertuan Agong who is elected every five years 
from among the nine hereditary rulers. Besides retaining their traditional 
functions as the head of Islam and the protector of Malay customs in their 
respective states (Ryan, 1967: 147), their roles remain symbolical and 
constitutional. 
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An important feature of Malaya is its population which is multi- 
ethnic in character. The major ethnic groups that predominate are the 
Malays, Chinese and the Indians. The census of 1957 showed that the 
Malays made up 49.8% of the population, while the Chinese and Indians had 
37.2% and 11.7% respectively (see Table I). This ethnic division is 
further marked by differences in language, religion, culture, historical 
experiences, economic activities and patterns of settlement. It is these 
arrays of differences that make one's existence in Malaya interesting, 
challenging and not the least, scary. 
Table I 
Population by Ethnic Group, West Malaysia, 1970,1957 and 1947 
Ethnic 1970 1957 1947 
Group 
Persons Persons % Persons % 
Total 8,810,348 100.0 6,278,718 100.0 4,908,086 100.0 
Malays 4,685,838 53.2 3,125,474 49.8 2,427,834 49.5 
Chinese 3,122,350 35.4 2,3339756 37.2 1,884,534 38.4 
Indians 932,629 10.6 735,038 11.7 530,638 10.8 
Others x9,531 0.8 84,450 1.3 65,080 1.3 
Source: Malaysia, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia: 
Community Groups, Kua]a Lumpur: Department of Statistics, 
1972, pp. 30-31, cited in Hon-Chan, 1977: 81. 
Historical Background of the Country 
Malaya has a long historical past. Archeological records show that 
the country was already inhabited as far back as the 
Pliestocene Feriod 
(Wheatley, 1973: xxx)" However, these early groups of settlers and their 
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way of life was not so significant as to leave any mark on the environment. 
It was the arrival of the forest cultivators from the north between 
2,500 and 1,500 B. C. that the first geographical impact upon the country 
was made. According to Wheatley (ibid.: xxxi) these were the forbearers 
of the present Malays and Indonesians and by the time of the "Dong-son"1 
period, civilisation had already taken shape in the form of a settled 
community, organised agriculture and a certain form of organised village 
life. Alastair Lamb (1964: 101-102) notes that by the second century A.. D. 
South-East Asia was already geographically known to the Mediterranean world 
as indicated by Ptolemy's description of the region. 
The written historical records of the country are comparatively 
recent in origin, and are mostly obtained through Chinese sources. The 
earliest of these were found in the Chinese dynastic annals which registered 
the presence of embassies from the countries of the South Seas. These 
annals gave an account of the development in the middle of the third century 
A. D. when trades delegations from China "mentioned about more than a hundred 
kingdoms in southern Seas" (Wheatley, op. cit.: l4-15). By the middle of 
the fourth century A. D. it was already certain that a settled and organized 
community had existed for some time and for the next hundred years these 
kingdoms became sanctuaries for Indians who migrated to escape the political 
turbulence that was occurring in India. Among these migrants were "the 
priests, Brahmans and the scholars" who according to Coedes (1968: 56) played 
a vital role in the spread of Indian cultural influence in the region. 
A notable account of these Indianised states was made by I Ching, a 
seventh century Chinese monk who spent much of his time in India and in this 
region. In his account, I Ching listed the ports of call if one was to 
travel from China to India. Two of these ports mentioned were Lang kas uka 
1. Dong-son: to denote a period of "metal-culture" that originated in 
Tonking in about 300 B. C. See Hall, D. G. E., 1964: 8. 
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and Kedah (Wheatley, op. cit.: 41-45), situated in the north-western part 
of Malaya. However, these two ports were forgotten and less frequently 
mentioned by travellers and traders after the rise of the Sri Vijaya 
empire in the eighth century A. D. From then onwards, the historical 
activities of the archipelago became concentrated within the matrix of the 
present Indonesian boundary. However, Malaya became prominent again with 
the founding of the kingdom of Malacca by Parameswara, a Sumatran prince 
in 1400. The opening of Malacca in fact marked the beginning of the 
country's modern history. By 1403, from a small fishing village, Malacca 
had reached such importance as a commercial centre that it warranted the 
Chinese Emperor to send his envoy. Being a newly established state, 
Parameswara took advantage of this relationship with China to protect 
himself from any foreign threat, especially from the kingdom of Siam. In 
1405, China under the Ming Dynasty recognised Malacca and promised pro- 
tection from enemies. With this recognition and protection, Malacca 
continued to grow in importance as an entreport port (Hall, 1964: 194). 
Wheatley (op. cit.: 312-13) for instance described the importance of 
Malacca in the following terms: 
"The life blood of Malacca was commerce. During the 
14th century, the Straits was the crucial sector of 
the world's major trade-route which had one terminus 
in Venice - or even further westwards - and the 
other in the Moluccan Islands. Spices were carried 
through the Archipelago over many routes and in 
the ships of diverse people; in the Indian Ocean 
they also followed various directions before finally 
entering the Middle East through either the Persian 
Gulf or the Red Sea; but to the Straits of Malacca 
there was no practicable alternative. " 
With the coming of Islam in 1414, a new dimension was added to its 
greatness as an unrivalled trading centre in the region. Malacca's 
conversion began with the Sultan himself. With his power and influence 
the new faith soon spread throughout the kingdom and its dependencies. 
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The conversion of the Malays to Islam was significant for it changed their 
It weltanschauung" from that of paganism and polytheistic Hinduism to the 
uncompromising monotheism of Islam. In the field of literary development, 
the writing system of the Malay language which was based on the Indian 
Pali script was abandoned in favour of the Arabic system of writing 
(A smah, 1982: 3). As to this development, Asmah (ibid.: 12) made the 
following observation: 
"Islam which came to the archipelao long before 
Christianity brought with it not only religious 
works but also Arabic tales and poetry. The most 
notable of the Arabic literary genres brought into 
the Malay world was a type of verse, known as the 
'shair'. This form became very much favoured by 
the Malays. Later shair verses were created by 
local people with local themes and these were 
taken from island to island. " 
The importance of Malacca as a trading centre came to the attention 
of a maritime power from Europe. Portugal which had already a trading post 
in Goa, at the southern coast of India, wanted a share in the monopoly of 
the eastern trades. In 1509, under the command of Admiral Diego Lopez de 
Sequiera, Portugese ships arrived in Malacca but had to withdraw due to the 
hostile reception they received from the ruling groups. Two years later, 
in 1511, under the leadership of Alfonso de Albuquerque and after heavy 
fighting, Malacca was captured by the Portugese. This marked the end of the 
golden period of the Malacca Sultanate and the beginning of the western 
colonial intervention. 
Malacca's downfall could therefore be attributed to its own strategic 
location and commercial prosperity. Quatritch Wales (1976: 195) when 
commenting on the position of Malaya noted as such: 
"I feel that I must draw attention to the obvious cultural 
limitation of the Malay peninsula, with its relatively 
restricted areas of fertility and its much divided 
terrain, and one must add, the strategic attractions 
that made inevitable its occupation by outsiders of 
relatively advanced civilizations. " 
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The Portugese ruled Malacca for more than a hundred years. However, 
its power and authority were confined only within the city. Schriekke 
(1967: 15-17) for example argued that the persistent policy of pursuing 
"glory, gospel and gold" did not augur well for the Portugese and their 
unfair treatment of the Muslim traders and the favouring of non-Muslims 
made the former turn to Acheh, a port situated at the northern coast of 
Sumatra. This apparently led to the decline of Malacca as the region's 
most important port. 
European rivalries for the eastern trade especially between the 
Portugese and the Dutch was at its height during the first half of the 
seventeenth century. The Dutch, who were already in Indonesia, felt that 
their monopoly over the spice trade would be incomplete without the control 
of Malacca. In 1641, after a long and protracted war, the Portugese were 
defeated. Malacca remained under the jurisdiction of the Dutch until 1824 
when it was transferred to the British as the result of the Anglo-Dutch 
treaty signed in that year. By this treaty, the Dutch agreed to recognise 
British rights over Singapore and also to exchange the Dutch possession of 
Malacca for the British colonial possessions in West Sumatra (Bastin, ed., 
1967: 55-58). The treaty therefore demarcated the two country's respective 
spheres of influence in the region. 
The British penetration into Malaya was more subtle than either the 
Dutch or the Portugese. It began with the acquisition of the island of 
Penang by Francis Light from the Sultan of Kedah through the treaty of 1786. 
They were primarily motivated by economic considerations, for strategically 
the island was ideally located as a port of call for the eastern trades. 
Hence the choice was important, for at this juncture in European history the 
tempo of industrialization had already gathered momentum and there was the 
need not only for the raw materials but also markets in which to sell these 
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finished products (Courtenay, 1972: 12). As a port, Penang had the 
advantage of both. 
The large-scale discovery of tin in the state of Perak in the middle 
of the nineteenth century opened a new era in both the political and 
economic history of the country. The new found resources seemed profit- 
able enough to attract entrepreneurs from the Straits Settlements of 
Penang, Malacca and Singapore, an island which came under the British 
through a financial agreement made between the Sultan of Johor and Sir 
Stamford Raffles in 1819. However, a major problem developed over the 
means of exploiting these resources. The country had an acute shortage of 
labourers. Initially this was met by Chinese immigrants who had already 
settled in the Straits Settlements. But supply could not meet demand and 
since local labour was scarce and showed little interest in working in the 
new industry, an initiative was taken by the colonial authority to facil- 
itate the emigration of Chinese labourers into the country (Hall, 1954: 142). 
This strategy was successfully executed and during the last quarter of the 
twentieth century, Malaya saw an influx of alien labourers working in the 
tin mines or doing other related activities. The effect on the country 
was tremendous. The large-scale importation of foreign workers destabilised 
the country's demographic structure. As Sadka (1968: 22) pointed out, 
"In the 19th century, this leisurely, stable type of settlement was 
succeeded by a new immigration pattern - the wholesale importation of adult 
male labourers. " 
The choice of China as the source of supply for the mining workforce 
was not accidental. In fact the encouragement given to the Chinese to 
emigrate was concurrent with the establishment of the British Settlements 
in Malaya. For instance, the foundation of Penang was described as "a new 
era in the history of Chinese emigration" when they were welcomed by the 
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colonial administration (Hall, op. cit.: 142). 
Until 1874, the British policy towards the affairs of the Malay states 
was strictly one of non-intervention. But in that year there was a shift 
of policy. Prolonged civil wars, disruption of the mines due to the gang 
fights among the various Chinese secret societies, pressures from the 
business communities and being motivated by the era of imperialism were 
often cited as the reasons that led to the full British intervention and 
the beginning of its forward movement in the Malay states (Gullick, 1964: 
33-36 and Amin and Caldwell, 1977: 13-22). Various treaties were signed 
between the British and the Malay rulers and these treaties, besides 
providing the British with political and economic legitimacy over the tin 
laden states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan, also place 
them in virtual control of these four states except on matters relating to 
Malay customs and religion. This was in fact the beginning of the 
Residential System, a policy of indirect rule which lasted until 1948 
when it was replaced by a centralised form of federal administration. 
The other states of Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu came under 
British influence at the turn of the century. The southern sate of Johor 
was the last to receive any form of British advisor. Although it was only 
in 1914 that Johor formalised its relationship with the British, the western 
influence was felt earlier than in other states due to its close proximity 
to Singapore. 
In 1941, during. the period of the Second World War, Malaya was already 
distinctly divided into three political and territorial groupings. These 
were the Federated Malay States, which consisted of Perak, Pahang, Selangor 
and Negeri Sembilan; the Unfederated Malay States of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, 
Trengganu and Johor; and the Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca. 
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Emergence of a Plural Society 
Frank Swettenham, a Resident who became Malaya's first Resident- 
General, attributed much of the development of British. Malaya to the Chinese 
immigrant communities. He described them as such: 
... it was the Chinese who began the work, who have 
continued it ever since, and whose efforts have 
succeeded in producing more than half of the world's 
tin supply. Their energy and enterprise have made 
the Malay States what they are today and it would 
be impossible to overstate the obligation which 
the Malay Government and people are under to these 
hard working, capable and law-abiding aliens. " 
(Swettenham, 1907: 231-232) 
Their incredible drive in pursuit of economic survival prompted 
Francis Light to describe them as "the most valuable part of our inhabitants" 
(cited in Purcell, 1967: 40). It was these qualities that impressed both 
the colonial administrators and entrepreneurs alike. Their arrival en masse 
to seek means of livelihood was an asset to the European and Chinese miners 
for these immigrants served as economic machines par excellence. The fact 
that the British were in control of the ports of entry into the country 
further facilitated the process. By 1871, for instance, there were already 
100,000 overseas Chinese in the Straits Settlements alone (Hunter, 1966: 37). 
The presence of the Chinese in Malaya was not a recent phenomenon. 
Trade relationships between China and this country had existed as early as 
the seventh century A. D. To the Chinese, the peninsular states were sources 
of jungle products such as the aromatic woods, spices, ivory, and rhinoceros 
horn. Along with them they brought commodities like salt, iron, rice and 
earthenware. For members of the ruling heirarchy, they brought gold, silver, 
silks, porcelain and lacquer-ware (Wheatley, op. cit.: 73). Their presence 
was therefore not unfamiliar to the region. Fei-Hsin, during his visit to 
Malacca in 1436 noted the presence of "white-complexioned folk among them 
who are a Chinese descent" (Wheatley, op. cit.: 325). 
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The existence of the Chinese during the pre-colonial period was 
sufficiently small in number so their presence warranted no concern. 
Furthermore, they came specifically for trading purposes after which they 
would return to their homeland and those who preferred to settle were easily 
assimilated into the indigenous community. 
However, the nineteenth century migration of the Chinese was different 
in both motivation and goal. It was the result of colonialism and its sub- 
sequent economic policies. Most of them came from the south-eastern provinces 
of Kwantung, Fukien, Hainan and Kwangsi; areas which "had very limited 
resources and suffered from severe population pressure" (Chang, 1973: 4). 
They came with a single purpose of earning their livelihood (Courtenay, 
op. cit.: 93). 
Until the outbreak of the Second World War, these Chinese labourers 
were transient in nature and hoping to make as much money as possible before 
returning home. For those who had the intention of permanent settlement, 
they developed their own social organization that was reminiscent of that in 
their homeland in China. Communication with the local population was rare 
due to cultural and linguistic differences. The colonial administration on 
the other hand was nonchalant towards the emergence of this new community 
and they were left very much to themselves. Initially, their presence was 
tolerable to the indigenous community but as their numbers grew and their 
position began to change from that of transient workers to permanent settlers, 
resentment towards their presence began to emerge. 
The modern Indians appeared on the Malayan scene at a much later date. 
Their large scale arrival was synonymous with the growth of the plantation 
industries which became a major venture at the turn of the century. Jain 
(1970: 439) for instance, described them as "a child of British imperialism" 
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associated especially with the growth of the rubber industry. In addition, 
they were . also imported and employed in the building of roads and railway 
lines, a vital part of the colonial economic infra-structure. 
Like the Chinese, the history of the Indians in Malaya could be dated 
as far back as the early centuries of the Christian era. The waves of 
migration that took place from the middle of the fourth century to the 
middle of the fifth century created such an enormous cultural impact that it 
virtually Indianised the indigenous states of South-east Asia (Coedes, 
op. cit.: 55-56). The Indian's political and cultural influence remained 
for many centuries and it only ended with the arrival of Islam. The con- 
version of Malacca into this new religion was an ideological coup d'etat 
which overthrew not only the Hindu influence upon the courts but also their 
dominant position as traders in the region. 
On the contrary, the modern Indian immigrants were far from the rank of 
traders or financiers. They were "chiefly unlettered labourers coming into 
the country to work for a pittance on some plantation or government project" 
(Sandhu, 1969: 31-32). However, their arrival "en masse" could not be 
understood without associating them with the growth of rubber as a plant- 
ation crop. The introduction of rubber at the end of the nineteenth century 
and its TTphenomenal success ... led to the decline and abandonment" 
(0oi, op. cit.: 186) of other plantation crops like coffee and pepper. To 
the European coffee planters who had suffered heavy losses due to the surplus 
production of coffee from Brazil in the 1890s, the success of rubber was a 
relief and a blessing (Courtenay, op. cit.: 50). In fact there was a rush 
towards investing in this crop. As Sandhu (op. cit.: 50) put it, investors 
and planters took the opportunity to invest "million pounds worth of money 
into the Malayan countryside and thousands of acres of new and reclaimed 
land were snapped by a horde of companies and individual planters. " 
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As an agricultural enterprise, the rubber industry was labour 
intensive in its operation. Local residents were either not keen or were 
fully engaged in other forms of occupation. Attempts to import labourers 
from Indonesia and Japan were unsuccessful due to the strict immigration 
controls imposed by these two countries. It was then that attention was 
turned towards the Indian sub-continent. Poor living conditions, especially 
in the southern parts of the country and the efficient recruiting machinery 
further facilitated the out-flow of these Indians. It was only after 1938 
when a ban was imposed by the Government of India on all assisted emigration 
that the process of labour recruitment was stopped (Arasaratnam, 1970: 10-20). 
Amidst all the economic activities that occurred especially during 
the first half-century of British rule, life among the Malays remained 
undisturbed. The colonial administration felt no necessity to incorporate 
the Malays into both the mining and agricultural activities. At the same 
time, not many Malays were prepared or willing to work as labourers in the 
new economic system. As Steinberg (1971: 322) observed: 
"The relative sparseness of the Malay population 
and its involvement in a traditional social order 
based on the village and cultivation of the land 
meant that few Malays were available or willing 
to engage in the wage labour needed for rapid 
development of export industries and their 
ancillary facilities. " 
Furthermore, with labour easily available either from India or China, 
there was no necessity at all to disturb the prevalent status-quo, and, 
looking at it from the capitalist point of view, what mattered most was the 
efficient functioning of the economic machinery. According to Roff (1967: 13), 
"between 1875 to 1900 the total revenue of the states under British protection 
rose from well under half a million Straits dollars to fifteen and a half 
million, and the value of exports rose from three quarters of a million 
dollars to more than sixty million. " 
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At the outbreak of the Second World War, Malaya was already at a 
convergent point of two new cultural traditions, each claiming a stake in 
the future of the country. As has been observed earlier, the indigenous 
Malays were left as spectators amidst the economic activities and the 
dynamics of demographic change that were taking place. It was also during 
this period that occupations and patterns of settlement took their ethnic 
identification. The Malays were identified as farmers and fishermen and to 
be found in the "kampungs"1; the Chinese living in the urban centres partic- 
ipating in mining or commercial activities; the Indians were to be found in 
the rubber estates working as rubber tappers. Thus on the eve of independence 
Malaya was already a fully-fledged plural society which Furnivall (1948: 304) 
succinctly characterised as follows: 
"In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes 
the visitor is the medley of peoples - European, Chinese, 
Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, 
for they mix but do not combine. Each group holds by its 
own religion, its own culture and language, its own 
ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the 
market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural 
society, with different sections of the community living 
side by side, but separately within the same political unit. 
Even in the economic sphere there is a division of labour 
along racial lines. " 
At this stage, a lengthy discussion given to the demographic history of 
the country which subsequently led to the emergence of a plural society is 
important in two ways. In the first place, this development influenced the 
course of Malayan politics that were to emerge, and secondly, out of this 
plural society evolved a plural school system which posed such an obstacle 
in the country's efforts of nation-building upon the achievement of indepen- 
dence in 1957" 
1. "kampungs" - villages 
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Emergence of the Plural School System 
Education of the Malays 
The development of education in colonial Malaya followed the demographic 
patterns as reflected by the racial composition and separation that existed 
in its society. Prior to the introduction of secular education, indigenous 
education was religious in orientation and traditional Malay education 
focussed mainly on the teaching of the Koran. It was customary in a Malay 
village for the children to learn how to read the Islamic sacred text from 
persons who were knowledgeable in the subject. The venue of learning 
varied from place to place. Most often it would be held in a "surau" 
(small mosque) or at the teacher's house itself. In the north and north- 
eastern parts of the c untry, besides the "surau", learning was held in the 
"pondok" (hut) where a form of residence was available for students. Children 
who were sent to these "pondok" schools would be equipped with all the basic 
essentials such as sleeping mats and pillows, cooking utensils and food. 
Learning in the "pondok" did not confine itself to only reading or reciting 
the Koran for the curriculum included the learning of the Arab language and 
the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic (Khoo, 1980: 1-8). 
The products of this "pondok" system of education after completing their 
studies would return to their respective villages to become religious 
teachers in their own communities. At the same time, it was not uncommon 
to see some of the ambitious students from these "pondoks" seek to continue 
their religious education in the Middle Eastern countries. 
In a traditional Malay society where Islamic values were held supreme 
and became its central value system, the focus of village life was centred 
around the "surau". It was here that meetings were held and decisions that 
affected the village were made. And in matters of religious importance, 
the advice of these religious leaders was always being sought. 
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In marriages, the religious leaders played the role of solemnizing the 
ceremony and in the "kenduri" (religious feast) they would be called to 
lead in the prayers. In a Malay traditional society, religious leaders or 
people with religious knowledge always held positions above the rest of the 
population. It is therefore unfair to suggest that "upward social mobility 
through education was then a virtually non-existent phenomenon" (Loh, op. cit.: 12) 
Initial attempts by the British to secularize these indigenous education 
systems among the Malays were met with hostility. For example, in Penang 
and Province Wellesly they were opposed to the secularizing attempt which 
they considered to be religiously undesirable. It was only after a compro- 
mise with the local religious leaders that the Koran would be taught in 
the school's precinct that parents began to allow their children to attend 
these schools (Loh, op. cit.: 13). 
The British educational policy towards the Malays was one of dualism. 
This was in line with the social policy adopted towards Malay society in 
general. The premise taken was to categorise the Malay traditional society 
into the rulers and the ruled. The ruling groups were the sultans and 
together with various district chiefs made up the ruling aristocracy who 
stood at the apex of the indigenous political structure. At the bottom of 
this ladder were the ruled, the peasants, commonly known as the "rakyat". 
Educationally, this pattern of dualism was earnestly carried out by the 
British (Loh, op. cit.: 31). For example, at the bottom of the educational 
heirarchy, the British built Malay schools for the masses as a mark of 
"paternalism and concern". The education provided was both terminal in 
terms of its duration, for post-primary education was not available in the 
Malay language, and minimal in its curriculum content, with only a limited 
scope for upward social mobility. The subjects taught were vocational in 
orientation and this policy was in line with the objective of making the 
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"rakyat" more versatile in their own environment, be they farmers or 
fishermen. In short, the Malay vernacular schools were pathetic in their 
conditions. As Sadka (op. cit.: 293) noted, "pedagogically the schools were 
bad; teachers were untrained and miserably paid, and had to deal with up to 
four standards at a time in one-room schools. " Nonetheless, this system 
found its apex in 1922 with the establishment of the sultan Idris Training 
College (S .I. T. C .) in Tan j ung Malim, Perak where Malay vernacular school 
teachers were trained. 
To that extent Malay vernacular education provided only a limited form 
of social mobility even in their own environment. With the exception of the 
few who managed to get selected into the S. I. T. C., the rest of the Malay 
school products would return to their respective traditional family occup- 
ations. In this context, education which was meant to be an agent of change 
was irrelevant as far as the British policy towards the Malays was concerned. 
In fact the curriculum provided was an indirect way of stagnating the Malay 
masses by confining them in their own rural milieu, far from the challenge 
of modern activities. Also, it was a form of social control at its best. 
Even the S. I. T. C. was directed towards this end. As Awang Had Salleh (1980: 139) 
explained, "S. I. T. C. was not a secondary school. It was a training college 
for teachers -a college to mould the people who will return to the village 
to make the village folks more satisfied with the village ways of life. " 
The British policy of educational dualism towards the Malays had its 
precedent in British India during the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Lord Macaulay (in Young, ed. 1952: 729) in his famous minute delivered on 
2nd February, 1835, stated that: 
"... it is impossible for us with our limited means, to 
attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present 
do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between 
us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, 
Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, 
in morals and in intellect. " 
- 28 - 
Macaulay Is minute on education was a statement of indirect rule at 
its best. Henceforth, it became the guiding principle not only for British 
officers serving in India but also in other British dependencies 
(Furnivall, op. cit.: 374-5). In the feudalistic Malay society, it was not 
difficult to identify the social stratification that existed (A. Kahar Bador, 
1975: 134-142). Divisions which were based on group status were deeply 
rooted in the Malay culture and it was a matter of reinforcing these stratified 
values for the policy to be realised. 
In its practicality, the policy of indirect rule required a close 
relationship between the colonizer and the ruling traditional elites of the 
colonized territories. This was in contrast to the system of direct rule, 
where, by and large, the colonizer had to deal directly with the natives. 
In the politics of indirect rule, these traditional elites functioned as 
intermediaries between the colonial administrators and the masses. Thus any 
policy that was formulated appeared to have the sanction of these indigenous 
rulers. It was these groups that Macaulay was referring to and to whom the 
English education was directed. In Malaya, this vision was realised in 1905 
with the establishment of the Malay College in the royal town of Kuala 
Kangsar in the state of Perak. Its establishment was significant in 
understanding the colonial policy of educational dualism towards the Malays. 
Loh (op. cit.: 24) described the Malay College Kuala Kangsar (N. C. K. K. ) 
as such: 
"... as an educational institution it was geared closely 
to a political objective, to give to the future Sultans, 
Malay Chiefs and the traditional elites an approximate 
English public school eduaction which could prepare them 
for participatory roles within the British Administration. ' 
The M. C. K. K. followed the best tradition that was provided in an English 
public school thus befitting its position as the educational custodian of 
the Malay aristocracies. The College's curriculum prepared the student for 
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the public examination conducted by the University of Cambridge Examination 
Syndicate. True to its objective, the products of this college were 
readily absorbed into the colonial bureaucracies. This was in contrast to 
the opportunity accorded to the majority of the Malay population who had 
been attending the Malay vernacular schools, even those few who managed to 
get selected for the Sultan Idris Training College. 
The M. C. K. K. and the S. I. T. C. were educational institutions which had 
both educational and political objectives for their establishment. 
Essentially, these institutions were instruments for preserving the status- 
quo of the Malay feudal society. They represented a form of social 
engineering and the outcome was obvious in that the Malay masses remained 
in their traditional rural environment and the few traditional elites 
provided the colonial government with the lower level of workforce and 
"interpreters" needed for the administration of the country. As Steinberg 
(op. cit.: 323) pointed out: 
"The maintenance of the traditional elite throughout 
the peninsula, either in its customary form or as 
the new bureaucracy, was parallelled by a striking 
absence of Malay peasant involovement in the mushrooming 
export economy, either as part of the work force or as 
entrepreneurs. The British sought actively to shield 
Malay peasant society from the disruptive effect of the 
new economic order, partly in the interests of the 
protectorate relationship and for a sentimental view 
of the idylls of village life, partly as the means of 
ensuring continued food production, and partly in order 
to avoid the political consequences thought likely to 
follow any substantial disorganization of the peasant 
economy. The traditional Malay ruling class actively 
concurred in the measure that resulted. " 
Education of the Immigrant Communities 
The establishment of Chinese schools in Malaya, in whatever form, marked 
the beginning of a settled community which hitherto had been transient. In 
comtrast to the Malay community where paternalism was accorded to their 
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education by the British, the policy towards Chinese education was one of 
neglect. It was only after 1920 when the Chinese schools became hotbeds 
for subversion and highly politicized that the government enacted a law 
that made these schools compulsory for inspection (Purcell, op. cit.: 228-9). 
Prior to this they were autonomous in every respect. 
The independent nature in the growth of Chinese schools in Malaya had 
its antecedent in imperial China. It was in A. D. 706 that a serious revol- 
ution in Chinese education began, when an imperial edict caused the salaries 
of the teachers to be paid by the students instead of the state (Bashford, 
1916: 103). The edict was significant for it placed the responsibility of 
education upon the individual rather than on the state. With this tradition, 
it was not surprising to see that Chinese education in Malaya developed 
autonomously into a social concern devoid of any interference from the 
government. This enterprising value towards education in fact fitted in 
well with the colonial policy of laissez-faire that was accorded to the 
immigrant communities. Out of this policy emerged large numbers of Chinese 
schools initiated either by individuals or as the result of their collective 
efforts. However, most of these schools were "old style schools where the 
children learned the classics by rote" (Chang, op. cit.: 29). According 
to Purcell (op. cit.: 228): 
"The teacher, as likely as not, combined his 
profession with that of fortune teller, or 
geomantic divines, letter writer, and general 
learned odd man of the village, and any man who 
could read and write fluently was considered as 
fully qualified to teach. " 
As to the conditions of the schools, Purcell (op. cit.: 228) observed 
that they were "dirty, ill-ventillated, and ill-lighted basements, out-houses, 
or attics: the sanitation was non-existent; skin diseases were common among 
the pupils. " Despite these pathetic conditions, no efforts were made by the 
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colonial government to intervene and provide them with the necessary 
assistance. It was only during the turn of the century that some interest 
was given to the Chinese schools in general. But the concern of the colonial 
authority was more on the political activities that developed within these 
schools rather than their educational aspects. This began during the first 
decade of this century when the revolutionary fervour that developed in 
China spilled into the Chinese community in Malaya and the schools became 
centres for the contending political groups (Purcell, op. cit.: 232). The 
Manchu Government which was then hostile towards the overseas Chinese, even 
embarked on a large scale educational aid programme (Loh, op. cit.: 40). 
Together with the Revolutionaries and the Reformists, they created intense 
p©liticization among the students and teachers that, if it remained unchecked, 
might threaten the stability of the country. In 1920, a regulation was made 
for the inspection of t'lese schools but it was rather administrative in form 
and understandably the policy of laissez-faire was still being pursued. 
Until after the Second World War, Chinese schools in Malaya retained 
their independence and autonomy with all the characteristics that were 
reminiscent of their homeland. It was in fact a miniature China, where, 
except for the location of the school, the teacher, text-books, curriculum 
content and language of instruction were all Chinese and imported wholesale 
from China (Purcell, op. cit.: 232-3). 
The modern Indians on the other hand were of a different tradition from 
the earlier groups that emigrated. They were mostly illiterates and they 
migrated with the sole intention of seeking a better form of life. The environ- 
ment from which they came was economically poor and socially represive 
especially for the majority who belonged to the lowest heirarchy of the rigidly 
stratified Indian social structure. It was in the hope of escaping from the 
grip of such an oppressive environment that they emigrated to this country. 
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To the planters, they were a source of cheap labour, while to these 
destitutes emigrating was the only way to escape from the strangulation of 
poverty. 
The colonial policy of not supporting the education of the immigrant 
communities also extended to the Indians. Their education was left to the 
initiative of the various voluntary organizations especially the Christian 
missionary groups. With the opening of Penang Free School by Rev. Hutchings 
in 1816, a provision was made to establish a Tamil school as its "vernacular 
branch school" (Chang, op. cit.: 19). This undertaking was also extended 
to the other parts of the Straits Settlement (ibid. ). However, in 1900, 
there was a slight shift in the government's policy when it undertook 
the building of Tamil schools in the states of Perak and Negeri Sembilan 
(Arasaratnam, op. cit.: 179). 
A definite policy on the education of the Indians appeared in 1923 
when a Labour Code was enacted at the request of the Government of India. 
The Code stipulated that a school should be erected on each estate which had 
ten or more children of school-going age. By this Code, the government was 
being relieved of the educational responsibility it had towards the children 
of these Indian immigrants. Instead, the onus of providing education fell 
on the planters themselves. Arasaratnam (op. cit.: 179) was correct in 
suggesting that with the law, "planters became the reluctant custodian of 
education of the labourer's children. " As a result of this development, 
many of these "estate schools" left much to be desired. The planters' 
reluctance to invest large sums of money were reflected in the conditions of 
these schools which more often than not had no proper venues. Teachers were 
poorly paid and in many instances, "estate's clerks, conductors, dispensers, 
kanganys and even labourers" would be assigned to teach in these schools 
(Arasaratnam, op. cit.: 180). 
_33_ 
Tamil schools, like their Malay counterparts, were only terminal in 
their set up. Secondary education in the Tamil language was non-existent. 
After completing their primary education, they would have no other 
alternative than to seek employment on the estates. The only avenue to 
further their education was to go to the English schools which in most 
cases they could not afford. Thus, they remained in the estates ready to 
follow in the footsteps of their parents. 
The Growth of English Education 
Except for the establishment of the Malay College, which was fully 
supported by the government, English education in Malaya saw growth through 
the initiative and efforts of various voluntary organisations. The 
government's policy of not promoting English education was often expressed 
by successive colonial administrators in the country. Sir George Maxwell 
(in Sidney, 1927: 202) for instance emphasised that: 
ý'... the first thing I should like to make perfectly 
clear is that education in this country so far as 
the government is concerned, does not mean English 
education. " 
This statement of policy however, did not retard the growth of English 
schools. Their development was attributed to the untiring efforts of the 
Christian missionaries who viewed education as a main vehicle for religious 
conversion (Holmes, ed. 1967: 25). Until 1920, when there was an obvious 
shift in policy, English schools supported themselves through the collection 
of fees from the students and annual grants provided by the government, 
based upon the number of students taking public examinations. 
Since the establishment of the Penang Free School in 1816, demands for 
places in the English schools were always high. The reason was that the 
Malays who initially had been suspicious towards these institutions, 
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especially with their evangelical activities, soon felt their importance 
and hence there was a clamour for them to be built in rural areas so that 
they could benefit from them (Loh, op. cit.: 53-54). These demands were how- 
ever rejected on the grounds of policy which required the Malays to attend 
Malay vernacular schools "to learn 1alay and the Koran" (Loh, op. cit.: 53). 
Swettenham's (cited in Sadka, op. cit.: 292) statement on English education 
could be a pointer to the policy that was to be adopted. He emphasised 
that : 
"The one danger to be guarded against is an attempt 
to teach English indiscriminately. It could not be 
well taught except in a very few schools, and I do 
not think it is at all advisable to give the children 
of an agricultural population an indifferent knowledge 
of a language that to all but the very few would only 
unfit them for the duties of life and make them dis- 
contented with anything like manual labour. " 
Nonetheless, the government's attitude towards the development of 
English schools was one of 'love-hate'. With the growth of the urban 
economy and the expansion of western bureaucracy, more personnel educated 
in English were needed by the government to fill in the intermediary 
levels of the workforce. At the same time, the growth of these English 
schools was restricted "to prevent rural Malays from becoming 'contaminated' 
with Western ideas and culture" (Watson, 1982: 26). This attitude adopted 
by the government further inflated the value of English education in the 
colonial labour market. 
Situated in urban centres, English schools were fee-paying insti- 
tutions. Thus they were not easily accessible to the Malays who were mainly 
in the rural areas nor to the people in the urban centres who were poor. 
In all aspects, the English schools were elitist in their set-up and high 
in their esteem. The curriculum provided was geared towards the prestigious 
Senior Cambridge School Certificate Examination which had strong occupational 
values not only for employment with the government but also 
in the private 
sectors. At the outbreak of the Second World War, English schools 
had already 
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developed into a system with all the prestige and privilege that super- 
c eded the vernacular schools both in stature and importance. The psychology 
that emerged out of this development was of considerable importance when 
analysing the "National Education Policy" in relation to its development, 
especially during the first decade of Malaya's independence. 
Colonial Policy and Practice in Retrospect 
Education per se was never a part of the colonial package. It was 
rather an off-shoot of the colonial process. The policy that developed was 
therefore "mainly self-serving" (Coleman, ed. 1965: 36), in line with the 
economic policy but rationalised by such an abstract description like the 
"civilizing effort" (Hobson, 1968: 286-294) without which the colony would 
have remained undeveloped. 
In Malaya, colonialism had left trails of discontent and this entailed 
the various policies that were adopted. Conspicuous among all these was 
its aggressive economic policy which consequently called for the recruitment 
of immigrant workers for maximum exploitation. The net result was the 
emergence of a plural society which under the prevailing circumstances 
required a new direction in policy and practice in general. Education was 
a particular case in point. The policy that was implemented was not only 
discriminatory but also inter and intra-ethnically divisive. The dualistic 
system that was developed for the natives and which was patterned along the 
traditional Malay social structure, created a wedge between the Malay 
educated masses and the few English educated elites. This policy had a 
subsequent effect upon the divergent nationalistic tendencies and the mode 
of response that the Malays developed towards British colonialism. The far 
reaching consequence of this educational dualism was reflected in the 
debates over the nature and content of education following the launching of 
the national education policy in 1956 and its process of implementation 
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during the first turbulent decade of the country's independence. 
Another aspect that emerged out of the colonial rule was the uncon- 
trolled growth of the Chinese and Tamil schools which served the educational 
and cultural needs of the immigrant communities. Far from their original 
home environment, these schools played a vital role in the preservation of 
their respective culture and identity. This was particularly true amongst 
the Chinese community (Pye, 1972: 31). The criticism that was often voiced 
against these schools was their lack of realistic approach towards the new 
environment. The systems that were adopted were alien in lock, stock and 
barrel and this further deepened the institutional cleavages among the 
various ethnic components of the country. 
Simultaneously, English schools developed their importance as elitist 
institutions, and being sanctified by the colonial authority, their products 
were easily "socialized into the political culture of the imperial country" 
(Coleman, ed. op. cit.: 36). To be educated was taken to mean an education 
in an English school and to be able to write and converse in the language 
of the colonial master. The "intellectual arrogance" (Nyerere, 1968: 52) 
that emerged out of this system developed into a psychological force that 
was strong enough to challenge any progressive attempt to restructure the 
educational system that was inherited from colonial days, even though it no 
longer served the purposes and needs of the country. 
At the turn of the century, racial segmentation was already a reality 
in Malaya and the government had a very limited option to pursue. The first 
was to intervene and develop a strategy that could forge a sense of oneness 
among the segregated communities; secondly, to be oblivious to the changes 
that were taking place. Unfortunately, it was the latter course that was 
taken and the country remained racially segregated as manifested by the 
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patterns of settlement, occupational structure and the school system 
established along ethnic lines. 
The laissez-faire policy of the government during the pre-1941 period 
could be interpreted as one of "non-committal" towards the people of the 
country and their future. Secondly, it was politically intentional on the 
part of the colonial government to embark on the "divide and rule" policy 
(Bell and Freeman, 1974: 64). Both the arguments were inter-related but 
the latter had repercussions. By ignoring the integrative potentials that 
were prevalent among the various ethnic groups, it was felt that colonial- 
ism itself would function at its best. 
Chapter 2 
In Search of a Consensus 
World War II and the Impact on Colonialism 
The global conflict of 1939-1945, despite the massive destruction 
it caused, was to some extent a historical landmark in the history of 
international colonialisim. If the "Berlin Conference of 1885" 
(Worsley, 1964: 14) marked the colonial process at its peak, the second 
World War and its aftermath saw the beginning of its disintegration. 
The psychological impact of the war was tremendous in that it left trails 
of a new-found confidence among the people of the colonized territories. 
To the local nationalists, this development was a source of strength 
and pride, the quality that was much needed to enhance their movement. 
Nonetheless, in some cases, this nationalistic fervour was also accom- 
panied by political radicalism, a phenomenon that was absent in the past. 
Thus, within a period of less than a decade, the chain of imperialism 
which had been holding the people for centuries began to crack and in 
some cases to break. Out of these political developments, new nations 
were born, national boundaries redrawn and new leaderships emerged. 
This scenario was particularly true in Southeast Asia where the impact of 
war on all spheres of life was deeply felt. Of importance was the fact 
that singularly at this juncture of history, colonialism and its advocates 
were made defenceless. The argument that colonialism was part of the 
"white man's civilizing mission" had finally lost its legitimacy. 
In the Far East, the efficiency of the Japanese war machine was 
decisive and this incurred a devastating blow on the military might of 
the colonial power in the region (Means, 1970: 44). Although the period 
of the Japanese occupation was short, it provided enough time for the 
people to take stock of the political changes that occurred around them. 
To the indigenous population, it was a period of national awakening, 
the political development that was serious enough to challenge the 
colonial power on their return when the war ended. The cry "Asia for 
the Asiatic" initiated by the Japanese was contagious and in Malaya, 
even the lack-lustre political attitudes of the Malays were affected by 
the slogan. 
In a plural society like Malaya, the response towards the Japanese 
invasion was inter and intra-ethnically varied. It was in the main a 
dynamic reflection of the society itself. The conspirators against 
British imperialism were also strongly anti-Japanese throughout the period 
of occupation, as were the Chinese who had a long historical emnity 
towards them. On the other hand, the Indians collaborated and this was in 
line with the general philosophy of most of the overseas Indians, that was 
to secure the support of the Japanese in their drive against the British 
in India (Means, ibid.: 48). However, the response of the indigenous 
community in general was to take advantage of the new political develop- 
ment by consciously supporting the new power with the ultimate aim of 
securing independence for their respective countries. 
Indonesia was an example of a country where the approach towards the 
Japanese was more to its advantage. The war years saw Indonesian national- 
ism, which had been suppressed by the Dutch, emerge into a force marked 
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by extreme militancy. Their hatred towards the Dutch rule was manifested 
by the overt support they gave to the Japanese invaders. But at the 
same time, a strong anti-Japanese feeling developed when Japan vacillated 
in granting them independence during the closing stage of the war 
(Kahin, 1970: 134-5). 
The political significance of the war towards colonized territories 
was direct and clear. The colonial power was no longer seen to be 
invincible, as it had been assumed to be, and this changed the whole 
perspective of the masses towards their colonial rulers. This breakdown 
of confidence had a snowballing effect on the growth of nationalism which 
was mostly anti-colonial in character. In countries where the forces of 
nationalism had already left their mark, they became well defined and 
increased in intensity. Here again, Indonesia is taken as a case in 
point. The interregnum period, from the time of the Japanese surrender 
until the arrival of the allied forces, witnessed Indonesia making its own 
unilateral declaration of independence from the Dutch, and the return of 
the allied forces was bloodily opposed by the natives (Kahin, ibid: 144-6). 
The events that shaped the political movements in neighbouring 
Indonesia took a different course in Malaya. The after effect of the war 
made the multi-ethnic character of the country even more defined and felt. 
Characteristic of their strategies in the occupied countries, the Japan- 
ese administration in Malaya further reinforced the ethnic divisions by 
favouring one ethnic community and suppressing the other. As Morrison 
(1949: 241) observed: 
"The Japanese, as in every country of Southeast Asia which 
they occupied, exploited racial differences in order to 
strengthen their own position. An even more potent factor was the prevailing sense of insecurity, which in 
a plural society causes people to believe that they 
can be safe only with their fellow-racials. Thus the 
war years witnessed a steady deterioration in Malay- 
Chinese relations. " 
This very act adopted by the Japanese in turn aggravated the 
delicate ethnic balance and created much animosity among the various 
ethnic groups as manifested by "some serious communal outbreaks" that 
followed after the Japanese surrender and just before the arrival of the 
British in 1946 (Morrison, op. cit.: 240). 
In Malaya, the ethnic distinctions were evident. They were differ- 
ences which could be easily identified by the "various institutions that 
existed, specialised economic functions, share in government administrat- 
ion, degree of education, religion, temperament, rate of education, and 
attitude towards Malaya" (Morrison, op. cit.: 240). However, one signif- 
icant fact had to be understood when analysing the Malay and non-Malay 
attitudes towards the country. As Ratnam (1946: 6) points out, "the 
former has a cultural and institutional continuity in the local context 
while the latter lacks a Malayan traditional past". This was in essence 
the source of the different responses accorded to the Japanese invasion. 
While the Malays were concerned about the future well-being of the country, 
the non-Malays were still being dictated by the developments that 
occurred in their countries of origin. With the absence of any common 
historical tradition, the country thus failed to respond collectively when 
the Japanese made their invasion. In fact, the ethnic value systems took 
varying forms of response, and to some extent this provided an easy victory 
for the Japanese at the initial stage of the war and the swift return of 
the British when the war ended. 
Psychologically, the impact of the war upon the country was immense. 
It shook the very fibre of trust the people had towards the British rule 
when as a protector the British failed to fulfil its obligation in time 
of national catastrophe. The humiliating defeat suffered at the hands of 
an Asian power, whose forces were lesser in numerical strength (Foong, 
1977: 99) left a wound which failed to heal even after the war had ended. 
Finally, it would be interesting to note that the war also marked the 
eclipse of colonialism, and in Malaya particularly, it was an initial 
stage towards self-realization. 
Emergence of Ethnic Nationalism 
Witnessing the return of the British to Malaya after their World 
War II debacle, Seabridge (1945: 202) commented that they arrived "as a 
man who has failed in a mission on which the very lives of his charge 
depended". This was the general view accorded to them when they returned 
to re-establish their pre-war eminence. Although their authority was 
promptly restored, the semblance of the pre-war atmosphere was absent. 
On the country's economic front, for example, the disruption was enor- 
mous (The Times, July 9,1946) and politically the climate within the 
country was one of radicalism (The Times, March 4,1946). Between these 
two, the latter was the most complex. At one end of the pole there was 
a clear exertion of Malay nationalism while at the other end of the 
continuum there was a nationalistic tendency manifested by the immigrant 
communities which was reminiscent of their countries of origin. 
Ethnicity, if it is to be defined as "characteristics, distinctive 
cultural or sub-cultural traits that set one group off from others" 
(Bell and Freeman, 1974: 10) together with nationalism "as an ideological 
movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and 
individuality for a social group deemed by some of its members to con- 
stitute an actual or potential nation" (Smith, ed. 1976: 1) are forces 
that could be harnessed to anyone's advantage. In Malaya, where there 
was an absence of any common value system among the various ethnic groups, 
ethnicity and ethnic nationalism were two divergent elements that could 
pose a threat to the viability of the polity. On the other hand, what 
other alternatives did the immigrant communities have when the concept of 
a Malayan nation was still vague and ambiguous in terms of its geographical 
delineation or political cohesion? The Malays themselves being indigenous 
did not at this period of Malayan history provide any form of a central- 
ised or cohesive model. Their loyalty was too parochial, mainly being 
diverted towards their respective states and rulers. Even the word 
"Malay" which was supposed to transcend beyond any political boundary had 
failed to become a unifying force (Roff, 1967: 242-5). Although the 
period before the Second World War saw the growth of Malay Associations 
in the various states of the country, attempts to form "a single national 
movement failed utterly at the hands of timorousness, state rivalries, 
and an inability to see beyond the traditional Malay political structure" 
(Roff, ibid: 246-7). Steinberg (op. cit.: 327) for instance, described 
the Associations as "conservative in bias, loyal to the rulers ... and 
displaying an almost equal enthusiasm for British colonial rule". 
It was in the 1920's that the first wind of change swept into 
"the Malay literate world" and this was brought about by the Pan-Islamic 
movement which had its roots in the Middle Eastern countries (Roff, op. 
cit.: 88-90). However, the movement was reformative rather than political 
in its orientation. In the main, it attempted to bring the Malays out 
of their narrow conceptual view of Islam and thus brought them in line 
with the current world view of its development. As such, the movement 
was far from being radical in that it could threaten the existing tradi- 
tional power structure of the Malays ýIvleans, op. cit.: 23). Furthermore, 
since the movement was intellectual in character, the impact on the masses 
was rather minimal. 
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Generally, the majority of the Malays in pre-war Malaya were poli- 
tically dormant and contented. Their fatalistic psychology together 
with the force of feudalism were two powerful elements that made them 
a defeated race and accepted the manipulation of the colonial ruler and 
its accomplices as a matter of course. Few therefore, could deny that 
to some extent it was the Japanese who stirred them into the realization 
that they were masters of their own destiny and their 'protectors' were 
unreliable in times of crisis. 
Until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Chinese were still 
regarded as transient by the colonial administration. The fluctuating 
nature of their migratory patterns made it quite difficult to ascertain 
their future attitudes and commitment towards the country. It was in 
this respect that the vocal and financial support given by the local 
Chinese towards the revolution of 1911 was tolerated by the government. 
The confrontation only started in the 1920's when the Chinese school 
teachers who had strong Kuomintang background "introduced anti-western 
propaganda into their schools" (Gullick, 1964: 74). Sir Cecil Clementi 
who became the Governor of the Federated Malay States in 1929 even went 
to the extent of ordering the removal of text-books that were considered 
to be subversive in their content and placed these schools under stricter 
government supervision (Loh, op. cit.: 97). This unprecedented measure 
taken by the colonial authority created considerable disquiet among the 
Chinese community at large (Loh, ibid.: 95). However, things began to 
change in 1937 when the Japanese occupied Manchuria. This development 
increased the prevalent nationalistic feelings among the local Chinese, 
and when the Japanese invaded Malaya in 1941 they were in Alliance with 
the British in facing their common enemy (Gullick, op. cit.: 77). To 
most of them the war was a "continuation of China's war" with Japan 
(The Economist, January 8,1949: 46) and being Chinese nationals they felt 
obliged to fight the Japanese. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable 
that feelings of resentment should develop among the Malays towards them. 
They were unhappy and suspicious about the fact that ancestral emnity 
became a major determinant when responding towards foreign domination. 
The Economist (ibid.: 46) made an appropriate observation when it noted 
that: 
"The Malays unable to understand the rights and 
wrongs of the war between China and Japan, merely 
resented the Chinese action and this resentment 
tended to align their sympathies with Japan rather 
than with China". 
Indian nationalism in Malaya was similar to that taken by their 
Chinese counterparts. Essentially, it followed the political patterns 
that developed in the Indian sub-continent. During the war, the 
Japanese capitalised "on the appeal of nationalism" of the Indians by 
helping them to set up the Indian Independence League and the Indian 
National Army to fight the British. Although these attempts by the 
Japanese proved futile, the impact of this development was far reaching. 
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Even after the war, the loyalty of the Indians remained towards India 
rather than to their new found home. As Simandjuntak (1969: 14) observed: 
".. e the emotional and political interests of the Indian 
community had not yet been transplanted to Malaya, in 
spite of the three and a half years' disruption of 
normal communication with India and the stabilization 
of the Indian population in Malaya. " 
It could thus be concluded that ethnicity and ethnic nationalism in 
pre-war Malaya was a de facto asset that could be advantageously utilised. 
The colonial policy of "divide and rule" which took subtler forms was 
overtly practised by the Japanese administration. Malay nationalism 
which was previously dormant and subdued was nurtured during the period 
of occupation and this in turn rekindled into a fully-fledged national- 
istic movement which was anti-colonial in character. For instance, 
Kesatuan Melayu Muda (Malay Youth Association) was one of these movements 
that had widespread followings and openly collaborated with the Japanese 
administration (Silcock and Aziz, 1967: 154). Personalities like Ishak 
Haji Mohammed, Ibrahim Yaakub and Ahmad Boestamam who were imprisoned for 
their anti-British activities were released by the Japanese and were 
given important appointments in the Japanese administration (Means, 
op. cit.: 23). 
The Second World War was the first ever crisis confronted by the 
colonial government in Malaya. It was therefore unprepared either to 
protect the colony or to mobilize the population in its defence 
(Amin and Caldwell, op. cit.: 85). The immediate effect on the population 
was one of confusion. In the absence of any acceptable common ideology 
among the divided population, it was inevitable that they should revert 
to their respective primordial loyalties and needs. Part of the blame 
could also be apportioned to the colonial policy itself. Since its 
full intervention into the country which began in 1874, the preoccup- 
ation of the colonial government had been one of economic exploitation 
and the future welfare of the state seemed to be only a token item on 
its agenda. Its social concern was the preservation of the ethnic 
status-quo either based on their geographical locations, economic 
activities or class structure. The failure to develop any common 
institution that could bridge these ethnic polyglots into one common 
bond further exacerbated the problems of ethnic separation. As a 
policy, it was excellently executed and was able to neutralise any form 
of ethnic conflict during the pre-war period. In this respect, the 
colonial policy of "divide and rule" was par excellence and the country's 
failure to respond collectively towards the Japanese occupation, to 
mention the least, was the outcome of this conscious effort. 
The Malayan Union 
Following the capitulation of the Japanese, the British returned 
to resume their old position and the country was immediately placed 
under a Military Administration. Together with their arrival, they also 
brought along a post-war political package in the form of the "Malayan 
Union". Essentially, the Malayan Union Plan proposed a centralised 
administrative structure and a common citizenship to all who professed 
loyalty to the country. The Plan attempted to place the various 
separate political entities which existed in the form of the Federated 
Malay States, Unfederated Malay States and the Straits Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca, with the exclusion of Singapore, under a centralised 
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administrative structure. Since the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 
1895, Malaya had eleven separate political units, each having its own 
system of bureaucratic framework. Administratively, this was too 
cumbersome for the colonial government and it was the objective of the 
proposed Union to streamline the bureaucracy. At the same time, the 
Malayan Union Plan also attempted to settle the intricate problems of 
citizenship. The Flan thus proposed the abolition of priveleges 
accorded to any ethnic group. Anyone born in the Malayan Union would 
be treated equally and be eligible for citizenship (Ryan, op. cit.: 
212-213)o 
Opposition to the scheme was strong and spontaneous. When the 
idea first appeared as an article in The Times (June 25,1945), the 
immediate reaction was disagreement. One such response, from Ismail 
bin Md Ali (The Times, July 5,1945) who, writing in a lengthy article 
which in general reflected the concern of the Malays over the proposed 
scheme, wrote: 
"It is only right to state, as a preliminary discussion 
on the future of Malaya that legally and morally Great 
Britain as a defaulter in her treaties with the Malay 
states, is hardly in a position to forego those treaties 
without the free will and the consent of the Malay rulers. 
Personally I doubt whether our Sultans would be willing 
to replace those previous engagements by one all 
embracing treaty which would convert the Malay people 
into British subjects. There is much that is sound in 
the fundamental principle of protection underlying the 
treaties between each of the Malay Sultans and Great 
Britain. The latter unquestionably acknowledged the 
sovereignty of the rulers, who unconditionally surrendered 
into British hands the economic and political management 
of the lands in return for British protection, which means 
not only that Great Britain undertook the defence of the 
Malay states from foreign aggression, but also she was 
legally and morally bound to preserve the existence of the 
Malay states and to maintain the identity of the Malay 
population. " 
In the same tone, Sir Richard Winstedt, a retired Malayan Civil 
Servant wrote that, "to abrogate the existing treaties with Malay rulers, 
unless they desire, would clearly be a breach of faith and seriously 
damage our prestige" (The Times, July 7,1945). Again, on October 2,1945 
he wrote in The Times that, "if now the alien Asiatic is to have a 
prepondrant voice in government as well as commerce, the Malay race is 
doomed to be a race of 'hammers of wood and drawers of water'. " 
Details of the Malayan Union scheme were published in a White Paper 
in London on January 22,1946 (The Times, January 23,1946). In Malaya 
a Pan Malayan Congress was held in Kuala Lumpur on March 3,1946 to 
discuss the Malayan Union proposal. The Congress which attracted about 
two hundred delegates from all over the country, was presided over by 
Dato' Onn bin Jaafar. In his speech he emphasised that the "Malays must 
play their part while the time yet remains in warding off the devastating 
and ignominy of race extinction" (The Times, March 4,1946). 
Despite the fact that the scheme was unpopular and aroused strong 
opposition from the Malay community, the colonial Government was not 
prepared to reverse the decision. This prompted The Times (March 2,1946) 
to mrnrnent that : 
"... official announcements gave the impression that the 
peoples and problems of Malaya were regarded as so much 
raw material for official re-arrangement. " 
Thus, the Malay's opposition to the Union scheme increased in 
intensity when the Colonial Government failed to rescind the plan. On 
April 1,1946, a few hours after it was inaugurated, a big demonstration 
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was organised by the Pan-Malayan Congress to show their disapproval of 
the whole scheme. The Sultans, aware of this mass feeling, boycotted 
the event after being warned by the Congress "not to attend the ceremony 
otherwise they would be disowned by the people" (The Times, April 3,1946). 
In response to this political development, a two-man parliamentary 
mission was appointed by the Colonial Government to visit Malaya and 
study the constitutional crisis that arose. The mission was sympathetic 
to the plight of the Malays and following the visit, discussions were held 
between the representatives of the Colonial Government, the Sultans and 
the leaders of the Pan-Malayan Congress. A Working Committee was formed 
to work out the details of the new constitution. The result materialised 
into the "Federation of Malaya Agreement" which officially replaced the 
Malayan Union on February 1,191+8. 
The new constitution was not without opposition. The non-Malays 
claimed that they had been ignored in the constitutional making process. 
Their anger was to some extent justified but by then the political mood 
of the Government had changed. By reverting to its pre-war policy of 
favouring the Malays, it also implied that the Colonial Government was in 
no position to accommodate fully the demands of the immigrant communities. 
At this point, some pertinent issues could be raised when analysing 
the spontaneous reaction of the Malays against the Union scheme. Of 
importance was the issue connected with the "legal annexation of the 
Malay states" (Mohammed Noordin Sopiee, 1974: 16). The scheme was inter- 
preted as a ploy to change the legal status of the colonial authority 
and thus placed the country under British dominion. Secondly, it was 
related to the position of the Malays in relation to other communities. 
By providing a common form of citizenship for all, the scheme abrogated 
all the previous practices of preferential treatment accorded to them. 
Allen (1967: 1) for example, correctly described the plan as breaking 
from the prinicple that "Malaya was primarily the land of the Malays". 
The political volte-face of the Colonial Government over a major 
post-war policy could be analysed by understanding the nature of develop- 
ments that took place in Malaya during and immediately after the war. 
It began when the British were defeated and the Japanese assumed the role 
of administrator which had been left vacant. In the absence of the 
"protectors" either in the image of the British or the feudal rulers, 
ethnic rivalries began and each claimed legitimacy over the political 
vacuum that had been created. This had a lasting effect for, following 
the Japanese capitulation, Malaya witnessed for the first time in its 
history, a serious ethnic conflict between the Malays and the Chinese 
which was only contained with the timely arrival of the British forces. 
The impact of these events was tremendous for after the war, ethnic 
relations in Malaya were never the same again. But, paradoxically, the 
Colonial Government had failed to perceive this development, especially 
within the Malay community who began to feel threatened by the presence 
of the immigrant communities. 
The Malayan Union Plan, in essence, was a political miscalculation. 
Planned during the war years, it lacked the knowledge and insight of the 
developments in the colonial territory. Malay nationalism and the 
anti-colonial sentiments which germinated during the period, blossomed 
into a force when the scheme was proclaimed. The Malays, being the 
natives, fully realised the implications of the scheme upon their status 
and hence reacted vehemently against it. Secondly, the tide of natio- 
nalism was sweeping the region and it was quite impossible to stop the 
momentum of the mass movement that developed without resorting to the 
use of force. Lastly, and of significance, was the fact that colonialism 
itself was at its weakest during this period of history. The success of 
the Malays in aborting the Malayan Union was also important in under- 
standing the subsequent political development of the country. It was 
a political land-mark for them who henceforth dominated the Malayan 
political scene. 
It could therefore be observed that by the end of the Second 
World War, ethnicity and its related problems began to be felt in 
Malaya. The most pertinent was the claim of legitimacy by the various 
ethnic groups over their cultural, political and linguistic status in 
the country. It was in this relation that the knowledge of ethnic 
nationalism and the ethnic rivalries that accrued with it are important 
in understanding the Government's failure to formulate any effective 
educational policy during the colonial period and the subsequent educa- 
tional problems that arose during the first decade of the country's 
independence. 
Post-War Educational Development 
The post-war educational policy for Malaya was in line with the 
Malayan Union Plan of bureaucratic centralization. Accordingly, its 
long-term objective was "to reconstruct the educational system so as 
to ensure the fullest educational development for every section of 
the community" (Council Paper No. 53,1946: 29). The policy was to 
strengthen the existing structure of the separate school systems by 
extending them up to post-primary level with the Government taking res- 
ponsibility for their development. The Plan also called for the re- 
organization of the syllabus and curriculum "in the light of modern 
educational practice and research" (Council Paper, ibid: 29-30). 
Following the withdrawal of the Malayan Union Scheme, the educational 
policy that was formulated to fit into the new administrative pattern was 
made inappropriate and irrelevant. To accommodate the new political 
developments, a new group, the Central Advisory Committee on Education 
was appointed in 1949 and its first report appeared in May 1950. The 
Report was significant for it was the first time that a statement of 
policy acknowledged that education should play a part in "nullifying of 
communal divisions and the integration of all into one Malayan entity" 
(Central Advisory Committee, May 1950: para 1). The Committee (ibid.: para1 
felt that English schools could meet this objective for in "Each class 
is a miniature Malaya, racial or religious difficulties seldom appearing". 
It was also "convinced that the ultimate desirable objective should be 
free(and finally compulsory) primary education in the medium of English" 
(ibid.: para 5). 
To some extent, the bias towards English as proposed by the Central 
Advisory Committee (ibid. ) was an indication that the colonial authority 
attempted to neutralise the educational controversies that had already 
emerged. The choice of English as the medium of instruction in schools 
could thus appease a section of the Malayan community who outrightly 
rejected the adoption of Malay language into the proposed educational 
system. At the same time, being a colonial language English was thought 
of as an instrument that could serve as a bond among the diverse pop- 
ulation of the country. As Tan Cheng Lock (1947: 97), a respectable 
Chinese leader, pointed out: 
"Speaking as a British subject and a citizen of the 
British colony, I think English should be the best 
common basic language to serve as a bond between 
the different sections of our permanent population 
because Malay, the language of the people of this 
country, is totally inadequate and unsuitable for 
the purpose especially in so far as the locally 
born non-Malays are concerned, and locally born 
non-Malays slightly outnumber the Malays in the 
colony. ' 
In a similar tone, Prof. Silcock (1949: 464) wrote that, "as things 
are a Malay language could not per se unify the people; English education 
is the only instrument that could". 
However, the recommendations of the Central Advisory Committee were 
rejected by the Federal Legislative Council and alternatively, the 
Government appointed another committee to look specifically into the 
education of the Malays (Annual Report on Education, 1955: 21). The 
appointment of this committee to look into the problem of Malay education 
rather than Malayan education as a whole left a big question mark over the 
whole issue. Nonetheless, the reason for this act could be attributed 
to the following justifications on the part of the Government. Firstly, 
the tide of Malay nationalism was at its height following their success 
in aborting the Malayan Union scheme. Their political exertion was thus 
felt when the Federal Legislative Council had to shelve the recommed- 
ations of the Central Advisory Committee on Education after a heated 
debate which took place in July 1950 (Annual Report on Education, 
ibid.: 21). Secondly, there was a considerable increase in the enrollment 
into Malay vernacular education. For instance, in 1950 there were 
276,000 pupils enrolled compared with 122,000 in 1941 (Central Advisory 
Committee, op. cit.: para. 3b). Thirdly, conditions in the Malay vernacular 
schools were in a pathetic state; without proper furniture, shortage of 
textbooks and general reading materials and, most important, Malay parents 
began to lose hope in Malay schools (Barnes report, 1951: 12-13). 
The Committee on Malay Education that was proposed was chaired by 
Mr. L. J. Barnes, Director of Social Training, University of Oxford. The 
"Barnes Report" as it came to be known, did not discuss the problems of 
Malay education in isolation but rather took the whole issue as a basis 
for a national framework for education. It was a radical proposition 
which suggested "a single-type primary school open to pupils of all races 
and staffed by teachers of any race, provided only that those teachers 
possess the proper qualifications and are federal citizens" (Barnes 
Report, 1951: ch. IV, para. 3). The Report (ibid. ) further stressed the 
importance of the primary school "as an instrument for building up a 
common Malayan nationality on the basis of those elements in the popul- 
ation who regard Malaya as their permanent home and as the object of 
their loyalty". 
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Further than that, the Report proposed that the new school should 
provide six years of free primary education in the medium of English or 
Malay. For the post-primary school, the medium of instruction would 
only be English. Provisions for the learning of vernacular languages 
were also given in each of these schools. The ultimate philosophy of the 
Report was to produce pupils with "effective bi-lingualism by the age of 
twelve plus" (Barnes Report, ibid.: ch. IV, para. 12). 
Generally, the Barnes Report was sympathetic to the Malays and 
fully understood the dilemma facing them. In describing the position of 
the Malays, the Report poignantly expressed its concern over their future. 
It noted that: 
"... the immigrant races, taking full advantage of the 
improvidence of the simple Malay, tempted him with a 
system of forward selling crop and catch for ready 
cash. Thus began the economic slavery of the Malay 
in full view of the protecting power" 
(Barnes Report, ibid.: ch. 2, para. 4). 
With this understanding, the Report strongly felt that "education 
appears as a last chance" for them (Barnes Report, ibid.: ch. 2, para. l4). 
It was therefore with this philosophical belief that the Report gave 
recognition to the status of the Malay language by placing it in order of 
importance on a par with English, at least for the first six years of 
schooling. To stress this vital issue, it clearly emphasised that "at 
all times it will be a main function of every school to safeguard the 
position and the status of the Malay language" (Barnes Report, ibid: 
ch. IV, para. 9). 
However, H. R. Cheeseman, the former Director of Education had 
certain reservations with regard to the Report. When it was first 
published he commented as such: 
"Again and again the most promising Malay boys have 
not been able to go on to English school because 
their parents have been unable to keep them. Again 
and again the most promising Malays in the English 
schools have had to leave before completing the 
secondary school course because of the compelling 
requirements of the family exchequers, because of 
the overwhelming necessity to earn money. It is 
sad that the Barnes Committee has failed to 
discover or at least to state that the chief problem 
to face is economic and not educational. There is 
only one way to deal with it. Until education 
has given the Malays their weapons for fighting their 
economic difficulties, then they must be helped" 
(The Straits Times, Sept. 5,1951). 
Cheeseman's comment was appropriate for it touched on the basic 
problem of the Malays themselves. As to this the Barnes Report had 
failed to suggest any solution. It did not even propose how the new 
system could help the Malays in their future educational endeavour. 
A positive aspect of the Report was its attempt to narrow down the 
existing educational pluralism which had been the feature of the existing 
school system. As the Report (ibid.: ch. IV, para. 17) noted: 
"the fact remain s that Chinese and Indians are 
being asked to give up gradually their own 
vernacular schools, and to send their children, 
not indeed to Malay schools in the present 
meaning of that term but to schools where Malay 
is the only oriental language taught". 
The Barnes Report therefore did not accord any status to the vernac- 
ular schools or languages other than Malay. The national school system 
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that it proposed in fact relegated the position of these languages to 
foreign status which would only be taught as a separate subject. This 
invoked unfavourable responses especially from the Chinese who viewed the 
Report as a conscious attempt to destroy their culture. The Straits 
Times (July 11,1951) in its editorial described the Report as 
"prostitution of education to politics". At the same time, strong 
opposition also came from the Indian community. In Kuala Lumpur, for 
instance, thirty-five Indian educators met "under the auspices of the 
Malayan Indian Congress to condemn the Report and request delay in its 
execution" (Finkelstein, 1952: 15). 
As a compromising measure, the Government appointed a Committee in 
January 1951 which was headed by Dr. William P. Fenn, a Chinese educator 
and Dr. Wu Teh-Yao, an official of the United Nations. The terms of 
reference given to this mission were to make a "preliminary survey of 
the whole field of Chinese education ... with particular reference to 
(1) bridging the gap between the present communal system of school and 
the time when education will be on a non-communal basis with English or 
Malay as the medium of instruction and other languages as an optional subject, 
and advising on (71) preparation of text books for present use with a 
Malayan as distinct from a Chinese background and content" (Fenn-Wu 
Report, 1951: ch. l, para. 6). 
However, after their meetings with Chinese leaders and teachers, the 
mission outlined its statement of purpose as: 
"to survey sympathetically but objectively the entire field 
of the education of Chinese in Malaya and to recommend such 
constructive changes and improvements as would lead to the 
Chinese schools making the greatest contribution to the welfare 
and happiness of the people of Malaya and in particular of the 
Chinese who have chosen that prosperous land as their home" 
(Fenn-Wu Report, ibid.: ch. 1, para. 11). 
There were several philosophical differences that existed between 
the Barnes and the Fenn-Wu Reports. Of significance was the means rather 
than the goal of achieving the "ultimate Malayan nation". The Fenn-Wu 
Report for instance, made an observation that, "if a Malayan nation is 
the political goal of all peoples in Malaya, it appears logical that all 
schools should evaluate critically their contributions to that goal" 
(Fenn-Wu Report, ibid.: ch. 3, para. 4). But contrary to the Barnes 
Report (op. cit.: 20) which called for the establishment of a national 
school of "inter-racial character", the Fenn-Wu Report, besides advocating 
the retention of the existing pluralism in the school system, also 
emphasized the need to given due recognition to the importance of the 
Chinese language other than Malay or English. 
l 
As to this effect, the 
Fenn-Wu Report (op. cit.: ch. 2, para. 15) suggested as such: 
"We would reiterate our belief in the importance of a 
broad view. Such a view demands mutual respect for 
each other's cultures. It also demands recognition 
of the fact that any restrictive imposition of one 
language or two languages upon the peoples of Malaya 
will not provide a healthful atmosphere for community 
understanding and national unity. The unity of a 
nation depends not upon the singleness of tongue or 
simplicity of culture; it lies in the hearts of its 
citizens". 
The Fenn-Wu Report represented the mass opinion of the Chinese and 
their concept of education in relation to the general development of 
Chinese culture. Thus it was strongly felt that any attempt to relegate 
the status of the Chinese language was also to mean that it would finally 
lead to the extinction of their culture. The Fenn-Wu Report (ibid.: ch. 2, 
para. 6) in its defence of the Chinese language and culture, 
1. Paradoxically, no committee was formed to look into the problems 
of the Indian schools. This could be attributed to the assumption 
that the demands of the Chinese community would also be of relevance 
to the Indian community in general. 
stressed that: 
"a new culture can come only from the natural mingling of 
diverse cultural elements for generations. In this 
process, elements which do not command appreciation 
disappear, while those which do, need no political or 
external support". 
The Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports provided the first open debate over 
the nature of education that would be suitable for Malaya. Central to the 
issues were the nature of school that was to be established and the 
language of instruction that was to be adopted. Disagreements over these 
were hard to resolve and henceforth continued to remain as a source of 
ethnic contradiction and conflict. 
The period following the Barnes and the Fenn-Wu Reports, saw two 
more committees being formed. The first was another Central Advisory 
Committee whose function was to study the recommendations as outlined in 
the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports. The Report of this Committee was again 
referred to a Special Committee for its consideration and to "make 
recommendations to the Government for suitable legislation" (Special 
Committee, 1951; para. 1). Both the Committees strongly endorsed most 
of the recommendations as outlined in the Barnes Report, and of particular 
importance was the support they gave for the establishment of a national 
school over the existing separate school system (Special Committee, ibid.: 
para. 15). Explicit in the Report (para. 7) was its commitment to the 
development of Malay education as initially expressed in the forwards to 
the Barnes Report (ibid.: para. 2). This paragraph stated that Malay 
education ought: 
(a) "to foster the growth of individuals towards the best in 
knowledge, skill and character which they have in them 
to attain; 
(b) to encourage and enable the Malay community to 
occupy its rightful place in relation to other 
communal groups in the mixed society of Malaya; 
(c) to assist the formation of a unified citizen 
body or nation, composed of all such groups". 
The Special Committee (ibid. ) except for a few minor alterations, 
reinforced the above objectives. Presumably to attract wider public 
appeal, modifications were made to the word "Malay" to change it to 
"each" as in (b) and to put "that is a Malayan nation" instead of the 
word "nation" as in (c). These changes were understandable for the word 
"Malay" would sound biased towards one ethnic community whereas referring 
to the Malayan population in general would not. 
The final product of all these reports was the Education Ordinance 
1952, which was the first and only attempt by the Colonial Government to 
legislate an educational policy that was national in scope and character. 
Undoubtedly, the Barnes Report had a strong influence on the final 
form of the 1952 Ordinance, especially over matters relating to the lang- 
uage policy in schools. This naturally invoked vicious opposition from 
the Chinese community who saw that nothing was mentioned about accommodating 
their language in the proposed educational system. For example, paragraph 
9 of the 1952 Ordinance stated that: 
"... the aim and purpose of the national educational 
policy of the Federation is to achieve a sound education 
of all children in the Federation using in the main, for 
this purpose, the official languages of the Federation 
and bringing together pupils of all races in a national 
type school with a Malayan orientation". 
Although the policy provided "reasonable facilities" for the 
learning of Chinese and Tamil languages if the parents of the pupils so 
wished (Ed. Ord. 1952; para. 9), the implication of the Ordinance if it 
was to be implemented was far reaching. For certain, it would end the 
long period of educational autonomy which the Chinese enjoyed and even 
jealously guarded ever since they first set up schools in Malaya. 
Essentially, the Education Ordinance, 1952 called for the establish- 
ment of two types of national schools which were defined as: 
"any school providing for children of all races a six-year 
course of free primary education with a Malayan orientation 
and appropriate for children between the ages of six and 
twelve and using in the main for this purpose the official 
language of the Federation" (ibid.: para. 21). 
Under this arrangement, English would be taught in the Malay medium 
schools to all children from the beginning of the first year while in the 
English schools, Malay would be taught from the beginning of the third 
year. In addition, facilities would also be made available for the 
learning of the Chinese and Tamil languages, "for those pupils whose 
parents or guardians request instruction in such languages" (ibid.: para. 21). 
The Education Ordinance, 1952, was a piece of legislation attempted 
by the Government after years of painstaking elaboration and conciliation 
among the various ethnic groups of the country. However, it was viewed 
as ambitious, especially in terms of the financial implications that 
it might incur. As the Report of the Mission from International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1955: 441) noted: 
"the technical difficulties in implementing the Ordinance 
became increasingly clear within a year. Enacted at a 
time of national prosperity, the cost implications had 
been considered only in vague and general terms though 
it was plainly evident that the program carried a potential financial commitment several times as large as their current 
education costs". 
The Mission (ibid. ) explained that following the outbreak of the 
Korean War in the middle of 1950, there had been an increase in demand for 
raw materials, especially rubber and tin. This economic growth boosted 
Malaya' s gross national product from ,$'3,550 million in 1949 to 
$1 7,520 
million in 1951. This is a remarkable increase of about 112%. But by 
1953 there was a marked decline in the export of these commodities (see 
Table 2) compared with the 1951 figures; the decline came to about 
01 1,740 million or 23%. Correspondingly, in 1949 Malaya's trade balance 
was in deficit by about W129 million, but this changed in 1950,1951 and 
Table 2 
Gross National Product by Origin (in millions) 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 
Rubber 420 1,400 2,025 1,080 715 
Mining 250 295 480 440 325 
Other agriculture & forestry 840 1,030 1,380 1,355 1,430 
All other activities i, '825 2,355 3,260 3,100 2,925 
Gross national income 3,335 5,080 7,145 5,975 5,395 
Indirect taxes 215 265 375 375 385 
Gross national product 
(at market prices) 3,550 5,345 7,520 6,350 5,780 
Source: The Economic Development of Malaya, The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, 1955: 22 
1952 when the surplus was ' 1,101, ,f1,321 and W 46 million respectively 
in Malaya's favour. The pattern again changed in 1953 when the country 
faced a deficit of about 1 218 million (The Mission, op. cit.: 23). 
In the Federal Legislative Council, a Member for Education explained 
that when the report on education was discussed in 1951 the "finances 
of this country were healthy and hopeful and there was a reasonable chance 
of implementing the several provisions of the Education Ordinance" 
(Legislative Council Debate, Oct. 6,1954). He attributed the cause of 
the financial constraints as resulting from the depreciating value of 
Malaya's three main export commodities. For example, between 1951 and 
1954 there was a drop of 57% in the price of rubber, 15% in the price of 
tin and 16% in the price of copra (see Table 3). All of these economic 
reasons were cited as a major obstacle towards implementing the 1952 
Education Ordinance. 
Table 3 
Decline in the Price of Commodities 
Commodities Price in 1951 Price in 1954 Percentage 
per picul per picul drop 
Rubber 156.50 67.00 57.2 
Tin 424.871 363.17 14.5 
Copra 34.50 29.00 15.9 
Source: Federal Legislative Council Debate, Oct. 1954 
* (the figures on percentage drop are self-derived) 
In the light of these financial developments, the High Commissioner 
in Council appointed a Committee in November, 1953 "to examine the method 
of implementation of the policy outlined in the Education Ordinance, 
1952, in the context of the diminishing financial resources of the 
Federation", to recommend the priorities for the implementation and 
"to explore additional sources of money for the maintenance and develop- 
ment of education" (Special Committee, 1954: para. 1). 
Since the terms of reference were mainly on the financial aspects 
of implementing the 1952 Ordinance, it proposed to the Government a 
"waste not, want not" policy (Special Committee, 1954: para. l2). Among 
the proposals recommended were "the reduction in the length of the primary 
course for intelligent children, central control over post-school certif- 
icate classes by combining small classes into one or not to allow small 
classes to exist, raising the fees for all evening classes other than 
elementary English and Malay and a more strict control over the grant-in- 
aid system" (Special Committee, 1954: para. 12). 
The Special Committee (ibid.: para. 13) also felt that "a more 
realistic share of the present huge cost of education" should be borne 
by those who could afford to pay. It therefore proposed an increase in 
fees for both the primary and secondary English schools, an increase in 
the educational rates, by imposing taxes in the rural areas for the benefit 
of the rural vernacular sct_ools and the introduction of a scheme where 
teacher trainees were required to repay the government a portion of the 
money spent on training them (Special Committee, 1954: para. 14-41). In 
terms of priorities, the Committee (ibid.: para. 12) considered "the 
introduction of National School features into vernacular schools and 
the extension of training facilities for teachers" as the most important 
aspect of the Ordinance if it was to be implemented. 
Education Ordinance 1952, and Public Reaction 
The 1952 Education Ordinance was not unanimous in its acceptance. 
Central to the disagreement was the issues related to the re-organ- 
ization of the school system and the implication it had towards the 
development of vernacular schools and their corresponding languages. By 
not considering their schools as "national" the Chinese obviously viewed 
the Ordinance as a mechanism of relegating their language and schools to 
a position that would lead to extinction. The United Chinese School 
Teachers Association, for example, demanded that "immediate steps be 
taken by the Federation Government to revoke the Education Ordinance of 
1952 and to reject the White Paper on Educational policy" (The Straits 
Echo, August 23,1955). The Association pointed out that it would not 
accept it as a condition to give up the mother tongue and thus help 
destroy its own culture (ibid. ). It thus condemned the Ordinance as a 
"scheme designed to eliminate all Chinese education in the country" 
(ibid. ). The Association even went to the extent of presenting a seven 
page memorandum to Miss Vijayalakshmi Pandit, President of the United 
Nations General Assembly when she visited the country in August 1954. 
The memorandum, among other things, demanded that the Federal Government 
take immediate steps to revoke the 1952 Ordinance which it claimed was 
aimed at the total elimination of Chinese schools in the country. It 
recommended the retention of the plural nature of the educational system 
with English, Tamil, Chinese and Malay being retained as the medium of 
instruction. Finally, the memorandum warned that if the "problem is 
not logically and justifiably solved, one cannot be enthusiastic about 
the future of Malaya' (The Straits Times, August 16,1954). 
The Malay's opposition towards the Ordinance was spearheaded by the 
Federation of Malaya Malay Teachers Union. Basically, the demands of the 
Union were for the upgrading of the standard of Malay schools, to make 
Malay language the official language of the country so that it would be 
on a par with English, and to raise the standard of Malay school teachers 
(Majallah Guru, August 1954: 426). Fennel (1968: 383) observed that the 
Malay school teachers were strongly against the Ordinance for it relegated 
the Malay language "to a position of a language fit only for the bazaar". 
The Malay school teachers in Kuala Lumpur were even convinced that the 
"plan to set up national-type classes would mean the gradual destruction 
of the Malay language" (Fennel, ibid.: 385). Warta Negara (May 4,1955) 
commented that "it is strange that there are people who are so forgetful 
of the fact that the Malay race does not only comprise of two million 
people in Malaya and however much we agree that English is the superior 
language, we should not try to overlook the fact that there are 70 million 
people in our neighbourhood who use the Malay language". 
However, the leaders of the Alliance Party which constituted the 
United Malay National Organisation (U. M. N. O. ) and the Malayan Chinese 
Association (M. C. A. ) 
1 
were neither unanimous nor consonant in their views 
towards the Ordinance. But somehow the issues remained subdued within 
the party. This was mainly because the Federal election was approaching 
and the Alliance, knowing the divisive nature of the matter, turned it 
1. The Malayan Indian Congress (M. I. C. ) only joined the Alliance on the 
eve of the 1955 election. 
into a low key political issue for fear that it might create discord 
among its component partners. Secondly, the 1955 election was an experi- 
ment in political co-operation among the various communal groups and the 
Alliance Party had the responsibility to prove that consociational pol- 
itics was possible and viable in a plural society. Thirdly, it was felt 
that issues that were related to ethnicity would be dealt with once 
the country achieved its independence. Under these circumstances, 
"Merdeka" (freedom) became the main theme of the 1955 election and the 
Alliance election manifesto shelved the whole issue of education, 
language and citizenship (Carnell, 1955: 327-8). 
In the final analysis, it should be noted that after years of 
labour, the Education Ordinance, 1952 failed to get off the ground. 
Various reasons were cited for not implementing it and the most important 
was the financial burden the Colonial Government had to bear if full 
implementation was to be carried out (Ed. Policy, Statement of the Federal 
Government: 1954). Nonetheless, one significant fact remained over the 
whole issue. Education which was meant to be a vital tool towards the 
development of a Malayan nation became instead a focal point of national 
discord. Thus, with all the political controversies that the educational 
issues generated and the financial problem as a raison d'etre, it was 
therefore with great political shrewdness that the whole matter of 
education was deferred by the Government until the people of Malaya 
themselves decided what would be best for them. 
The post-war period thus saw a remarkable development in Malayan 
education. From 1946-1952, various committees were formed, reports being 
published, statements of policies were issued by the Government, and 
finally, the 'nactment of the 1952 Education Ordinance. Despite the 
compromises that had been reached among the various ethnic groups over 
the future of Malayan education, it failed to get off the ground. Clearly 
at this juncture of Malayan history, educational issues had already 
become entwined with the dynamics of ethnicity and ethnic nationalism. 
Beginning of Consociational Politics 
In his directive to Sir Gerald Templer, the new High Commissioner 
for Malaya on February 2,1952, the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
stated that, 
"the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United 
Kingdom is that Malaya should in due course become a 
fully self-governing nation. To achieve a united 
Malayan nation there must be a common form of citizenship 
for all who regard the Federation or any part of it as 
their real home and the object of their loyalty". 
(The Times, February 8,1952) 
On October 12,1952, in his broadcast to Australia, Templer again 
reiterated the idea that "it was a declared aim of British Government to 
grant self-government status to Malaya" (The Times, October 13,1952). 
This became a reality when the Deputy High Commissioner announced in the 
Federal Legislative Council the appointment of a Select Committee to look 
into the question of Malaya having its first federal election (Legislative 
Council Proceedings, May 6 and 7; 1953)" 
Carnell (1954: 222) attributed this change of heart on the part of 
the Government as due to the marked decline in terrorist incidents and 
the development of political consciousness and understanding between the 
Malays and Chinese which resulted in the formation of the UMNO-MCA 
Alliance. Up to this point, Sino-Malay c oi-operation had been mostly 
isolated and only when it was felt necessary. Thus, the formation of 
the Alliance was a political watershed especially when taking into 
consideration that UMNO and MCA were two political parties of extreme 
dissimilarity from whichever perspectives they were viewed. The fact that 
both parties were willing to contest the election on a common platform 
was in itself an encouraging sign for the future development of the 
nation. Underlying this co-operation was the assumption that in a 
society where enthnicity could be identified by geographical location, 
voting patterns too would also follow similar lines of division. Follow- 
ing this principle, areas which had Chinese electoral majorities would 
be contested by the MCA candidates and UMNO would be contesting in areas 
which were mainly populated by Malays. This overt form of gerrymandering 
was first experimented in the state of Selangor to contest the first 
Kuala Lumpur municipal election held in February 1952. Its success in 
the election led to the development of siirilar arrangements throughout 
the country. 
Scepticism grew over this new political development especially in 
view of the differences that existed between the i1MN0 MCA partnership. 
The Times (January 17,1952) cynically observed that "it is doubtful if 
this partnership signifies the beginning of a working compromise between 
the two communities". At home, DNO-MCA co-operation was strongly accused 
by Party Negara as "nothing less than a betrayal of the Malay community" 
(Ratnam, op. cit.: 192). 
The success of the : 'alliance in the various municipal and town 
council elections prompted Tunku Abdul Rahman to fomalise its formation 
nationally. On September 14,1952, speaking at an UMNO General Assembly 
held in Butterworth, he said that "he would soon invite all political 
parties to a conference on ways and means of attaining I11alaya's 
independence" (The Times, Septmeber 15,1952). An agreement in principle 
was reached between UMNO and MCA on March 16,1953 over the election to 
the Federal Legislative Council. After the conference, the Tunku was quoted 
as saying "I feel that Chinesealay understanding is an essential pre- 
requisite for Malaya's independence" (The Times, March 17,1953)" 
Besides the basic differences that existed between IMNO and MCA, they 
were able to agree on the minimal consensus that at the moment, unity and 
independence were to be of supreme importance. It was upon these vital 
principles that the two political parties agreed "to defer a settlement 
of those basic disagreements on citizenship, education, language, 
immigration and economic matters which had been such obstacles to Malayan 
political advance from 1945 to 1952" (Carnell, 1955: 326). 
In a plural society like Malaya where deep primordial cleavages 
existed among the various ethnic groups, consociationalism seemed to be a 
viable option for it provided "a framework of shared interests within 
which groups will be willing to interrelate, compromise and accommodate 
one another" (Apter, 1977: 319). Presumably, this was what in Tunku's 
mind when on September 14,1952 he invited other political parties to 
discuss matters related to Malaya's future. Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, 
Commissioner-General in Southeast Asia, in a speech delivered at t'-ie 
Kuala Lumpur Press Club dinner on iv"ay 14,1952 entailed in essence the 
embodiment of consociationalism. Among the comments he made in his 
speech he mentioned that: 
"the only method by which Malay, Chinese, Indians and 
British could create a nation united by mutual regard 
and identical loyalty was by coming together to reduce 
their differences and expand their agreements" 
(The Times, May 15,1952). 
All these developments created an atmosphere that independence was 
imminent. Apparently, getting the cue from this new political atmosphere, 
political parties began to prepare plans and strategies in anticipation of 
an election. The UM411NO, for instnace, at its annual general assembly 
which was held in Malacca on April 6,1953, unanimously passed a resolution 
calling for the election to be held by 1954 (Carnell, 1954: 223). A few 
months later, on July 15,1953, a Federal Election Committee was estab- 
lished (Carnell, ibid.: 224) and after considering the various electoral 
alternatives that might suit the country (Tinker, 1956: 260-265), it was 
decided that the election would be held on July 27,1955" 
Within the Alliance, there was dissatisfaction over the allocation 
of seats. The MCA, for example, was given fifteen seats instead of twelve 
as initially allocated (Tinker, op. cit.: 267). This gesture on the part of 
UMNO's leadership in conceding fifteen seats to the MCA created a crisis 
in the party, and at one stage Tunku threatened to resign as leader if his 
proposal was not accepted ( The Eco., July 23,1955)" Significant to this 
development was Tunku's accommodative and compromising philosophy adopted 
towards the MCA and MIC despite the fact that Malays made up more than 
80% of the electorate (see Table 4) 
Table 4 
1 955 Election : communal breakdown of the electorate 
Communal group Voters Percentage 
Malays 1,078,000 84.2 
Chinese 143,000 11.2 
Indians 50,000 3.9 
Others 9,000 0.7 
TOTAL 1,280,000 100.0 
Source: Ratnam, Communalism and Political Process in Malaya, 
1965: 187. 
Typical of the principle of accommodative r,. olitics, the Alliance 
adopted an "ice-box policy's (Lijphart, 1966: 177) over the vexed issues 
of citizenship and education. Besides a call for the repeal of certain 
provisions of the emergency regulations and a call for an independent 
commission to study constitutional reform, the manifesto also pledged to 
safeguard the special position of the Malays, to uphold the rulers as 
constitutional heads of state, to make the Malay language the national 
language within ten years, ensuring other communities of their rights to 
preserve their education and culture (The Times, May 18,1955). 
The result of the election was important in many ways. Firstly, 
the Alliance won 51 of the 52 seats obtaining 79.6% of the votes 
(see Table 51 
The remaining seat was won by the PMIP's candidate in the Krian constit- 
uency. Secondly, the assumption that voting patterns would be along 
ethnic lines proved to be wrong. yll the MCA and IIIC candidates who 
contested under the Alliance ticket in areas which were predominantly 
Malay, won the election. Thirdly, The Times in its leading article 
(July 29,1955) commented that the Alliance victory was also a "vote for 
independence". There was little doubt about this last comment, for it 
was the "Merkeka" (freedom) platform that swept the Alliance to success 
and power. Fourthly, the Alliance initial experiment on consociational 
politics seemed to have succeeded and could be a viable alternative to 
a plural society. Lastly, the emergence of accommodative politics as seen 
in the formation of the Alliance is important in understanding the develop- 
ment of Malayan education, especially in relation to policy formulation and 
implementation. 
Table 5 
1955 Election: Party Performances 
Party No. of 
Candidates 
Seats 
Won 
Votes 
Polled 
Percentage of 
Total vote 
(spoilt votes 
excluded) 
Alliance 52 51 818 , 013 79.6 
Negara 30 - 78,909 7.6 
Pan-Malayan 
Islamic Party 11 1 40,667 3.9 
National Assoc. 
of Perak 9 - 20,996 2.0 
Perak Malay 
League 3 - 5,433 0.5 
Labour Party 4 - 4,786 0.4 
Perak Progressive 
Party 2 - 1,081 0.1 
Independents 18 31,642 3.0 
Source: Ratnam, op. cit.: 196 (table 10). 
Towards a New Educational Era 
With the Alliance massive electoral victory, an internal self- 
government was accorded to ý'Ialaya in February 1956. Under this arrange- 
ment, the new government was given the responsibility of ruling the 
country except on matters related to external defence and foreign affairs. 
However, this new political development did not neutralise the difficul- 
ties surrounding Malayan education. Rather, these issues became even 
more vociferously articulated than ever. While still at its infant 
stage the Alliance Government was caught in the cross-fire over a problem 
which it skillfully suppressed during the 1955 election. 
Sensing the mood was growing among the public, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
who was the Chief Minister, issued a statement that his government would 
re-examine the whole question of education in view of the criticisms 
levelled at existing policy (Malay Mail, August 11,1955). In his capacity 
as the new Minister of Education, Dato' Abdul Razak re-affirmed Tunku's 
statement on the need to review the provisions of the Education Ordinance 
1952 (Govt. Press Statement, August 18,1955, cited in Fennel, ibid.: 422). 
Although education per se was not the major issue in the ýýliiance 
camp during the 1955 election, it could not negate its growing importance 
either during or after the election period. For example, post-war Malaya 
saw a tremendous growth in school enrollments. By 1955 there were 
870,362 pupils enrolled in all types of school in the Federation (Annual 
Report on Education for 1955: 25) an increase of 9<k in one year (Annual 
Report on Education for 1954: 34). Thus, whoever ruled the country, it 
was inevitable that education would remain as a major issue not only in 
terms of its quantitative expansion but also in terms of political 
controversies that it was bound to generate. 
Parallel to this development was the potent question of national 
unity which had always been in the mind of the new government. The 
centrifugal forces were getting stronger and encompassing the whole 
arrays of disagreements that characterised any plural society. Within 
the Malay communities there was a task of harnessing loyalty towards the 
Malayan nation that would transcend the narrowness of each state's parochial- 
ism. To the immigrant communities who had been accorded citizenship 
status, there was also a problem of switching their allegiance to the 
newly found home. 
It was against this background that a sense of urgency emerged 
within the government. The general consensus was that if a new Malayan 
nation was to be inculcated, efforts towards this objective must be con- 
centrated among the younger generation of the population and invariably 
the onus was placed on schools. In September 1955, hardly two months 
after the election, a high-powered fifteen-member committee was appointed 
by the Government of the Federation of Malaya. The com-, nittee was chaired 
by Dato' Abdul Razak Bin Hussin who was also the Minister for Education 
and the terms of reference were: 
(a) "To examine the present Education policy of the Federation 
of Malaya and to recommend any alterations or adaptations 
that are necessary with a view to establishing a national 
system of education acceptable to the people of the 
Federation as a whole which will satisfy their needs and 
promote cultural, social, economic and political development 
as a nation, having regard to the intention to make Malay 
the national language of the country whilst preserving and 
sustaining the growth of the language and culture of other 
communities living in the country: 
(b) For this purpose to examine the Educational structure of the country including such provisions of the Education 
Ordinance, 1952, as may require alterations or adaptations 
and the measures for its implementation contained in 
Council Paper on educational policy No. 67 of 1954" (Report of the Education Committee, 1956). . 
The Report of this Committee, also popularly known as the Razak 
Report, was a watershed in the development of Malayan education. Contro- 
versial it may be, the fact remained that it was the first time that a 
major responsibility of charting the course of Malayan education was given 
to the people of Malaya themselves. Drawn from among the members of the 
Federal Legislative Council, the Committee included 9 Malays, 5 Chinese 
and an Indian. 
l In the main it was a committee bestowed with the 
responsibility of formulating a national system of education for the 
country that was in anticipation of "Merdeka". Secondly, its terms of 
reference were both accommodative to the principle of multi-culturalism 
as demanded by the immigrant communities and at the same time inflexible 
in its decision to elevate Malay as the national language of the country. 
Thirdly, by taking the Education Ordinance, 1952 as the basis for struc- 
tural changes that were to be adopted, the Committee was therefore in no 
position to produce changes that could be constured as revolutionary. 
And lastly, the Razak Report reflected the determination that schools 
should play the role of a broker among the younger generation for the 
purpose of national integration. 
However, the Razak Report did not end the controversial issues that 
surrounded Malayan education. Paradox as it might have been, the problems 
1. See Chapter 4 for details of the Committee members. 
were neither centred on the structural and curriculum changes that were 
to occur, but rather over the language of instruction that was to be 
adopted. The Annual Report on Education for 1955 (p. 21) did agree on 
the nature of the problem when it noted that "the greatest difficulty 
has been the conflicting claims of these different languages". The 
matter was not resolved even when the country was on the threshold of 
independence. The word "kerdeka" which was successful in developing a 
significant political consensus among the population did not however 
provide any form of catalyst towards national reconciliation especially 
when it touched upon the delicate issue of language and culture. 
Chapter Three 
Towards Nationhood 
M erdeka: a Challenge to the Nation 
By the end of the Second World War, the mosaic of ethnic diversities 
had already emerged in Malaya that fitted well into Furnivall's (op. cit: 
304-35) description of a plural society. This to some extent posed a 
problem for the Colonial Government in its attempt to decolonise the 
territory. For instance, The Times (April 20,1949) in its leading article 
commented that any constitutional progress in Malaya could only come by 
"healing communal jealousies and by reconciling the competing interest of 
Malayan peoples". But, the article failed to suggest any remedial 
solution to the problems. In fact, it reflected the country's state of 
political uncertainty. As Hawkins (1948.286-87) commented, 
"the situation in Malaya was never darker and the only 
faintly glimmering star of hope was the fundamental 
common sense and respect for realities that distinguish 
Malays and Chinese". 
As such, it was inevitable that the question of ethnic unity dominated the 
thoughts of the colonial administrators and local leaders alike. 
The reasons for this gloomy development could be attributed to the 
following factors. First, the diverse effect of the war upon the ethnic 
groups and the subsequent political development that ensued were serious 
enough to gain immediate attention from the interested parties. Second, 
the threat of communist insurgents imposed a pressing need for the pop- 
ulation to be united if the communists were to be defeated. 
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Although these problems were hard to resolve,. somehow they were 
reduced and contained. Two indicators point in this direction. The 
first was the willingness on the part of the Malay and Chinese leaders 
to forge a political alliance as seen in the 1952 Municipal election 
held in Kuala Lumpur and the Federal election of 1955" Secondly, and in 
corollary to the first, the Sino-Malay unity that had been forged caused 
a severe setback to the communist insurgents. These developments to 
some extent acted as a catalyst for the Colonial Government to speed up 
the process of decolonisation over the country. 
With the attainment of independence on August 31,1957, the need for 
unity became even greater if the country was to contain the forces of 
political instability and destruction. It was in the light of these 
circumstances that national unity became the prime concern of the newly 
elected Government of the Federation (L. C. D. July 10,1957: col, 2844). 
A significant fact about Malaya's path to independence was that it 
was achieved peacefully. This was in contrast to the revolutionary 
struggle the Indonesians had to encounter in their pursuit of independence 
(Woddis, 1967: 35-6). To have achieved independence through peaceful 
means was without doubt an achievement on the part of the leadership. 
Lives were spared and the unnecessary loss of blood was avoided. 
1 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that national independence also 
entails the mobilisation of the masses towards the realisation of a 
common national ideology. 
1. The fact that Malaya's independence was achieved "without any loss 
of blood" was often quoted by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the country's 
first premier. 
As Nkrumah (1970: 57) pointed out: 
"In societies where there are competing ideologies, it is 
still usual for one ideology to be dominant. This 
dominant ideology is that of the ruling group. Through 
the ideology is the key to the inward identity of its 
group, it is in intent solidarist. For an ideology does 
not seek merely to unite a section of the people, it 
seeks to unite the whole of the society in which it finds 
itself. In its effects, it certainly reaches the whole 
society, when it is dominant. Fo; besides seeking to 
establish common attitudes and purposes for society, the 
dominant ideology is that which in the light of circum- 
stances decides what form institutions shall take, and in 
what channels the common effort is to be directed". 
In a Malayan plural society such form of mass mobilisation was 
needed for the initial basis of nationhood so as to generate a sense of 
common experience for its diverse population. But this form of develop- 
ment was absent and it seems that the population in general tended to 
take it as a form of "givenness" rather than prizing it as a hard won 
commodity. Nonetheless, the serene road that led the country to indepen- 
dence was upset by the problems that lay ahead. These were the problems 
of nationhood and among the most pertinent were the processes related to 
nation-building and decolonisation. 
The Problem of Nationhood 
Hoseliz (1965: 556) describes nation-building, 
"as a process which requires above all the formation of 
a national elite with power over all parts of the country; 
the development of a uniform national ideology which is 
shared in its essentials by all persons inhabiting a 
national territory; and the evolution of political pro- 
cedures adequate for successful interaction with other 
nations in the world". 
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Paramount to this is the development of a national identity which Verba 
(1965 529) defines as "the belief of individuals and the extent to which 
they consider themselves members of their state". In short, it is when 
"one searches for it, that nations need it, that people fear the loss of 
it" (Verba, ibid: 529). It is thus a complex process and in a plural 
society the problems are multifarious. 
To achieve such a coherent objective is, although difficult, not 
impossible. In a plural society, conflicting variables are many and no 
government has yet emerged unscathed from the surge of centrifugal 
tendencies that are current in it. At the same time, no models either 
from the western or eastern countries which have the problems of ethnicity 
could be cited for emulation. The history of internal conflicts as 
experienced by the newly independent states like Malaya and British 
Guyana do not differ much from what has been happening in countries like 
Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada. Common to the problem 
is the philosophical differences over the future of the state in which 
people wish to live, the means of achieving consensus and a "political 
culture" (Verba and Almond, 1963: 12) that is to be adopted in the new 
polity. Partly, it is a process towards the development of a national 
identity where "the institutionalization of commitment to common political 
symbols" occur (Verba, op. cit.: 530). The importance of this process is 
again stressed by Verba (ibid.: 530) as "not merely that the symbol repre- 
sents the nation, but that the creation of the symbol is coterminus with 
the creation of the nation". 
Failure to fulfil the obligation towards the common political 
symbol often resulted in tragedies of a national scale. Recent examples 
were many and the sources of conflict varied. For instance, language 
became a divisive national issue as in the case of Belgium, Canada, 
Malaya and the canton of Berne in Switzerland. Sectarianism developed 
in Northern Ireland and the Netherlands between the Protestants and the 
Catholics; tribalism caused the loss of many lives in Nigeria during the 
sixties and in Malaya ethnic conflicts came to a climax in May 1969 when 
many lives were lost. 
At the same time, various methods had been employed to neutralise 
the disintegrative elements that prevailed. For example, it was under the 
pretext of preserving the national boundary that the central government 
of Nigeria almost annihilated the whole of the Ibo tribe for trying to 
secede from the Federation (Rabushka & Shepsle, 1972: 204-5). On the other 
hand, in order to avoid any form of bloodshed, a national boundary was 
allowed to be fragmented as in the case of Singapore's separation from 
Malaysia in 1965. All these trends tend to suggest that in a multi-ethnic 
society, the threat to the polity is always latent and this further 
exacerbated the inherent problems of nation-building itself. Ekuban 
(1980: 129) for example, illuminates the problems by citing Africa as a case: 
"Ethnicity is perhaps one of the most powerful of the divisive 
forces in Africa. It accounts for the creation of federalist 
forms of government in Nigeria, the Congo and Uganda, the 
attempted secession of Biafra from the rest of Nigeria in 
1967 and of Togo from Ghana in the 1950's. It delayed 
progress towards independence in Kenya and it is a powerful 
factor in the movements in Zimbabwe and Namibia". 
Malaya's problems arose due to the plurality of its population 
structure. Its society fitted well into both Furnivall's (1948) and 
Smith's (1965) theoretical model of a plural society. While Furnivall's 
(op. cit) model was essentially based on the economic and social criteria, 
Smith's (op. cit. ) theoretical, framework was defined in terms of the basic 
institutional system. To stress this point, Smith (op. cit. ) noted that: 
"pluralism and its alternative must be defined institutionally 
rather than in racial or ethnic terms. Cultural heter- 
ogenity has many forms and bases, while cultural pluralism 
has only one, namely, diversity of the basic institutional 
system". 
Plainly, Smith implied that it was the institutional differences that 
serve to distinguish differing cultural and social units. Thus the 
"population that contains groups practising different forms of institut- 
ional systems exhibit a corresponding diversity of cultural, social and 
ideational patterns" (Smith, op. cit. -, 88). 
The successive census of 1947,1957 and 1970 showed the almost 
constant feature of the Malayan population in terms of its ethnic division 
(see Table 1 ). But, nonetheless, the differences in the ethnic compo- 
sition should not be construed as de facto divisive and thus alienate one 
ethnic group from another. 
1 But Malaya's uniqueness besides being 
ethnically divided, lay in the claim of legitimacy over the country as 
asserted by the immigrants who constituted one half of the population and 
the indigenous Malay's rejection of this claim. This indigenous-immigrant 
tension was further exacerbated by the differences in terms of culture, 
language and religion. 
1. Indonesia is an example of a multi-ethnic society which is able to 
reduce its divisive tendencies. 
Colonialism: the Impact on Language and Culture 
Tylor (1891: 1) defined culture as "that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of society". Culturally, pre- 
independent Malaya did not manifest any similarity that could act as a 
basis for understanding among its multi-ethnic population. Given the 
fact that they all eat rice, even this did not give them any form of 
commonality for differences existed in the way it was consumed. Cultur- 
ally, and in a nutshell, they differ not only in life but also in death. 
As Abdullah Taib and Mohammed Yusoff (1982: 108) pointed out: 
"Culturally, the Malays are Muslims, speak Bahasa Melayu 
(Malay) and maintain their own traditional customs and 
practices. The Chinese are mostly Buddhists or Christians, 
speak a variety of Chinese dialects, and maintain 
traditional Chinese customs and practices. Some Chinese 
practices, such as the consumption of pork, the keeping of 
dogs in homes, and gambling, are extremely distasteful to 
Malays. The Indians are mostly Hindus, speak a number of 
Indian dialects, and maintain customs and practices of 
their own, some of which (such as the penchant for alcoholic 
drink) are also distasteful to Malays and virtually 
proscribed to them". 
Linguistically, the divisions were even wider and without any common 
language to bridge them, Malaya was a miniature "tower of Babel". In 
due course and out of necessity, Malay became the interactive language 
among them. This development was least surprising for historically the 
language had been the lingua-franca besides being the language of 
administration and commerce. Its position was described by William 
Marsden (cited in Asmah, op. cit: 5) in the following terms: 
"The Malay language which has commonly been supposed original 
in the peninsula of Malayo, and from thence to have extended 
itself throughout the eastern Islands, so as to become the 
... cont. 
lingua-franca of that part of the globe, is spoken 
everywhere along the coasts of Sumatra, prevails without the mixture of any other, in the Island country of Manangkabau and its immediate dependencies, and is 
understood in almost every part of the island. It has 
been much celebrated, and justly, for the smoothness 
and sweetness of the sound, which have gained it the 
appellation of the Italian of the East. This is owing 
to the prevalence of vowels and liquids in the words (with many nassals which may be thought an objection) 
and the infrequency of any harsh combination of mute 
consonants. These qualities render it well adapted to 
poetry, which the Malays are passionately addicted to". 
Paradoxically, as the British colonial power became more established, 
its role in administration and commerce soon declined. Following the 
spread of English education, the predominance of Malay as the main medium 
of communication either in business or governmental circles was gradually 
phased out. The growth of English education and the colonial policy of 
making English as the official language were thus among the contributory 
factors that caused independent Malaya a decade of linguistic crisis. 
The arrival of the Chinese and Indians further transformed the 
cultural complexity of the country. Together with their regional and 
provincial differences, they also brought along their dialects which were 
traceable to the areas of their origins. Among the Chinese, "where so 
many diverse dialects mingled" the need for a common language among them 
was even more pressing compared to what occurred in China "where the 
people of a province all spoke the same dialect" (Purcell, op. cit: 233-4). 
The adoption of Kuo-yu (the national language which was a compromise between 
northern and southern mandarin) in January 1920 was a turning point in the 
development of the Chinese language. The language soon became a common 
mode of expression among the educated Chinese. As Purcell (op. cit: 
227-228) observed: 
"The adoption of Kuo-yu is half the story of 
educational development in modern China to date: 
the other half is the adoption of San Min Chu, or Three Principles of the People, of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, 
and the foundation of Chinese education". 
Kuo-yu was immedately introduced into Malaya and soon became the 
language of instruction in Chinese schools replacing the various dialects 
(Chang, op. cit.: 17-18). As for the Indians, since the majority came from 
the Tamil-speaking states of southern India, it was not difficult to 
institutionalise Tamil as the common language for the Indians. 
1 
Despite their religious differences, animosity which was based on 
sectarianism was practically unheard of. The Malays profess Islam which 
advocates monotheism and is strictly uncompromising in its attitude 
towards Hinduism and Taoism, the religions most Indians and Chinese 
respectively adhered to, and where polytheism is the norm in both, along 
with idol worship. The absence of any religious related conflict may 
be partly due to the fact that religions are closely affiliated to eth- 
nicity. Religious boundaries seldom cross ethnic lines. In Malaya, it 
is an accepted fact that Malays are Muslims, the Chinese are Buddhist or 
Taoist, and the Indians are Hindus. Since religion is easily identifiable 
with ethnicity, its role as a source of conflict remained insignificant. 
Secondly, religion, per se, had not been communally politicised and at the 
same time there was no material reward attached to it. Furthermore, 
1. According to the census taken in 1970,80.9% of the Indians belonged 
to the Tamil speaking group. See R. Chander, 1970, Population and 
Housing Census, etc, p. 29. 
religious conversion would not make any change of status in ethnicity. 
Added to these cleavages were the problems of decolonisation, a 
disturbing phenomenon in any newly independent state. It was a process 
that had to be carried out simultaneously with nation-building. Admittedly, 
it was not an easy task to accomplish. In Malaya, especially, where life 
had "grown comfortable with the British colonial bottle" (Das, June 11, 
1982), the task of decolonisation was monumental. It required vital 
changes both in the psychological and institutional make-up so as to 
provide a new direction and relevance to the country's history, culture 
and aspirations. As Evans (Oct. 1971: 282) observed: 
"the task of decolonisation is then the two-fold one 
of counteracting the massive set of reinforcing 
institutions which have for so long trained the 
colonized to reject their background, and of beginning 
the process of constructing a viable alternative". 
Uppermost in the process was how to disacustom the colonial psychology 
that had long been entrenched among the colonized, especially the leaders. 
For instance, the institutions that were established were all taken from 
the metropolitan model which was totally alien to the indigenous cultural 
environment. This was particularly felt in the field of education where 
the system that was adopted was directed more to the needs of 
the colonial 
society rather than for the benefit of the newly independent state. 
The 
defect of the colonial system of education was obvious. 
Nyerere (1968: 46) 
described it as, "not designed to prepare young people for the service of 
their own country; instead it was motivated by a desire 
to inculcate 
the values of the colonial society and to train individuals 
for the service 
of the colonial state". 
-i 
In his study of the history syllabus taught in Malayan schools 
during the colonial period, Santhiram (1978) pointed out how the teaching 
of local history was negated to the barest minimum and the students 
instead were exposed to the British history and its colonial glory. The 
educational system that was established thus prolonged the state of both 
educational and "intellectual dependency" (Altbach, 1982: 475) that the 
newly independent country had towards its ex-colonial master. 
The disruptive effect of the colonial schools towards the indigenous 
society was well elucidated by Watson (1982: 28) in the following terms: 
"Colonial schools were deliberately set apart from the 
indigenous culture with the result that those who 
attended them gradually grew away from their original 
roots, a trend that was lamented by many missionaries 
by the 1920s but one that was by then very difficult to 
reverse. Because there was a lack of clarity regarding 
which society and what place in society students were 
being prepared for, colonial schools did not necessarily 
prepare for leadership in the indigenous society nor for 
leadership in the colonial society. They were designed 
to fit people into a world different from that with which 
they were born and in which their parents lived and worked". 
Hence, the colonial school system had a far-reaching effect upon 
the colonized. In Malaya, it was successful in alienating the English 
educated from the vernacular educated, besides the already natural differ- 
ences that existed between the indigenous. Malays and the immigrant 
communities. But it was the impact on the mind that created the greatest 
obstacle towards the process of decolonization. With the educational 
system being geared towards the inculcation of colonial values and norms, 
the outcome was not hard to envisage. With the newly acquired status 
they began to alienate themselves from the masses and felt culturally 
inferior and confused about their indigenous heritage. As much as 
possible they tried to associate themselves with the colonial cultural 
circle, and the difficulty of being accepted as part of it made them 
even more convinced of the superiority of the colonial culture. Citing 
the impact of colonialism upon Africa, Daniel (1981: 173) noted that: 
"... the African came to believe in his own inferiority. 
He developed a sense of shame about his cultural 
heritage and turned his back on it. Instead, he embraced 
the values of an alien culture and began to ape the white 
man, emulating specific aspects of his life-style; dress, 
eating and drinking habits, music, cosmetics, even 
exaggerating the particular accents of the colonizer's 
language". 
Daniel's description of the colonial influence upon the African, to 
a certain extent had some relevance to Malaya. The impact of colonialism, 
for example had left trails of confusion upon their culture, identity and 
values. Among the most significant was the neo-colonial psychology of 
using "the norms of the metropolitan culture as the yardstick against 
which all values, behaviours and attitudes are measured" (Evans, op. cit: 281). 
Freire (1970: 38-39) aptly described the phenomenon as "self-depreciation" 
for "so often do they hear that they are good for nothing, know nothing 
and are incapable of learning anything - that they are sick, lazy, and 
unproductive - that in the end they become convinced of their own 
unfitness". 
Cultural Pluralism and its Dilemma 
Two theories are often cited when analysing the dynamics of a plural 
society. The first is cultural pluralism, the philosophy which has been 
adopted by Switzerland and Belgium, and cultural assimilation which has 
"1 
91 
been commonly assumed to have taken place in the United States. The 
focus given to these theories was to provide relevance or otherwise to 
the integrative mechanism Malaya chose in its process of nation-building. 
Assimilation is "a process of interpenetration and fusion in which 
persons and groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are 
incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (Park & Burgess, cited 
in Gordon, 1964: 62). This implies that during the process, ethnic iden- 
tification or any form of ethnic or communal affiliation or symbol has to 
give way to the wider and acceptable forms of behaviour in consonant with 
the dominant cultural group. As Friedman (1969: 348) pointed out: 
"The tendency is for the ruling cultural group to 
enforce the adoption of certain externals, in terms 
of which a superficial 'adjustment' is secured. 
The adopting culture it must be emphasised, is not 
in a position to choose". 
Assimilation is directly contradictory to the philosophy of cultural 
pluralism. While the assimilationist called for the dis-continuance of 
the prevalent ethnic characteristics, the goal of the cultural pluralist 
is "to maintain enough subsocietal separation to guarantee the continuance 
of the ethnic cultural tradition and the existence of the group" (Gordon, 
OP- cit.: 158). Horace Kallen, the acknowledged exponent of cultural 
pluralism argued strongly against the assimilation goal of multi-ethnic 
America. To him, blood relationship is "inalienable and unalterable" 
(Callen, cited in Gordon, op. cit.: 145). Taking the United States of 
America as a case, Kallen argued that: 
"The American way is the way of orchestration. As in an 
orchestra, the different instruments, each with its own 
characteristic timbre and theme, contribute distinct and 
recognizable parts to the composition, so in the life and culture of a nation, the different 
regional, ethnic, occupational, religion and other 
communities compound their different activities to 
make up the national spirit" (cited in Gordon, op. cit: 147). 
Opponents to Kallen's proposition were many. They argued that the 
strength of modern American Union was not the result of ethnic parochial- 
ism and institutional diversity, but rather on the role of the public 
school system which as an institution facilitated the progress towards 
the process of Americanization. As Henry Steel Commanger (1955: 7-8) 
put it: 
"Each decade after 1840 saw from two to eight million 
immigrants pour into America. No other people had 
ever absorbed such large and varied racial stocks so 
rapidly or so successfully. It was the public school 
which proved itself the most efficacious of all 
agencies of Americanization - Americanization not only 
of the children but, through them, of the parents as 
well". 
Kallen's line of thinking appeared among the immigrant communities 
in Malaya. For example, Tan Cheng Lock (op. cit.: 96), in his speech at 
the Legislative Council held in Malacca, openly expressed his resistance 
to assimilation by stating that, "any attempt to make the non Malays 
adopt the Malay language and to assimilate into Malay culture would be 
most energetically resisted ... as something most obnoxious and baneful 
to their well-being and would be foredoomed to failure". This view was 
again expressed in the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese Education (see Chapter 2). 
The Report, in its discussion of a "Malayan culture" stated that "by 
virtue of its composite population it should be a land where the develop- 
ing culture draws its validity from acceptance of the high values of 
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other cultures. The people of Malaya will have to learn to understand 
and appreciate their cultural differences" (Fenn-Wu Report, op. cit: 
c h. 2, para. 3). 
However, discussions on cultural pluralism as a social philosophy 
would be incomplete without understanding its mechanism as experienced by 
Switzerland and Belgium. 
Cultural Pluralism in Switzerland 
Switzerland had often been cited as a model for cultural co-existence 
despite its diversity in language, religion and ethnic background. 
Rabushka & Shepsle (op. cit.: 208) observed that the Swiss were able "to 
combine ethnic diversity and democratic stability, no mean feat in view 
of the rarity with which this relationship occurs in other plural societies". 
While it was commendable to mention Switzerland as a successful case of 
stability in a plural society, consideration should also be given as to 
whether the country's political structure accounted for its success, and 
could serve as a model for other countries to emulate. Mayer (1968: 707) 
for instance, pointed out that Switzerland is a country which is "histor- 
ically unique and cannot be duplicated under different conditions". As 
a country, it did not originate as a nation-state and had never become 
one. 
The Swiss Confederation initially grew out of a mutual alliance among 
the cantons in their struggle against the feudal rulers and the German 
Emperor (Rabushka Shepsle, op. cit.: 208). The ancient Swiss Confederation 
had no constitution, no central government, no national army and not even 
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a capital. This Confederation lasted for five centuries and collapsed 
in 1798 (Mayer, op. cit: 711-712). It was the constitution of 1848 which 
changed its status from a Confederation into the present Federal struc- 
ture which provided equality for Germans, French and Italians (Mayer, 
op-cit.: 713-714). 
Today, Switzerland has twenty-two cantons which are independent and 
autonomous from each other. Fourteen of these cantons are German-speaking, 
three French-speaking and one Italian-speaking. Of the remaining cantons, 
three have both German and French as official languages, and one has 
German, Romansh and Italian as its official languages (Rabushka & Shepsle, 
op. cit.: 209-213). In cantons which are unilingual, language does not 
develop into a major issue and even if it does, it still remains confined 
within the boundary of its canton without affecting the Federation as a 
whole. However, in cantons where more than one official language exists, 
the spectre of linguistic conflict still remains eminent. A classic 
example of this was over the Jura problems which resulted in serious 
ethnic disturbances in canton Berne. The Jura had been a problem in can- 
ton Berne for a long time. It was formally annexed by canton Berne in 
1815 but the trouble began when Berne refused to accept French as the 
official language and at the same time denied its minority representation 
in the canton legislature (Mayer, op. cit.: 723). The population which 
was predominantly French-speaking and Roman Catholic had little affinity 
with the German-speaking inhabitants who were mostly Protestant. It was 
therefore a combination of linguistic and religious differences that 
generated the demand to secede and form a canton of its own. 
In fact this 
was the motive behind the separatist movement which was formed in 
1947. 
Switzerland should not therefore be "over-emphasised" as a country 
that has successfully neutralised any overt form of ethnic conflict. Its 
absence may be true in cantons where the population is mostly unilingual, 
but the same does not apply to cantons which have more than one official 
language and different religions. By citing the whole, without regard to 
the part, a serious error of judgement could result when analysing the 
dynamics of a plural society. 
Another vital aspect that has to be placed into proper perspective 
is the position of religion and language in Switzerland. In the Malayan 
plural society, the separation is not only confined to ethnicity, but also 
extends itself to language and religion. The separation becomes even 
more rigid as the languages and religions are identifiable with the various 
ethnic groups of the country. By contrast, Switzerland's "linguistic 
boundaries do not coincide with but cut across the religious boundaries 
in most cases and therefore serve to offset one another" (Mayer, op. cit: 715). 
The census of 1960 (see Table 6) showed that among the German-speakers, 
61.3%. were Protestants and 37.2% were Roman Catholics. At the same 
time, among the French-speakers 53.7% were Protestants and 44.4% were 
Roman Catholics. The conclusion that could be drawn from this census was 
that in Switzerland there was a clear absence of linguistic identification 
with religious affiliation. 
Table 6 
Correlation Between Religious Affiliation 
and Mother Tongue 
Mother Tongue Protestant Roman Catholics Old Catholics Jews Others 
German 61.3 37.2 0.7 0.2 0.6 
French 53.7 44.4 0.3 0.3 1.3 
Italian 4.6 93.6 0.2 0.1 1.5 
Romansh 34.6 64.8 0.3 0 0.3 
TOTAL 57.1 41.3 0.6 0.2 0.8 
Source: Unpublished table of the 1960 Swiss Federation Census 
cited in Mayer, op. cit. p. 715. 
Cultural Pluralism in Belgium 
Up to February 7,1968 when Paul Van den Boeynants resigned as the 
Prime Minister due to the political crisis that developed within his 
Christian Social Party (PSC), Belgium's political system "has been cele- 
brated as a case where a highly particularistic and diffuse political 
culture sustained a more-or-less stable and effective government" 
(Coombes 
& Taylor, 1968: 62). This catastrophic outcome which led to his resignation 
was the result of the split in his PSC between its Flemish and 
French 
speaking members (Coombes & Taylor, ibid: 62). 
Belgium is linguistically divided between the Flemings (Dutch-speakers) 
and the Walloons (French-speakers). Statistically, 55.4% of 
the population 
lives in the five northern provinces, 32.6% are found in the four south- 
ern provinces and 11.46 live in Brussels (Coombes & Taylor, ibid: 63). 
In the northern provinces, the Flemish speaking population predominates, 
while in the four southern provinces, French-speakers form the majority. 
In Brussels both languages are spoken and recognised as official. 
Language as an issue appeared in the Belgium political scene just 
before the Second World War, when boundaries were drawn to delineate 
linguistic spheres of influence between the Walloons and the Flemish. 
Initially, it was religion that became the source of conflict in Belgium. 
The Reformation movement which swept Europe in the fifteenth century did 
not demolish the influence of the Catholic church in the Belgian terri- 
tories. The controversy developed over the secularization of the state 
as advocated by the Liberals and opposed by the Catholics. This religious 
cleavage was further aggravated by the linguistic difference between the 
Walloons and the Flanders (Urwin, -1970: 322). 
Various reasons were cited over the rise of language as a major 
issue in Belgium's political life. According to Urwin (ibid: 333), by 
the 1940s the Flanders were no more a minority in the country; secondly, 
the Flemish-speakers had benefitted tremendously from the speed of indus- 
trialization that was taking place; and lastly, despite the fact that 
they were already in the majority and had achieved so much progress, an 
inferiority complex remained among them. Coombes and Taylor (1968: 65) 
observed that the new self-confidence that emerged among the Flemish 
came from a background of "economic depression and colonization by a 
French speaking elite". The Walloons on the other hand, viewed the 
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linguistic resurgence shown by the Flemish as a threat to their existence 
(Coombes & Taylor, ibid: 65). With all these developments, it was inevitable 
that a showdown would happen in the state which had been so often commen- 
ded for its ethnic tolerance. 
The first serious polarization between these two groups occurred 
when the Walloon Socialist Trade Union called for a strike against the 
austere policy implemented by the newly formed coalition government of the 
Social Christians and the Liberals in 1958. The strike was only partly 
successful due to the refusal of the Flemish Catholic Trade Union to par- 
ticipate (Rabushka & Shepsle, op. cit: 114-5). On seeing the controversy 
that developed out of the Austerity Law which had been passed, the 
Liberals withdrew from the coalition and this subsequently forced a fresh 
election upon the country (Ranushka & Shepsle, op. cit: 115). 
The 1961 election and the following elections of 1965 and 1968 saw 
the question of language emerging as a dominant issue in Belgium's pol- 
itics. After the 1961 election, for instance, the government which was 
made up of a coalition between the Social Christians and the Socialists 
introduced a linguistic legislation which among other things established 
the "language boundaries between the Walloons and the Flemish" and at 
the end of 1962 a bill was passed "that declared Brussels bilingual" 
(Rabushka & Shepsle), op. cit: 115). 
The climax of linguistic extremism and the inter-play of ethnic 
politics occurred in the election of 1968. Rabushka & Shepsle (op. cit: 117) 
described the election as one which saw "the overwhelming salience of 
language, the rise of political entrepreneur, the politics of outbidding", 
'i 
I 
and a marked absence of political moderation. The campaign was harsh 
to the extreme with each group bidding for support by invoking ethnic 
sentiments. The Volksunie (Flemish Nationalists) for instance, wanted a 
Federal system of government with an independent Flemish state, thus 
limiting the jurisdiction of the Central Government only to matters 
relating to economy, social policy, defence and foreign policy 
(Coombes & Taylor, op. cit.: 68). The Walloons, not to be outdone, cam- 
paigned vigourously for the establishment of a "separate Walloon country 
with its own elected assembly responsible for internal Walloon affairs" 
(Coombes & Taylor, op. cit.: 67) . 
Assimilation: Malay Exclusiveness? 
Underlying all the examples that have been cited, a clear fact 
remains. Countries which possess the elements of pluralism, be they 
ethnic, cultural or institutional, have to face the reality of the con- 
flict potentials that are current in it. The avenues that could lead to 
disagreements are many and the chances for national reconciliation become 
less once these differences are translated into open conflict. As Smith 
(1965: XI) observed, "It is perfectly clear that in any social system 
based on intense cleavages and discontinuity between differentiated 
segments, the community of values or social relations between these 
sections will be correspondingly low". 
The examples taken from Belgium and the Jura problems in canton Berne 
tend to confirm the fact that nation-building in a plural society is a 
complex and delicate process and the philosophy of cultural pluralism has 
yet to prove its success. For those who argue along the lines of class 
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struggle (Stenson: 1976, Cham: 1975), the example from British Guyana was 
a clear indicator that ethnicity in itself is a potent force that could 
not be easily slurred by just an ideological slogan. In British Guyana 
for example, Dr. Jagan's Peoples Progressive Party which was Marxist in 
orientation, and his invocation on the prinicple of "apanjaht"1 during 
the 1961 election showed that "race could not be masked by ambiguous 
allusions to socialist ideology" (Rabushka & Shepsle, op. cit: 98). In 
citing the American case, M elson & Wolpe (1970: 118) pointed out that, 
"While most white Americans have been assimilated within the secondary 
institutions of the society, their primary group relationships remain 
highly segregated by nationality or religion, and ethncity remains a 
persistent fact of political life". 
While cultural pluralism as a policy has not achieved much success, 
what is left then for a plural society to pursue? One integrative 
mechanism that is assumed to have taken place in the United States is 
the melting-pot theory. The concept envisages "that the culture of 
the immigrants as 'melting' completely into the culture of the host 
society without leaving any cultural trace at all" (Gordon, op. cit: 125). 
However, Glazer and Moynihan (1963: 12-13) had different views on what 
was really happening in the country. While not denying "the powerful 
assimilatory influences of American society operate on all who come 
into it, making the children of immigrants and even immigrants themselves 
a very different people from those they left behind", at the same time, 
a certain amount of reservation was also expressed. 
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1. A Hindi term which means "vote for your own kind". 
As they pointed out: 
"It was reasonable to believe that a new American type 
would emerge, a new nationality in which it would be 
a matter of indifference whether a man was of Anglo- 
Saxon or German or Italian or Jewish origin, and in 
which indeed, because of the diffusion of population 
through all parts of the country and all levels of the 
social order, and because of the consequent close 
contact and inter-marriage, it would be impossible to 
make such distinctions. This may still be the most 
likely result in the long run. After all, in 1960 
almost half of New York City's population was still 
foreign-born. Yet it is also true that it is forty 
years since the end of mass immigration, and new 
processes, scarcely visible when our chief concern was 
with the great masses of immigrants and the problems 
of their 'Americanization', now emerge to surprise us. 
The initial notion of an American melting-pot did not, 
it seems, quite grasp what would happen in the short 
run, and this short run encompasses at least the length 
of a normal life time, it is not something we can 
ignore" (Glazer & Moynihan, ibid: 13). 
The observation made by Glazer and Moynihan is quoted at length 
here mainly because it tries to stress the fact that assimilation takes 
time and could not be realised within a generation. Secondly, the concept 
does not hold valid with recent immigrations into the country. Friedman 
(op. cit: 350) explained this development in the following terms: 
"Minorities have always composed an important part of the 
American social structure. The original immigrants 
(the 'old' minorities) accepted the assimilative condit- 
ions in the school; and, pragmatically speaking, the 
system worked for a long time ... but it is becoming 
increasingly obvious that the 'new' minorities do not 
fare this well. Colour prejudice clouds the future of 
many of them; and accultration is easier for them than 
assimilation. The language and culture ties which provide 
security for particular groups cause difficulties in a 
school system which has not even acceded to the need for 
dual language teaching. The invisibility of the poor, the 
passivity and occasional withdrawals of some minority 
groups, all militate against assimilation". 
Another important aspect about the process of assimilation in 
America was that the melting-pot ideal was parochial in its scope. 
As Gordon (op. cit: 119) noted, "the proponents of the melting-pot ideal 
had dealt largely with diversity produced by sizeable immigration only 
from the countries of Northern and Western Europe - the so-called ' old 
immigration' , consisting of people with cultures and physical appearance 
not greatly different from those of the Anglo-Saxon stock". The melting- 
pot theory might have been true during the early part of the immigration 
into the new world. But, with the latest wave of immigration which came 
mostly from countries of Eastern and Southern parts of Europe and also 
from the Fax East, patterns of assimilation began to change. The new 
groups of immigrants, being mostly from neither the Anglo-Saxon nor Teutonic 
stock, were not easily assimilated into the mainstream of American culture 
(Anglo-Saxon based) due to the fact that they were different not only in 
their ethnic origins but also in their cultural experiences 
(Glazer & 
Moynihan, op. cit: 14-17). As a corollary to that, it was in their search 
for security in the face of a newly found environment that the "new 
immigrants" sought to remain within the enclave of their own ethnic 
groups and this made them even more difficult to assimilate. 
It could be 
safely concluded that the melting-pot theory was a pre-twentieth century 
phenomenon and was essentially a conformity towards the 
Anglo-Saxon 
culture. It was in the main institutional and structural 
integration 
which produced the present form of American nationality. 
But whatever may have been said about the 
failure of the present day 
assimilative policy in America, it had already 
benefitted from the earlier 
integrative process which undoubtedly laid the foundation of a strong 
and 
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cohesive American nation. Central to this successful phenomenon was the 
role of the English language which became the common vehicle for national 
communication and expression, and its integrative role as the main lang- 
uage of instruction in schools. 
Between the two alternatives, cultural pluralism and cultural 
assimilation, what route should Malaya take then? As has been observed 
earlier, cultural pluralism as a policy had strong appeals among the 
immigrant communities. Their refusal to assimilate, as embodied in the 
speeches of Tan Cheng Lock (op. cit) and the Fenn-Wu Report on Chinese 
Education (op. cit) created a serious obstacle for any programme related to 
the process of national integration to be effectively implemented. At 
the same time, their demand to be recognised as fully-fledged citizens of 
the country and thus put them on a par with the indigenous Malays was too 
vocal to be left unheard. The Malayan Union Plan was to some extent in 
compliance with this demand. However, the plan was so vehemently opposed 
by the Malays that it had to be abandoned. 
It should also be emphasised here that the demand for equal citizen- 
ship, especially among the Chinese immigrants, was in fact not genuine 
in its entirety. A survey by Singapore Chinese newspaper 
(Nan Chian) in 
the late 1940's showed that 99% of the Chinese would not give their 
undivided loyalty to the Malayan Union (Hawkins, op. cit: 
82). What spurred 
the demand was presumably the population of the country at that time which 
was in favour of the immigrant communities (see Table 7). As the table 
indicates, in 1941 the Malay population was only 40.5% and this made them 
a minority in their own country. It was quite obvious that by their 
numerical superiority, the immigrants tended to legitimise their claim 
over the country and thus negated the presence of the indigenous Malays 
who were then outnumbered in population. 
That sheer numbers determined the faith of an indigenous community 
has long left its mark in history. The modern game of popular politics 
which legitimises the rule by the majority tends to deny the inalieable 
rights of the natives whose power and authority is being usurped and at 
the same time sanctioned by this modern opinion. Singapore was a case 
when a definitive race (Malay) became a marginal group due to the influx 
of immigrants. The same was true with the native Indians of the United 
States. 
Table 7 
Number and Composition of the Population 
in Malaya, 1941 
Race Number Percentage of Total 
Chinese 2,418,615 44.0 
Malays 2,248,579 40.5 
Indians 767,693 14.0 
Europeans 30,251 0.5 
Eurasians & others 80,035 1.0 
TOTAL 5,5k5 , 173 100.0 
I 
Source: Ooi Jin-Bee, 1963: 121. 
As a philosophy for nation-building, cultural pluralism was 
unacceptable to the Malays. They perceived that being immigrants, it was 
their responsibility to adapt to the new social and cultural environment 
paramount of which was the country's language and its traditional instit- 
utions. The advocates of cultural pluralism were thus met head-on by the 
Malays who saw the immigrants with their numerical superiority and economic 
strength as a serious threat to their survival. It was essentially this 
f eeling of insecurity that brought about the adoption of the slogan 
"'Hidup Melayu"1 as their rallying cry against the Malayan Union in 1946. 
Besides entailing the survival of the Malay race, the slogan also called 
for the preservation of the Malay language and culture. It was in 
pursuance of these objectives that demands were set that independent 
Malaya would have to adopt only one language and one culture and these 
must be Malay. As a corollary to that, the Malayan identity that was to 
emerge would also have to be Malay-based. This was reflected by Dato' 
Onn's speech in Parliament when he moved a motion demanding "that the 
Rupabangsa or Nationality of the Persekutuan Tannah Melayu shall be 
known as 'Melayu"' (Parliamentary Debate: Feb. 10,1962)3 To an outsider, 
it sounded as uncompromising ethnocentricism on the part of the Malays. 
But, viewing it from a psycho-historical angle, it was a re-assertion of 
the desire to restore their status-quo as the natives of the country 
which was on the brink of becoming a mere historical show-piece. 
Nonetheless, this idea of "Malay exclusiveness" was of course 
rejected by the immigrant communities. 
It was viewed upon as tantamount 
1. Literally translated it means "Malays Live". The slogan is signif- 
icant for it was adopted by UMNO during the initial period of its 
formation and it reappeared during the ethnic riot of May 13,1969. 
2. "Persekutuan Tannah M elayu" means the "Federation of Malay Land". 
3. "Melayu" means Malay. 
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to Malay assimilation of which they strongly disapproved. There was 
obviously a divergent formula perceived by the various communities as to 
the course that the country should take in its arduous task of nation- 
building. The Malays wanted their language and culture to be the basis 
for the country's identity, whilst the immigrants were protective of their 
own heritage and thus against any form of assimilation into the local way 
of life. All these differences came to the fore with independence when 
the problems of nationhood emerged and the new nation tried to get con- 
sensus on the mechanics of integration that could accommodate all the 
divergent and controversial views. 
Thus, it is within these emerging circumstances that education was 
chosen to play a vital role in the country's nation-building process. To 
a certain extent, the choice of education was not irrelevant, and as 
Bock (1982: 79) points out: 
"It is within this pervading context of conflict that 
education is increasingly expected to function as the 
single most influential force for ameliorating social 
conflict and facilitating orderly directed social change. 
Often, it is in the most intensely pluralistic societies 
that education is expected to play the most central 
nation-building role". 
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Chapter Four 
The Development of an Educational System 
The Razak Report 
In the words of R. S. Peters (1967: 1) education "refers to no partic- 
ular process, rather it encapsulates criteria to which any one of a family 
of processes must conform". This description provides a wide and varied 
form of interpretation and utility. Unesco (1973: 6) emphasised the 
purposes of education as "to serve the wider ends of social change and 
transformation". Within this context it was therefore not uncommon to 
see education being utilised for purposes of public policies, pursuing 
social, political or economic objectives. For the newly independent states 
which were often threatened by political disintegration due to the diverse 
nature of their population structure, the search for an institution that 
could provide a common denominator continued. But most, if not all, con- 
sidered education as an important element in providing "national and 
social cohesion" (Unesco, ibid: 85), besides the important role it contrib- 
uted towards the development of human capital (Schultz, 1979). 
It was the belief that school as an institution could provide a 
common experience and exposure which in the long run would narrow down the 
gap among the different cultural and personal backgrounds, which the child 
brought with him into the classroom. This was the general feeling among 
the Malayan leaders when education was given an important task as part of 
a nation-building process. What necessitates this rationale was mainly 
the result of the pluralistic nature of the Malayan society which on the 
eve of independence saw the immediate need to establish an institution 
that could provide the basic Malayan orientation to the young. The school 
as an institution was thus given the role of fulfilling this objective. 
In the words of Dato' Abdul Razak (LCD, May 16,1963: col. 1150), when 
introducing the Report of the Education Committee, "We strongly believe 
that one of the essential elements in the building of a united Malayan 
Nation is that ohildren of all races should learn the same things in the 
same way at school". 
The choice of an institution that would be in accord with the prac- 
tising ideology of the state was hard and difficult to make. Given the 
position of Malaya's multi-ethnic composition, the choice could further 
generate rather than diffuse the moods of discontent that were already in 
existence. At the same time, even after the decision had been made there 
remained the choice of relevant strategies that should be adopted for the 
objective to be realised. Related to this, two methods could be employed. 
One was by imposing a central ideological principle that would dictate 
the general direction of the society. The other was the adoption of a 
liberal ideological approach which provided freedom of choice and direc- 
tion for the society to pursue. In a centrally directed state, any form 
of social policy adopted was with the view of homogenizing the existing 
disintegrated social components that might hamper the stability and sec- 
urity of the state. Thus, through a common ideological framework it was 
envisioned that a standardized pattern of behaviour might emerge and a 
centripetal tendency develop. While this social philosophy of dictating 
a society towards a common ideological goal may in itself prejudice the 
growth of a democratic ideal, nevertheless it had been proved effective 
I 
in countries where the political will of the people was harnessed 
towards the direction and needs of the polity. 
In Malaya, the above pattern of ideology was an anathema to the 
leadership in general. 
1 
During the colonial era, the country had been 
advocating the laissez-faire rule which advanced the importance of private 
enterprise in national development. Upon independence, Malaya adopted 
an administrative and institutional model which mirrored the prevalent 
British institutions. As an example, the monarchial system was never 
before at its pedestal strength when the country was at the dawn of inde- 
pendence. Although the political power that emanated from the system was 
minimal, their presence and the ritualistic role they played created an 
aura of their indispensibility among the masses. The courtly rewards 
which had been the by-products of the system penetrated through the various 
strata of the population and this further legitimised their position as 
the privileged ruling class. Another instance of colonial influence 
remaining in independent Malaya is the creation of the two Houses of Parl- 
iament. The first is the Dewan Rakyat and the other is the Dewan Negara. 
2 
The Dewan Rakyat housed the elected representatives and the Dewan Negara 
is for the members nominated by the Government. All these were again 
buttressed by the bureaucratic machinery which was the key to the colonial 
1. The leaders of the Alliance Party which sought independence from 
Britain had either aristocratic or propertied backgrounds. Tunku 
Abd. 
Rahman was a prince from Kedah; Tun Abdul Razak was an aristocrat 
from Pahang; Tun Tan Cheng came from a wealthy family. With these 
backgrounds it would be improbable for them to get enmeshed in 
such a radical ideology. 
2. Dewan Rakyat and Dewan Negara are equivalent to Britain's House of 
Commons and Lords, respectively. 
"administrative hegemony" (Puthucheary, 1978: 5). Independence was thus 
a mere continuation of the institutions that had been in existence since 
colonial times. No attempt was made to re-institutionalise the colonial 
apparatus so that it could respond to the needs of the newly independent 
nation. The Malayanisation process that took place following independence 
merely involved the change of personnel, without affecting the basic insti- 
tutional structure. Thus, when the country was looking for an institution 
that could act a 'broker' for its diverse population, there was a limited 
option that could be considered as practically uncontroversial. Both the 
political institution and the economic model of which underpins its ideo- 
logical foundation, were still at their infant stage of development. At 
this critical period of the nation's history, it was inevitable that 
school as an institution was chosen to play a major role in the process 
of nation-building. 
While education did not in itself provide a conflict-proof arrangement 
(and in the context of the Malayan plural society the issue had been 
perenially controversial) nonetheless, it was assumed to be an institution 
where the effect of change would be gradual and the social disruption 
that accrued would be minimal. Secondly, the political role that education 
could play was viewed as essential towards the socialisation of the 
oncoming generation. As Coleman (op. cit.: 3) suggested, "Once regarded as 
an essentially conservative, culture-preserving, culture-transmitting 
institution, the educational system now tends to be viewed as the master 
determinant of all aspects of change. " Thirdly, if change was to be 
effected, the focus of attention should be directed towaxds the young 
and for this there would be no better place than the school. These 
I 
ideas were summed up by Dato' Abdul Razak (LCD, op. cit.: col. 1158) 
as such: 
"This Report on education, which; I consider is a 
practical one, lays the foundation of a national 
system of education on which a united Malayan 
Nation will be born and grow into a happy and stately 
manhood". 
A year later, when he moved the Education Bill, 1957 in the Malayan 
Parliament, he again reiterated the important role that education could 
play towards the breaking down of the cultural barriers among the various 
ethnic groups. He emphasised that: 
"It is the object of the new policy under this Bill to 
break down the barrier within the various types of 
schools and bring them together under a national 
system in order that by so doing we shall create a 
sense of communion and unity among all who live in 
this country as the object of their undivided 
loyalty". (LCD, March 7,1957: col. 2542). 
It was with this understanding and philospohy that the Education 
Committee of 1956 was established. The formation of the Committee 
reflected an ardent commitment on the part of the Government towards the 
establishment of a common institution that could act as a "broker" for 
children that came from different cultural backgrounds. It was a planned 
strategy which attempted to break away from the system that was disjointed, 
uncoordinated and elitist to one which was egalitarian and popular. 
The Razak Report: Philosophy and Content 
The Razak Report was significant in the development of Malayan educ- 
ation mainly for three reasons. Firstly, the Committee was set up by the 
first elected Government of Malaya following the Federal election of 1955. 
It was chaired by the Minister of Education and the members were all 
Malayan in nationality, except for the advisors who were British. 
' 
Secondly, it was clearly stated in its terms of reference that it was the 
Government's intention to establish a national system of education and 
was quite explicit, albeit ambiguous, in emphasising the ultimate objective 
of one language and one nation philosophy. Thirdly, the Committee was 
also given the power to recommend structural changes that might be needed 
to provide the educational system with its national character. 
As reflected in the terms of reference (see Chapter 2), the Report 
was populist in its appeal rather than "e tatist"(Bracher, 1970: 10) in 
its implication. The national system of education that was to be estab- 
lished must be generally "acceptable" by the people. While it was the 
intention of the Government to make Malay the national language of the 
country, emphasis was also given to the "growth of the language and 
culture of other communities" (The Razak Report, para. la). 
1. Members of the Committee were Dato' Abdul Razak bin Hussain (Chairman), 
Mr. Y. T. Sambanthan, En. Suleiman bin Dato' Abdul Rahman, En. Abdul 
Aziz bin Haji Abdul Majid, En. Shamsudin bin Nain, Mr. Too Joon Hing, 
En. Abdul Rahman bin Hj. Taub, Mr. : "oh Chee Yan, En. Zainal Abidin 
bin Sultan Mydin, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, En. Abdul Hamid Khan, Mr. Leung 
Cheung Long, En. Mohamed Ghazali bin Jawi, Mr. Lee Thean Hin and 
En. Mohamed Idris bin Mat Sil. 
The Director of Education, Mr. Payne and his Deputy Mr. G. Woods were 
in attendance at all meetings. The Secretary was En. Mohamed Sanusi 
bin Baki (until Nov. 1955) and thereafter Mr. T. E. Hughes. 
The Report also defined its terms of reference accordingly. Firstly, 
the Committee felt that the recommendations were meant for the "next ten 
years" (The Razak Report: para. 8), a period considered to be transitional 
in Malayan education. Secondly, it was to recommend "an educational 
system acceptable to the people of the Federation as a Whole" (The Razak 
Report: para. 9). However, the Committee noted that all the recommendations 
were to be based on the principle that Malay would be made the national 
language while at the same time protection was given to the languages 
and cultures of the non-Malays living in the country. Thirdly, the 
Committee was given the task to develop an educational system that would 
instil a common Malayan outlook and for this purpose it recommended the 
introduction of a common content curriculum for all schools, irrespective 
of their medium of instruction (The Razak Report: para. ll). Lastly, the 
Committee recommended: 
ft... that the ultimate objective of educational policy 
in this country must be to bring together the children 
of all races under a national educational system in 
which the national language is the main medium of 
instruction, though we recognise that progress towards 
this goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual" 
(The Razak Report: para. 12) . 
The main elements which the Report tried to highlight was the phil- 
osophy that in a plural society schools could play a vital role in 
creating conditions towards the "instillation of consensus values" 
(zeiglar 
& Peak 1971: 212). This basically implied that schools became an important 
"link-point" for the purposes of transmitting new cultural norms. To 
achieve the objective, the Report stressed the importance of a common 
content curriculum for all schools irrespective of the language of instruc- 
tion used. Rather than emphasising the key role that a common 
language 
of instruction could play, the Report noted: 
"We cannot over-emphasise our conviction that the 
introduction of syllabuses common to all schools 
in the Federation is the crucial requirement of 
educational policy in Malaya. It is an essential 
element in the development of a united Malayan 
nation. It is the key which will unlock the gates 
hitherto standing locked and barred against the 
establishment of an educational system 'acceptable 
to the people of Malaya as a whole'. Once all 
schools are working to a common content syllabus 
irrespective of the language medium of instruction, 
we consider the country will have taken the most 
important step towards establishing a national 
system of education which will satisfy the needs of 
the people and promote their cultural, social, 
economic, and political development as a nation" 
(The Razak Report: para. 119). 
The above recommendation was important for two main reasons. In 
the first place, it played down the role of a common language of instruc- 
tion in schools in preference to the common content curriculum. Secondly, 
by attempting to equate "a national system of education" with "a common 
content syllabus" the Committee tended to negate the significance of 
a common language of instruction as an instrument for social integration 
as had been frequently envisaged. In the context of the Razak Report, 
the role of the national language merely facilitated rather than asserted 
a key role towards moulding a united nation. Another instance was over 
the question of secondary education which the Report categorically 
emphasised: 
"All schools of this type will work to a common syllabus 
and for common examinations. The question of the 
language medium of instruction in these schools is not 
a matter of first importance in view of the recommen- 
dation ... that action should be taken 
to establish a 
common content syllabus for all schools. More than 
one medium of instruction may be used. There will be 
sufficient flexibity in the curriculum to allow schools 
or parts of schools to give special attention to partic- 
ular Malayan languages and cultures" 
(The Razak Report; para. l3c). 
In terms of the recommendations, the Razak Report was cautious in 
its approach. Obviously, there was no element of radicalism in it that 
tended to suggest the complete dismantling of the existing system. In 
fact, at the primary level of education the Report essentially preserved 
and strengthened the plural school system which had been the basis of 
colonial education. The Report also enhanced the linguistic pluralism 
in the schools, while concurrently giving a strong emphasis to English 
as the language of international significance, and Malay by virtue of it 
being the national language of the country. However, there were changes 
which the Report recommended that could be construed as new and to some 
extent a great departure from previous practice. The philosophy of 
making the educational process an instrument of national unity was more 
articulated and strongly stated as compared to the past educational 
reports formulated during colonial times. 
Another aspect of the change that was of considerable significance 
was when the whole process of education became the preoccupation of the 
Government. In other words, the Report marked the beginning of the 
nationalisation of the school system. Previously, education was not fully 
the concern of the Government. The political structure of the country 
(see Chapter 2), which favoured administrative de-centralization, placed the 
responsibility fcr education at the discretion of the various states. The growth 
of schools again depended upon the money available and the roles of the 
voluntary organisations in helping their development. Even after the 
Federation of Malaya Agreement in 1948, when the geo-politics of the 
country were clearly established and a centralized system of administration 
was created, the Government remained indifferent towards placing education 
into the newly formed administrative structure. 
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If these changes were to be felt and seen, it was mainly in the 
organizational structure which the Report recommended. Prior to the 
Razak Report, except for the English schools, vernacular education was 
fairly terminal and no efforts were made to streamline them into a fairly 
uniform unit. The Report's recommendation that "certain fundamental 
changes" (para. 29) were to be made in the structure and organization of 
the school system undoubtedly had most of its immediate impact. In the 
first place, it defined the structure of the Malayan school system that 
was to appear. Secondly, the Report standardized the schools in terms 
of curriculum content, teacher training programmes and the system of 
examination. All these were further re-inforced by the newly created 
bureaucratic machinery which favoured the centralization of the educat- 
ional system. 
Having the educational system placed directly under the central 
control of the state had positive and negative implications. On the 
positive side, a centralized system provided proper control and orderly 
development of education throughout the polity. Under this system, spatial 
variation in terms of the allocation of resources as pertained to the 
geographical question of "who gets what where" (Smith, 1979: 15) could be 
minimised. Also, by placing education fully under the control of a 
central authority, it gave explicit commitment in making the schools into 
a vehicle in pursuance of specific objectives, be they political or 
national. Archer (1979: 621+) was in accord with the above argument when 
she observed that "Educational legislation is national and uniform both 
in conception and application in the centralized system". 
On the negative side, a centralized system had to bear certain prob- 
lems such as "inflexibility", lack of "autonomy" on the part of teachers 
and excessive "political manipulation" at the political centre (Archer, 
ibid.: 254-261). In this system, the avenues to effect change were 
limited and the process tedious. Above all, it der; ended much "upon the 
aggregation of grievances, the acquisition of political sponsorship, and 
the percolation of these demands into the central decision-making arena" 
(Archer, ibid.: 271). But, the most serious drawback of the system was 
its inability to provide immediate response to the demands for changes 
in policy. Archer (ibid. -4,621) summed up this decision-making problem as 
such: 
"Because the political centre thinks long and hard 
before it legislates and because the intervening 
changes brought about through other processes 
are minimal in comparison, then long periods of 
relative static are typical in the centralized 
system". 
For a new nation which was only starting its own system of education 
and where the problems of nation-building were monumental due to the dis- 
parity in regional development, inequality in economic opportunity and the 
severity of racial polarity, the Education Committee of 1956 was to some 
extend justified in centralizing the educational machinery, at least for 
the first two decades. In the first place, the country was still lacking 
in the various essentials required for the proper functioning of an 
educational system that could be national in stature. Uppermost in this 
was the need to establish a foundation for a unified system which was 
absent during the colonial time. Secondly, by having a centralized 
system, an equal start in the development of education could be initiated. 
This was especially felt in the allocation of the country's resources, 
so as to ensure equality in their distribution. Thirdly, the multi- 
ethnic character of the population made it pertinent for the system to be 
centralized, thus enabling the authority to streamline the direction in 
accordance with the needs of the country. In this sense it could be 
perceived as essentially for the purposes of political and bureaucratic 
requirements. 
The Razak Report was quite explicit in stressing the importance of 
curricular reforms so as to achieve a common Malayan outlook (para. 115). 
At the same time, it also expressed the primacy of national needs as in 
the case of the national language policy (para. 12). Nonetheless, the 
Report was also shrouded with ambiguity. For instance, while recommending 
the setting up of the national system of education, the Report further 
enhanced the plural school system at the primary level of education. It 
proposed the "establishment of standard primary schools with the national 
language as the medium of instruction, and the development of similar 
type but in which the language of instruction may be English, Tamil or 
Kuo Yu" (para. 13b). The Report (para. 13c) was also vague as to the 
position of the language of instruction in the secondary schools. Lastly, 
the word "main" (para. 12) itself provoked much controversy. To the 
advocates of the mono-lingual policy, the word was not precise in connot- 
ation if the ultimate objective of the national education policy was to 
make Malay as the "sole" medium of instruction in schools. The thrust of 
the argument was that the word "main" was ambiguous and vague and thus 
provided an indirect sanction towards the practice of multi-lingualism 
in schools. Among those who advocated the policy of liberalism on 
language usage, the word "main" implied that other than the national 
language, other languages would also be recognised as the medium of 
instruction in schools. The controversy on the word and its implications 
remained (Chai, op. cit.: 33) but no efforts were made to clear the air. 
In the light of this development, it could be seen that besides 
paving the way for the establishment of a national system of education 
which had the ultimate aim of making schools an instrument for national 
integration, the various recommendations and proposals of the Report in 
fact generated further controversy. For a policy-document of immense 
importance such as the Razak Report, it lacked clarity and precision. 
The repercussions were far and wide, especially when the whole document 
was translated into action. 
The Razak Report: a Compromise Without Commitment 
True to its task, the Education Committee of 1956 had fulfilled its 
duty in recommending a system of education that was "national in scope 
and content". But it had the political misfortune of being vague and 
ambiguous. If it was intentionally planned as such, then it was done in 
bad taste, for, under proper scrutinization, the Report could create dissent 
and might hamper its due process of implementation. In the first place, 
its terms of reference which called for the setting up of a "national 
system of education acceptable to the people of the Federation as a whole 
which will satisfy their needs and promote their cultural, social, econcmic 
and political development as a nation" (The Razak Report, para. la) 
mirrored the in-built accommodative principle of which the Committee had 
to abide. The second aspect of the terms of reference provided recognition 
to Malay as the future national language while at the same time "preserv- 
ing and sustaining the growth of the language and culture of other 
communities living in the country" (The Razak Report, ibid. ). The contra- 
dictory nature of the terms of reference did not provide a clear-cut prop- 
osal that could be firmly acted upon. The weakness lay in the presence of 
a dual proposal for every statement of objective. For instance, the 
Report called for the establishment of an educational system that would 
be national in character, while at the same time it ought to satisfy the 
needs of the various cultural groups. Essentially, the objective was to 
provide all round satisfaction but being devoid of the understanding 
that no national issue could fulfil every ethnic's needs. Another 
aspect of the incongruency in its objective was in relation to the national 
language of the country. This was again weakened by the presence of 
another supporting proposal which called for the "preservation and sustain- 
ing the growth of the language and culture of other communities" (ibid. ). 
The lack of clarity in the Report, to some extent, had its roots in 
the terms of reference which in turn could be attributed to the political 
bargaining during the period of deliberations (see Chapter 2). This was 
confirmed by Dato' Abdul Razak, the Minister of Education and also the 
Chairman of the 1956 Education Committee. Speaking in the Federation of 
Malaya Legislative Council Debates (May 16,1956: col. 1146) he pointed 
out that the primary task of the Committee was: 
"to recommend a policy which would be acceptable to the 
people of the Federation as a whole. Therefore, to 
achieve this paramount objective, there must be 
compromise -a spirit of give and take and in some 
instances technical and theoretical considerations had 
to be subordinated to this paramount objective. " 
From the proceedings of the Legislative Council, it was apparent 
that the Malays were accommodative to the needs of the immigrant commun- 
ities. S. O. K. übaidullah, a member of the Council, heaped praise on the 
Malays for showing their "sagacity and far-sight". In his speech, he 
further added that "the Malays, who refused to accept the members of 
other communities into their political organization only seven years ago, 
ave already accepted the other communities as their political partners 
on the one hand and have also shown them that they are willing to give 
their languages their legitimate place in the system of education of the 
country" (LCD, May 16,1956: col. 1162). He again described the Report 
as "a shining example of Malay liberalism" (ibid. ). 
It could be safely argued that the Report was a by-product of much 
political manipulation and bargaining. Under the context of ethnic com- 
promise, it was therefore not unusual to see the absence of clarity in 
the Report. Ambiguity was meant to camouflage the details and strategies 
for future action. And in the final analysis, it was meant to be flexible 
and accommodative to the needs of the various cultural groups. 
A Landmark in Structural and Organizational Innovation 
Whatever might have been said about the ambiguity of objectives and 
the contradictory statements that were found in the Razak Report, none 
could deny the changes it brought to the educational history of the country. 
For the first time, patterns of a national educational framework were laid 
which could be considered as both structurally and organizationally 
innovative. In terms of control, the Report placed all matters related 
to education under the jurisdiction of the central Government in which 
the Minister for Education became responsible for it. The Report (para. 30) 
stated that: 
"the Ministry will be generally responsible for educational 
policy throughout the Federation and, in particular, it 
will be responsible for secondary education in consultation 
with State/Settlement Governments and (inter alia) for 
post-secondary education, for technical education (other 
than trade schools), for the training of teachers and for 
the conduct of examinations. The Ministry will also be 
responsible for the control and payment of grants to be 
made through State/Settlement Governments to local education 
authorities for primary education. " 
The above clause placed the whole level and process of education into 
a national concern and this created the need for restructuring the organ- 
izational set-up of the educational machinery. The Report defined the 
types of schools that were to be set up, the language of instruction to 
be used and the nature of examinations to be taken. Under the new plan, 
all schools irrespective of their categories were subjected to Government 
inspections (The Razak Report, para. 38 & 39). This measure ended the 
era of complete autonomy enjoyed previously by schools which were financ- 
ially independent from the Government. 
The plan also categorised the primary schools into two types. One 
was the Standard School of which the medium of instruction would be the 
national language and the other was the Standard-type where the medium 
of instruction would be either in Kuo-yu, Tamil or English (para. 54). 
The Report also defined Secondary education as "the education given to 
pupils who have satisfactorily completed the Primary course" (para. 67). 
It proposed three types of secondary courses and these were academic, 
vocational and technical streams (para. 69). However, it was the aim of 
the Government to "establish only one type of National Secondary School 
where the pupils work towards a common final examination" (para. 70). 
In the realm of examinations, the Report recommended the establish- 
ment of three types of examination. The first two were meant for promotional 
purposes and thus acted as a selective device, while the third type was 
intended for certification. In the first category, pupils would have to 
sit for the Malayan Secondary School Entrance Examination at the end of 
their sixth year of primary education (see Appendix A). Those who passed 
would be eligible for promotion into secondary school (para. 75). At the 
end of the third year in secondary schools, the pupils would sit for the 
Lower Certificate of Education (para. 76). Again, this was for selective 
purposes. Those who passed the examination would proceed to the upper 
level of their secondary education. Finally, the Report recommended that 
pupils would have to sit for another examination at the end of their secon- 
dary education. The National Certificate of Education as it was called 
had a compulsory Malay paper in it (para. 78 & 79). But this was only 
another version of the Cambridge School Certificate examination which had 
already established itself in all English schools. As the Report 
(para. 81) 
suggested, "The form of the examination for the National Certificate will 
be such that the same examination and the same question papers can 
be used 
for the purposes of both the School Certificate and the 
National Certificate": 
Thus, by taking only one examination package, the pupils would be awarded 
with two certificates. One was the Federation of Malaya 
Certificate and 
the other was the Cambridge School Certificate. Except 
for the compulsory 
Malay paper, the examination was totally conducted in 
English. 
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Ironically, despite the fact that Malay was to be the national 
language of the country and was made compulsory in schools, the position 
of English remained as the most important medium of instruction. The 
Report was unequivocal as far as the policy on English language was con- 
cerned. For instance, it stated that the language was important for 
purposes of employment and for higher education both inside the country 
and overseas (para. 71). Again, the Report (para. 82) added that "entry 
into the Government service is mostly based upon qualifications which 
can be gained only in Government or Aided English schools. " 
Another aspect of change which the Report recommended was in the 
field of curriculum. Paragraph 115 of the Razak Report recommended that 
the curriculum content and time-tables for all schools should be stream- 
lined. "One of the fundamental requirements of educational policy in 
the Federation of Malaya is to orientate all schools, primary and secon- 
dary, to a Malayan outlook. We consider that the way to do this is to 
ensure a common content in the syllabuses of all schools" (ibid. ). This 
recommendation ended the curricular gap that had been one of the features 
of the Malayan plural school system. Under the colonial set-up each 
school system was autonomous both in its set-up and in formulating its 
academic content. They had their own ways of developing their curricular 
objectives and contents, strategies of instruction and mode of assessment. 
The measure as recommended by the Report could be considered as the first 
major step towards the development of a common national outlook. At 
least this was what the Razak Report tried to imply. 
However, the nationalization of the school system would be ineffective 
without substantial changes to the curriculum content. Standardization 
alone would not mean much if the old contents in the curriculum remained. 
It would be a misfit if the old contents in the curriculum, which were 
essentially colonial in outlook, and objectives were to be adopted in 
the new system of education. The Razak Report was well aware of the 
importance of standardizing the curriculum, but paradoxically it failed 
to recommend the changes in content. 
Again, there were serious flaws in the Report's basic assumption 
that "a common content in the syllabus of all Schools" would provide the 
much needed orientation towards the development of a "Malayan outlooklt. 
This strategy would not materialise unless it was geared towards "Malayan" 
in its content and philosophy. It seemed that the "Malayan" concept was 
mischievously phrased. Undeniably, the types of outlook that would 
emerge depended much on the contents of the curriculum that were to be 
adopted. By analysing the terminal objective of the Report which specified 
the type of examination which the pupils would have to take, it seems 
that it was a common colonial outlook which the Report tried to inculcate 
and not the ttMalayaness" as had been indicated. 
l 
The Razak Report: A Taint of Neo-Colonialism 
Basically, and as has been observed, the Razak Report brought along 
structural and organizational changes that were fitting for a newly inde- 
pendent nation. Other than that, the Report was not new either in its 
philosophy or in its recommendations. In the past, reports on education 
1. This issue was argued -forcefully in Parliament. See Parliamentary 
Debates, Aug. 10,1960: col. 21k6. 
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had also mooted similar ideas. It was a Report which emphasised educ- 
ational continuity rather than change. As an example, the Report failed 
to deviate from the colonial school system which provided education in 
four language streams. The Education Ordinance, 1952 was in fact clear 
in its conception of a "national school", especially at the primary 
level. The Ordinance (1952: para. 21) defined it as "any school providing 
for children of all races a six-year course of free primary education 
with a Malayan orientation and appropriate fcr children between the ages 
of six and twelve and using in the main for this purpose the official 
languages of the Federation and providing facilities of instruction in 
Kuo-yu and Tamil". It further added that there would be only two types 
of national schools, i. e. either using Malay or English as the medium 
of instruction (see Chapter 2). In contrast, the Education Ordinance, 
1957 (para. 2: p. 34) divided the primary school into two categories. The 
first was the "standard primary school" which means, 
"a primary school in which the medium of instruction 
is the National language and in which the English 
language is a compulsory subject of instruction and 
in which facilities for the teaching of the Chinese 
and Tamil languages shall be made available if the 
parents of fifteen children in the school so request. " 
The second category was the "standard-type primary school" which the 
Ordinance (ibid. ) defined as: 
"a primary school in which the medium of instruction is 
the Chinese, Tamil or English language and in which the 
National language and the English language if not the 
medium of instruction are compulsory subjects of instruc- 
tion and in which facilities for the teaching of the 
Chinese and Tamil languages if not the medium of instruc- 
tion shall be made available if the parents of fifteen 
children in the school so request" (ibid. ). 
The paradox was that the Education Ordinance, 1952 attempted to 
narrow down the educational pluralism that was in existence by making the 
official language of the country as the language of instruction in schools, 
while the Razak Report, as seen in the Education Ordinance, 1957, further 
sanctified the four language streams at the primary level. By doing so, 
the Report in fact maintained the status-quo of other languages, a 
feature inherited from the colonial past. 
From the Report it could also be concluded that the recommendations 
of the Committee were far from creating a single system with the national 
language as the common medium of instructicn. In fact it was an overt 
attempt to make the primary school pupils bilingual and in some cases 
trilingual (The Razak Report, para. 18,54 & 62). This was due to the 
disparity in the ways languages were being treated in the curriculum. 
For instance, pupils who attended a Malay medium school would be bilingual 
in the sense that English language was a compulsory subject in it. The 
same was true of those who attended an English medium school where the 
national language was a compulsory subject. However, for pupils who 
attended a Tamil or Chinese medium school, they would be trilingual for 
besides learning their own language, they would also have to learn 
English and Malay as compulsory subjects. 
It would also be of interest to note the educational policy as 
stated in the Education Ordinance, 1952 and the one which was proposed 
by the Razak Report as enshrined in the Education Ordinance, 1957. In 
the former, there was an interplay of various ethnic demands and pressure 
over the nature of the educational system that was to take shape as seen 
in the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Reports (see Chapter 2). But they were all 
done within the framework of colonialism. In the latter and in anticip- 
ation of independence, the presence of ethnic demands and pressure were 
in fact even greater. For instance, altogether 151 memoranda were 
received from all sections of the community (The Razak Report, para. 3) 
Even more important was the process of deliberation which was carried 
out within a "Malayan circle" among whom had already envisaged a task 
of guiding the country towards nationhood. Common to all, was the frame- 
work they were deliberating upon and this was over the type of educational 
policy which would be suitable for a plural society like Malaya. 
Under the Education Ordinance, 1952 (para. 9), the educational 
policy was "to achieve a sound education of all children in the Federation 
using in the main, for this purpose, the official languages of the 
Federation and bringing together pupils of all races in a national type 
school with a Malayan orientation". In addition, facilities were also 
provided for learning other languages. The Education Ordinance, 1957 
(para. 3) on the other hand, called for the establishment of a "national 
system of education acceptable to the people as a whole which will satisfy 
their needs and promote their cultural, social, economic and political 
development as a nation, with the intention of making the Malay language 
the national language of the country whilst preserving and sustaining the 
growth of the language and culture of peoples other than Malays living 
in the country". Without doubt, the 1957 Ordinance was a watered down 
and a more flexible version of the policy as compared with the earlier 
proposal. 
Conspicuous in both the Ordinances was over the language of 
instruction in schools. The Education Ordianance, 1952 for instance, 
was unequivocal in its policy of recognising only the official languages 
of the country for instructional purposes. This was not the case with 
the Razak Report or the Educational Ordinance, 1957. It lacked the 
clarity and commitment in specifying the language of instruction that 
was to be adopted, be in national or official. Vaguely the Education 
Ordinance, 1957 echoed the terms of reference as outlined in the Razak 
Report. However, the Committee's definition over the national language 
and its role in the national system of education (The Razak Report, para. 12) 
was not incorporated in the 1957 Ordinance, except in paragraph 5, which 
stated that "it shall be the duty of the Minister to secure the effective 
execution of the educational policy of the Federation including the 
progressive development of educational institutions where the National 
Language is the medium of instruction". But again, this assurance did 
not imply or emphasise the relevant goal as outlined in paragraph 12 of 
the Razak Report. 
Could the Razak Report be called "national" when the national lang- 
uage was not given its proper place in the educational system and the 
curriculum content still retained its colonial character? The Education 
Ordinance, 1957 defined the "national language" as the Malay language. 
As such, the invocation of the word "national" should be justified by 
the implementation of the national language policy in the national system 
of education. Although the Razak Report did elevate the position of the 
national language to be on a par with English as the official language of 
the country by making it compulsory in all schools, it fell short of the 
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necessary assurances that it needed for its development so as to enable 
it to take the place of English. The absence of any positive recommend- 
ation that could enhance its role in the educational system implied that 
the Report was ambivalent in its commitment towards the national language. 
Indirectly, it could also be suggested that the Government was not prep- 
ared to commit itself to implementing a one-language policy in schools. 
This was in essence the content of the Razak Report as far as the question 
of the national language was concerned. When there was so much emphasis 
on English it was therefore not a blatant act to pronounce it as a con- 
spiracy and an indirect attempt to promote the continued use of the col- 
onial language. 
With independence, it was normally assumed that it was the end of 
colonialism. But with the position of the colonial language becoming 
even stronger, it was seen to be the beginning of another era. Altbach 
(1972: 543) correctly described the phenomenon of neo-colonialism that 
faced the newly independent nation as such: 
"On the ruins of traditional colonial empire, 
however, has emerged a new, subtler, but perhaps 
equally influential kind of colonialism. " 
On the question of education he further stated that the preservation 
of linguistic status-quo of the metropole was "one of the most important 
aspects of neocolonialism and the impact of the colonial heritage on the 
Third World" (ibid.: 546-7). In the words of Robinson (1981: 183) the 
adoption of the Western model was not only expensive but also "inappropriate 
to most requirements of Third World countries". 
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Pire Van den Berghe (cited in Buchanan, 1975: 37) warned about the 
new form of imperialism by suggesting that: 
"Of all the manifestations of neo-colonialism, 
the cultural and linguistic one is the most 
insidious, the least visible, and in the long 
run, the most effective ... Linguistic imperialism is the main type of colonial influence which a 
former great power can afford when its cultural 
prestige survives its political and military 
might, " 
In the Malayan context, it was obvious that the colonial language 
had the upper hand at the expense of the disadvantaged majority who had 
all the confidence and hope over their national language. But this was 
not the view among the privileged few. Like the case of the Filipinos 
(Constantino, cited in Buchanan, op. cit.: 37) where "English became the 
wedge that separated the Filipinos from their past and later was to 
separate educated Filipinos from the masses of their countrymen", the 
same could be said of the Malayan experience. As Buchanan (op. cit.,: 37) 
observed, "This policy of elite-training, using a non-indigenous language 
to inculcate non-indigenous values, deprived the societies of the Third 
World of their natural leaders". 
The Education Bill, 1957 
To provide legal effect to the recommendations of the Razak Report, 
the Education Bill, 1957 was introduced in the Federal Legislative Council 
on March 7 of the same year. In the words of Dato' Abdul Razak, the Bill 
represented "the maximum agreement possible under present conditions of 
education in this country" (LCD, March 7,1957: col. 2530). He even 
considered the Bill as "the constitution , the charter for 
the children 
of the new independent Malaya" (ibid. col. 2531). 
The debates that followed did not invoke much criticism towards 
the Bill. Instead, praises were showered on Dato' Abdul Razak for the 
"spirit of tolerance, goodwill and understanding" when formulating the 
Bill (ibid.: col. 2558). However, certain features emerged from the 
debates that re-inforced the view which Buchanan (op. cit) had been 
expounding. For instance, a Member of the Council was relieved over 
the retention of English in the new school system that he made an obser- 
vation that was worth noting: 
"We also know that with the various languages of 
this country and the national language, we will 
get ourselves lost outside the territory and to 
overcome this the Bill has provided for the teaching 
of what is an international language, that is the 
English language" (LCD, March 7,1957: col. 2544). 
Another Member was unhappy when English schools were placed under 
the "standard type" category. In his statement of appeal for the change 
of status he argued that: 
''It is a great pity that the English school is 
derogated to a subsidiary position. The English 
school is a grand institution - an institution 
from the portals of which more than 90 per cent of 
the Honourable Members of this Council have 
emerged, an institution which has given to the 
country Ministers of State, an institution which 
has produced the first elected Chief Minister for the 
country. I am sorry to see that we are not utilising 
fully the services of this institution" 
(LCD, op. cit. ) 
The above statement which unnecessarily glorified the English schools 
was sharply rebuked by Councillor Abdul Hamid Khan. In his reply he 
commented that, "by August 31st we would have shed our old clothes of being 
colonial people for that of a new status of an independent people and we 
do not wish to perpetuate our colonial status by thinking that English 
schools are everything in the world" (ICD, op. cit: col. 2559)" 
Unfortunately, this type of statement was rare. In most cases the 
debates were mild and restrained. This could be attributed to the 
dominance of the Alliance members who controlled fifty-one out of the 
fifty-two Council seats. Secondly, independence was only a few months 
away and it was important for the newly elected Government to see that 
the Bill would not create much controversy, especially when it was debated 
in the Council. This was to create an impression that there was a sense 
of solidarity and consensus among the multi-ethnic leaders of the 
country. 
The Razak Report: Reviewed 
When introducing the Education Bill, 1957 to Parliament, Dato' Abdul 
Razak stressed its importance in the following terms: 
"that this Bill is one of the most important legislations 
which have ever been introduced into the Council since 
it is the constitution, the charter for the children of 
the new independent Malaya which will emerge into full 
nation-hood; in just over five months time. This is, 
therefore, one of the most important piles upon which, 
in the shifting sands which have hitherto retarded our 
development as one nation, the future of this country 
is to be strongly and securely founded" 
(LCD, March 7,1957: col. 2531) . 
The importance of the Bill was reflected in the above statement and 
this necessitated the urgent attention given to it despite the fact that 
the country was yet to achieve its independence and the members of the 
legislature were only partly being elected. Iolitically, it could be an 
advantage to the Government t: o give special treatment to an 
issue of 
such importance. On the other hand, it could turn out to 
be a liability. 
Since the Bill was not passed by a fully-elected Council, it could be 
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claimed as illegitimate by opponents of the Bill who viewed it as a 
final product of colonialism. 
Paradoxically, the argument over the Report did not emerge within 
that ideological line of thought as envisaged. Instead of focussing 
themselves on the subject of education per se, the controversy that 
developed centred mostly on the question of a school system that could 
accommodate the divergent needs of the various ethnic groups. As such, 
the policy-makers had to confront not only the problems of policy-making 
and its due process of implementation, but also to narrow-down the 
diverging tendencies that the educational policy had created. The prob- 
lems that emerged thus clouded the basic objective and the fundamental 
philosophy which the Razak Report intended to pursue. It was in this 
light that education could be perceived as the final product of a 
"political struggle" (Archer, op. cit.: 3) and, in the final analysis, it 
came back to the basic political question of "who gets what, when and 
how much? " which Lassewell (1950) had appropriately expounded. 
For an issue of importance, like education, there is no way that 
it could be de-politicized. Interest in this institution is phenomenal. 
The fact that "people could improve their market 'worth' from very little 
with no schooling to high earning capability with large amounts of 
schooling" (Carnoy, 1974: 4) made it inevitable that education should be 
in the limelight of politics. As Maurice Kogan (1978: 20) noted: 
"... education is political. It is volatile. It 
strongly reflects the often conflicting and wide- 
ranging preferences of a society which it also 
helps to sustain, improve, embellish and from 
which it draws resources. If politics are the way 
in which individuals assert their claims and have them reconciled with the claims of others, education 
reflects and clarifies and expresses those claims in the society, though it cannot of itself reconcile them". 
Kogan's observation is appropriate for it reflects the inseparable 
issue of "education and politics". In Malaya for instance, the shelling 
began as soon as the Razak Report on Education was made public in 
March, 1956 and henceforth never stopped. The Malay's view of the Razak 
Report for example could be generalised from a speech made by Zulkifli 
bin Muhammed, the PMIP Deputy President. According to him, "the Islamic 
Party will continue to strive for realisation of the object of using the 
Malay language and education as the unifying factor in the country" 
(The Straits Echo, Aug. 6,1959). To the Malays, the question of the 
Malay language and its position in the national education system was not 
an item that could be compromised. At the same time, the Chinese were 
even more vocal in their displeasure towards the Razak Report. They felt 
that the Report was in contradiction of what they had been demanding. 
The Report thus generated a strong disapproval from the contending 
groups which subsequently developed a crisis of confidence within the 
MCA and UMNO that together with the MIC formed a partnership in the 
Alliance Government. This incident, which almost split the coalition 
Government, occurred at a critical period when the country was facing its 
first post-independent election. It was with this background that the 
Alliance promised to include the review of the existing educational policy 
in its 1959 election manifesto (The Straits Echo, July 21,1959)" 
Thus, in keeping with this political pressure, as suggested by a Member 
of the opposition party (P. D., Aug. 10,1960: col. 2133) and by taking its 
cue from the Razak Report itself (para. 16) the Government appointed a 
committee1 in February 1960 with the following terms of reference: 
"To review the Education Policy set out in Federal 
Legislative Council Paper No. 21 of 1956 (the Report 
of the Education Committee, 1956) which was approved 
in principle by resolution of the Federal Legislative 
Council on the 16th of May, 1956, and in particular 
its implementation so far and for the future; to 
consider the national and financial implications 
of this policy including the introduction of free 
primary education; and to make recommendations" 
(The Education Review Committee, 1960, para. l). 
Basically, the Education Review Committee, 1960 re-affirmed the 
educational policy as recommended by the Razak Report. It pointed out that 
the 1956 Report was suitable for the needs of the country. 
"After examining the implementation of the policy 
recommended in the 1956 Report and considering the 
representations submitted to us, we are satisfied 
that the main features of the 1956 policy are suited 
to the present needs of the country" 
(Education Review Committee, 1960, ibid.: para. 62). 
However, the Education Review Committee proposed two new structural 
changes. The first was the raising of the school leaving age to fifteen, 
and secondly, it called for the introduction of universal free primary 
education effective from 1962 (Education Review Committee, 1960, para. 63). 
In the former, the main purpose was "to raise the school leaving age to 15 
and to provide nine years of education for all those pupils who did not 
qualify for full secondary education including the Sekolah Lanjutan Kampung2 
(see Appendix B). 
1. Members of the Committee were: En. Abdul Rahman bin Haji Talib 
(Chairman), Tun Leong Yew Koh, En. Mohd. Khir Johari, Dato' '; ong 
Pow Nee, Capt. Abdul Hamid Khan, En. V. Manickavasagnam, En. Koh 
Kim Leng, En. Dahari Hj. Mohd Ali and En. Abdul Chani bin Ishak. 
2. "Sekolah Lanjutan Kampung" - "Rural Continuation School". 
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There will be a three-year course after the end of the six-year primary 
course with a pronounced vocational content which will help these pupils 
to acquire manual skills which they will be able to apply according to 
their environment, whether urban or rural" ( Education Review Committee, 1960, 
para. 93). As to the latter, the Education Review Committee (para. 121) 
recommended "that primary education should be free in all fully-assisted 
schools; that some increase in fees in secondary schools would be 
justified (the rates of school fees have not been changed for a generation); 
and that as an incentive to the development of education in the national 
language no fees should be charged in national schools and classes after 
the primary level". 
This was a change from the recommendations as outlined in the Razak 
Report (para. 66) which stated that "a selection examination at the end of 
the primary course for entry to secondary schools" would be given to the 
pupils. For those who passed this examination, they would proceed to the 
secondary level of education; while those who failed would be given "a 
Primary School Leaving Certificate" (Razak Report: para. 66). The Education 
Review Committee found the system defective and gave three reasons for 
this assessment. Firstly, under the existing system "most children end 
their formal education at the age of 12 or 13 (Education Review Committee, 
para. 86). Secondly, the existing system did not create much opportunity 
for the majority of the pupils to proceed to secondary schools and thus 
created much human wastage (Education Review Committee: para. 
87). Thirdly, 
it was felt that "children at the age of 13 are too young for any normal 
and legal form of employment outside their own families. This creates 
a menacing social problem" (Education Review Committee: para. 
88). 
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With free education being provided at the primary level, the 
Government thus fulfilled the objective as outlined in the "Karachi Plan"1 
(Francis Wong & Tiang Hong, 1974: 116). This development also entailed 
an automatic form of promotion at the primary level where there would 
be no retention for pupils in any class or standard (Education Review 
Committee, 1960: para. 89(b) ). At the post-primary level, education 
would be free only in the Malay medium schools, in the Rural Continuation 
School and to pupils from "Special Malay primary classes moving to fully- 
assisted secondary schools" (Education Review Committee, 1960: para. 122). 
From here it was evident that the Education Review Committee was favour- 
ing the national language stream in the hope that by so doing it would 
help towards the development of education which utilised the national 
language as the main medium of instruction. 
While the Education Review Committee agreed on the basic principles 
as enshrined in the Razak Report, it was somehow sceptical in the concept 
of an educational policy that was "acceptable to the people of the 
Federation as a whole" as stated in paragraph 9 of that document. 
Pertaining to this clause, the Education Review Committee remarked that 
"it would, however, be incompatible with an educational policy designed 
to create national consciousness and having the intention of making the 
Malay language the national language of the country to extend and perpet- 
uate a language and racial differential throughout the publicly-financed 
educational system" (Education Review Committee, 1960: para. 20). 
In this 
sense, the Education Review Committee was more realistic 
in its perception 
1. The "Karachi Plan" was proposed by seventeen Asian countries who were 
members of UNESCO. The Conference which was held in Karachi 
(December 
1959 - January 1960) proposed that each member country should achieve 
the objective of providing at least seven years of free universal 
education (see Wong and Hong: op. cit.: 116). 
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of an educational system that was to be national in stature. 
However, the Education Review Committee, 1960 created a paradox of 
it own. Although under the terms of reference it could recommend certain 
changes, somehow it did not propose any remedy whatever for the ambiguities 
contained in the Razak Report. Instead, the Education Review Committee 
justified the existence of the four main languages of instruction in the 
primary schools and also provided the facilities for "Kuo-yu and Tamil 
to be taught in assisted English and Malay medium primary schools at the 
request of the parents of fifteen children from any school ... and by 
permitting the teaching of languages and culture other than Malay and 
English in fully assisted secondary schools" (Education Review Committee, 
1960: para. 20) . 
The Education Review Committee, 1960 somehow tried to amend the flaws 
by recommending certain changes at the secondary level of education. 
Firstly, it ended a partial grant-in-aid to secondary schools which did 
not conform to the national system of education in accordance with Section 
37 and 39 of the Education Ordinance, 1957 (Education Review Committee, 1960, 
para. 164). Section 37 of the 1957 Ordinance stated that: 
"The Minister shall, subject to the provisions of this 
Ordinance, maintain all existing secondary schools 
which were in receipt of grant-in-aid or other similar 
financial assistance from the Government on the day 
immediately preceding the appointed date and may, subject 
to the provisions of this Ordinance, establish or take 
over and maintain other secondary schools in so far as 
moneys voted or provided for the purpose permit: provided 
that a secondary school other than a National type secondary 
school shall be maintained only for such period as the 
Minister shall deem sufficient to enable such school to 
conform to the requirements of a National type secondary 
school. " 
Section 39 of the Ordinance, 1957, in accordance with Section 37, 
gave the power to the Minister to cease maintaining any national type 
secondary school which failed to conform to the requirements of the 
Ordinance. In this case, the schools were given one year's notice to 
abide by the rule. 
Thus, paragraph 164 of the Education Review Committee, 1960, 
created a dilemma for the secondary schools which had the medium of 
instruction other than the official languages of the country. To conform 
would mean that the schools would have to change the medium of instruction 
to either Malay or English. Failing to conform would mean the loss of 
financial grants. To these schools, the Education Review Committee, 1960 
(para. 164) recommended the following: 
"(a) that those secondary schools which are still partially 
assisted should be informed that they will become 
eligible for and will receive full assistance with 
effect from the lst of January, 1962, if in the mean- 
time they have satisfied the Minister that they have 
made arrangements to conform fully as from that date 
or earlier with all current statutory requirements; 
(b) that partial assistance as at present should continue 
until the end of 1961; 
(c) that partial assistance should then be discontinued 
under Sections 37 and 39 of the Ordinance, unless the 
school concerned has, in the meantime, satisfied the 
Minister that it has made arrangements to conform 
fully with all statutory requirements as from the beginning 
of 1962, or earlier, in which case full assistance may 
be granted under (a); 
(d) that schools which do not so satisfy the Minister should 
be regarded as independent schools ineligible for any 
assistance from Government funds as from the beginning 
of 1962. " 
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These recommendations are quoted at length for indirectly they 
incorporated a strategy which would eliminate secondary schools that 
refused to conform to the national stated policy. This was to ensure 
that public funds were channelled only to schools that were willing to 
accept certain conditions as laid out by the Government. Under this 
arrangement, schools which refused to conform could still exist with the 
status of "independent secondary schools" but being deprived of any finan- 
cial grants from the state. To some extent, this measure had a slight 
relevance to the strategy which Archer (op. cit: 107) termed as "restrictive". 
The strategy implied the removal of "some of the facilities owned by the 
dominant group, or preventing it from supplying these resources to the 
educational sphere" (Archer, op. cit.: 107). 
Although the Education Review Committee, 1960 did not invoke any form 
of legislation that called for the abolition of these secondary schools 
that provided instruction in languages other than the country's official 
languages, the conforming clause nonetheless suggested that the Government 
was determined to recognise only two languages for instructional purposes 
at the secondary level of education. This new development created consid- 
erable discomfort among the Chinese community. Mr. Too Joon Hing, an 
independent Member of Parliament, described the Report of the Education 
Review Committee as deviating from the fundamental principles as had 
been laid out in the Razak Report (The Straits Echo, Oct. 20,1961). In 
his response to the Chinese educationalists who rejected the Report of the 
Education Review Committee, 1960, Khir Johari declared that even if Chinese 
were to be made one of the official languages of the country, it would not 
satisfy them. "They will only be satisfied when Malaya becomes part of 
China" (The Straits Echo, Nov. 9,1960). 
However, in Parliament, the Minister of Education argued that the 
issue over the language of instruction in secondary schools was not new. 
According to him, the schools were given three years since the enactment 
of the Education Ordinance, 1957, for them to adapt in accordance with 
the requirement for a national-type secondary school (F. D., August 10, 
1960). Thus, whether the schools wished to conform or 
left entirely for the individual school to decide. As 
Education pointed out: 
"Schools which do not wish to conform until 
1962 should be considered as schools which 
refused aid from the Government and like 
the 153 independent schools, they will not 
receive any aid from the Government" 
(PD, Aug. 10,1960: col. 2126). 
be independent was 
the iinister of 
Besides the conforming clause, the Education Review Committee, 1960 
was also specific over the languages that were to be used in public 
examinations. Etcept for the Malayan Secondary School Entrance Examination 
which would be set in the four languages used in the primary schools, 
other public examinations such as the Lower Certificate and the Federation 
of Malaya Certificate of Education would be in the official languages of 
the country (Education Review Committee, 1960: para. 172,173 & 174). 
To emphasise the point, the Education Review Committee (para. 175) 
stressed that "for the sake of national unity, the objective must be to 
eliminate communal secondary schools from the national system of assisted 
schools and to ensure that pupils of all races shall attend both National 
and National-type secondary schools. An essential element of this policy 
is that public examinations at secondary level should be conducted only 
in the country's official languages. " Thus, under the Education Review 
Committee, 1960, pupils had to be prepared for the public examination 
which would be conducted either in English or Malay. This implied that 
other than in subjects like languages and literature, the medium of 
instruction in all conforming schools would be the official languages of 
the country. 
Another positive point of the Education Review Committee was the 
assurance given towards the development of the national language in the 
school system. Both the Lower Certificate and the Federation of Malaya 
Certificate of Education examinations would be set in the national lang- 
uage beginning in 1960 and 1962 respectively (Education Review Committee, 
1960: para. 25). 
Although the Education Review Committee did outline the steps taken 
towards the development of the national language in the national school 
system, like the Razak Report, it did not categorically provide any 
recommendation for the establishment of Malay secondary schools. The 
Education Review Committee, 1960 thus retained the policy of opening up 
classes in the English medium secondary schools, using Malay as the 
medium of instruction (Education Review Committee, para. 39c). As for 
making the national language the main medium of instruction, it was not 
committed in its implementation especially in terms of the time schedule. 
In this matter the Committee was ambivalent and unsure. For instance, 
paragraph 61 of the Education Review Committee stated that the measures 
which had been taken "represent firm initial steps in the process of 
giving the National Language its rightful place in the educational system 
but there is still a long road to travel before the ultimate objective of 
makiizg the National Language the main medium of instruction in all 
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schools can be fully realised. " This was again re-emphasised by the 
Minister of Education when he introduced the Report of the Education 
Review Committee, 1960 to Parliament on August 10,1960. While emphasising 
that the development of the national language was one of the main object- 
ives of the national system of education, he also noted that "it is the 
most important instrument for national unity and it must be the basis in 
our national educational system" but at the end he cautioned that it must 
not be rushed (PD, Aug. 10,1960: col. 2130-2131). 
The Education Review Committee and the Political Reaction 
If the Razak Report was discussed in an atmosphere of cordiality, it 
was not so with the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960 when 
it was brought up in Parliament in August 1960. By this time, the Malayan 
Parliament had fully elected representatives. It was in 1959 that the 
first national election was held since independence and the outcome was 
different from the first Federal election which had taken place in 1955. 
In the first place, the Parliamentary seats were increased from 51 as in 
1955 to 104 in 1959. Secondly, while in 1955 there was only one oppo- 
sition member, this number had increased to 30 by 1959 (see Table 4). 
Thirdly, all the members of the legislatures were elected representatives 
as compared to the previous Parliament where it was shared between the 
elected and nominated members. With all these changes, it was inevitable 
that the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960 would have a 
rough passage through Parliament. In moving the motion that Parliament 
accepted in principle the policy as recommended by the Education Review 
Committee, the Minister of Education stressed two important issues that 
had been the focus of ethnic controversy. First was the conforming clause 
which had been strongly opposed by the Chinese Schools Board of 
Governors. As to this, the Minister pointed out: 
"In this respect, The Razak Report, 1956 in paragraphs 
38 and 39 had stated clearly that the Government 
would establish two types of schools. The Report had 
been passed by the Legislative Council and this 
proved that the matter was not new. The Education 
Ordinance 1957 had given a period of transition which 
within that period, the Minister had the power to 
provide grants to schools other than the national- 
type secondary schools with a reasonable time period 
to enable to the schools to adapt itself in accordance 
with the characteristics of a national-type secondary 
school" (PD, August 10,1960: col. 2125). 
The Minister again re-emphasised the objective that had been laid 
out in the Razak Report. This was: 
"... to unite children from all races under a common 
system of education in which the national language 
will be the main medium of instruction. Efforts 
towards achieving this objective had to be done full- 
heartedly -I proposed to set up more classes in the 
Government primary schools where the medium of instruction 
is Malay and this process of development would continue in 
all stages when teachers are fully trained" 
(PD, Aug. 10,1960: col. 2130). 
Secondly, the Minister also made a clarification on the position of 
the national language in the school system. He stressed that: 
"However, we must face the reality. The Government has 
no intention of making the Malay language as the medium 
of instruction by sacrificing the standard of education 
in our schools. As had been mentioned in the 1956 Report, 
progress towards achieving this goal cannot be rushed but 
must be gradual. I call on the Honourable Members who 
seriously love the country and our children to be patient 
and trust that the Government is sincere in its determination 
to make the Malay language as the main medium of instruction 
in our schools" 
(PD, Aug. 30,1960: col. 2131 )e 
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When analysing the above statement, it was quite certain that the 
Government was not sure and even vacillated over the position of the 
national language in the national school system. 
In the debates that followed, Mr. Ve: erappen, a member of the oppo- 
sition submitted that the Report is a failure" (PD, Aug. 10,1960: col. 2146). 
He further argued that the crux of the matter was over the examinations 
that were to be taken in the official languages of the country. He 
contended that the ruling forced Chinese students to take the examination 
in English. He then asked the following questions: 
"Is the English language the language of Malaya? Are 
we trying to create Englishmen in Malaya or are we 
trying to create Malayans in Malaya? Do we want a 
Malayan outlook or an English outlook? ... we do 
not agree that English is more foreign to these people 
than Malay. They are in this country and they should 
accept the national language; but to ask them to learn 
a language which is 8,000 miles away is incredible" (ibid. ). 
A PMIP Member, En. Zulkiflee bin Muhammad was also concerned over the 
prominence given to the English language. While admitting its importance, 
he also cautioned the Government on the influence the language had and 
that it must be "jealously treated when implementing the policy" (FD, 
Aug. 10,1960: col. 2174). 
Outside the House, the debates continued. As has been observed, 
dissatisfaction over the Razak Report was further fuelled by the Report of 
the Education Review Committee, 1960. The issue became even more serious 
when political entrepreneurs, teachers, nationalists, chauvinists and the 
public in general began to take a very serious interest in the future of 
Malayan education. Added to that, the debates that developed began to 
incorporate the fundamental principles that had been enshrined in the 
Federal Constitution. True enough, just like any other public issue, the 
debates on education became acutely polarised, not in terms of basic 
philosophy but rather in terms of ethnicity and language. 
In Retrospect 
In establishing a national system of education, Malaya faced a 
similar dilemma to that experienced by other newly independent states. 
The demands that the national system of education should be based on 
local philosophy and needs was dwarfed by the colonial interest represented 
by the new elites who had been the product of colonial grooming. The 
Razak Report was one shining example where the remnants of colonialism 
were clearly manifested. Of particular significance was in ihe area deal- 
ing with the language of instruction in schools. For instance, throughout 
the discussion over the Razak Report (LCD, May 16,1956: col. 1144-1205), 
most of the concern shown by the Council Members was on the future of the 
English language rather than emphasising the role that the national lang- 
uage should contribute towards the development of the country's national 
system of education. This colonial influence was so great that it had 
come to the stage where even among the Malay Members of the Legislative 
Council themselves showed very little confidence in their own language 
(LCD, May 16,1956: col. 1194). The same trend of thought was again 
expressed when the Education Bill was tabled on March 7,1957. 
Admittedly, there were changes in the structural and organisational 
set-up as recommended in the Razak Report. But a newly independent nation 
needs more than just structural changes. What the country needed was an 
entirely new educational set-up, both in content and philosophy to suit 
the needs of an independent country. Thus, any national system of educ- 
ation had to be free from both the political and psychological influences 
of the colonial past. It was in this vital area that the Razak Report 
failed in its task. 
Apparent in the Razak Report and the Education Review Committe, 1960 
was the overt act of perpetuating inequality in opportunity at the secon- 
dary level and the re-inforcement of ethnic segregation at the primary 
stages of education. In the former, both committees negated the exist- 
ence of rural-urban educational anomalies. The policy of opening Malay 
secondary classes in the English medium secondary schools was 
open discrim- 
ination towards the rural-based population. This was due to the fact that 
most of the English medium secondary schools were located in the urban 
centres and therefore not easily accessible to the Malay pupils who 
mostly lived in the rural areas. Sheer distance from these schools gen- 
erally prevented Malay pupils from attending these classes. At the same 
time, being attached to an established institution, the psychological 
barrier in terms of social interaction, opportunity in the use of facilities 
and the feelings of freedom and pride were conspicuously absent. In fact 
these "embryo classes" were like squatters that lived day by day at the 
discretion of the parent institutions. 
Another aspect of the paradox was the continuation of the ethnic seg- 
regation as manifested by the establishment of primary schools 
that provided 
instructions in four different languages. The preservation of ethnic 
schools was in fact a recognition of the concept of educational pluralism, 
and element of "divide and rule" which had been so successfully implemented 
during the period of colonial rule. 
lastly, even with the introduction of the common content syllabuses 
in all schools with a view "towards the development of a common Malayan 
outlook" (The Razak Report, 1956, para. 115 & The Education Review 
Committee, 1960, para. 46), it would be just an "innovation of nomen- 
clature" (Foster, 1965: 185) for in the final analysis it was the mode of 
evaluation and its credentialism that determined the final content of the 
curriculum. So long as the school leaving certificate was being dictated 
by an Examination Syndicate from Britain, it was inevitable that the 
content of the curriculum would be tilted away from Malaya. Thus, the 
national system of education had nothing "national" to be proud of. The 
reluctance of the policy makers to deviate from the umbrella of colonial- 
ism was in the final analysis the essence of Malayan education 
during the 
first decade of independence. 
Chapter Five 
Education, Constitution and Politics 
As has been mentioned in the last chapter, the flaws of the proposed 
national education system as envisaged in the Razak Report were many. 
Among them were the retention of the plural school system at the primary 
level of instruction, the failure to recommend the establishment of 
Malay medium secondary schools, the strong colonial colouring of the 
structure and content of the curriculum and the ambiguity of the policy 
itself. However, these defects failed to generate the necessary public 
interest. Instead, they were all eclipsed by the language clause of the 
Report, especially in relation to the position of the national language 
and other languages in the proposed school system. 
As the terms of reference in the Razak Report (para. 1) suggested, it 
was the intention of the Government to make schools the instrument for 
the socialisation of the young. To achieve this end, a common language 
of instruction was recommended. It was not an empty formula. 
As Ekuban 
(op. cit.: 128) pointed out: 
"A common language is an effective instrument in 
forging national unity. Political slogans such 
as "one people, one language" heard in countries 
like Israel are not empty words". 
But this view was in contradiction of the stand taken by the immi- 
grant communities who felt that all languages 
deserved recognition, 
especially in the national education system of the country. 
This phil- 
osophical difference over the "language of instruction" 
in schools did 
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not however confine itself only to the realm of education. It somehow 
touched on the very basis of the country's constitutional framework, the 
bargaining processes that took place during the course of its formulation, 
and the spirit of compromise and reconciliation over certain matters 
related to ethnic interests. Although education per se was not incorpor- 
ated directly in this bargaining process, much of the recommendations 
in the Razak Report were inextricably linked to the constitution itself. 
All these were in relation to the position of the national language in 
proposed national education system (Razak Report: para. la, 12 and Ch. III) 
and the status given to other languages. Thus, an understanding of the 
Malayan constitution was therefore imperative if one was to analyse the 
development of Malayan education and the political process that accrued 
with it. 
Education and Article 152 of the Constitution 
In Malaya, the supremacy of the constitution is unchallenged. In 
the words of Malaya's foremost judge, Tun Mohammed Suffian (1976: 17-18), 
"It is supreme in the sense that there is no law which it cannot make, 
repeal or amend, that no person can declare its Act invalid, and that it 
cannot legislate to prevent the repeal or amendment of its own enactments". 
For a plural society like Malaya, the Federal Constitution, besides 
embodying the rule of law, also acted as a source of reference for the 
individual and societies. It outlines one's legal position in the soc- 
iety and one's relationship with the state. It was in this context that 
the constitutional-making process became subjected to much political 
opposition and scrutinization when the British Government introduced the 
"Malayan Union" plan immediately following the end of the Second World 
,ý 
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War (see Chapter 2). The same development occurred in 1956 when the 
country was preparing for its independence (Vasil, 1980: 105-106). However 
in the latter, the differences that emerged were amicably solved through 
the process of bargaining and compromise among contending groups (Leifer, 
1969: 203) . 
Under these circumstances it could be summed up that the constitution 
of Malaya to a certain extent was a by-product of national consensus and 
conciliation. To use the words of Jennings (1959: 82), it was "an instru- 
ment of national co-operation, and the spirit of co-operation is as 
necessary as the instrument". It was in the same spirit that the Federal 
Constitution of 1957 was written. Besides embodying "the rule of law" 
(Jennings, ibi. d: 62) it also attempted to reconciliate the various communal 
interests that prevailed within the polity. Of particular importance 
were matters that defined the position of the indigenous community vis-a-vis 
the immigrants, especially over the questions of citizenship, special 
rights of the Malays and the national language of the country. The prob- 
lems that surrounded these issues were mostly based on the indigenous- 
immigrant sentiments that had been mentioned earlier. For instance, the 
non-Malay's call for the liberalisation of the citizenship requirements 
and the adoption of a multi-lingual policy was disagreeable to the Malays. 
They felt that the conferment of citizenship status would also provide 
these immigrants with political recognition, which the Malays were still 
unprepared to give, fearing that this would threaten their position as 
the natives of the country. 
1 Secondly, the Malays were still suspicious 
of the loyalty of the immigrant communities towards their new home. 
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1. In terms of numbers, the Malays had only a slight edge over the 
immigrants. See Legislative Council Debates, July 10,1957: col. 2860. 
2. The Chinese in particular were identified with the communist terror- 
ists who tried to impose their rule over the country. To the Malays, 
this meant domination from China. 
As a corollary to the question of citizenship, there were also 
issues related to the national language and the special position of the 
Malays. However, these differences were reconciled during the period of 
constitutional negotiation and what emerged was a quid-pro-quo arrange- 
ment, where, by and large the Malays compromised over the liberalization 
of citizenship status for the immigrant communities in return for recog- 
nition over "the special rights of the Malays" and accepting Malay as the 
national language of the country. 
' 
As a liberalized form, the final 
product of the Federal Constitution provided a single nationality for 
those who qualified either by birth or by fulfilling certain requirements 
such as a period of residence, passing the national language test and 
by taking the oath of loyalty (Federal Constitution, Pt. lll: para. l4-19). 
This process of bargaining was essentially the spirit behind the form- 
ulation of the 1957 constitution. As Mohammed Suffian (1976: 251) pointed 
out: 
''... in return for the relaxation of the conditions 
for granting to non-Malays of citizenship, the 
rights and privilieges of Malays as the indigenous 
people of the country were to be written into the 
constitution, and there were other provisions also 
agreed to by the non-Malay leaders. " 
It is not difficult to point out "the other provisions that were 
agreed by the non-Malays" as mentioned by Mohammed Suffian. Language 
was one aspect that had been the subject of political controversy during 
the period of the constitutional negotiation process. Tun Tan Siew Sin 
1. For detailed discussions, see K. J. Ratnam (1965: Ch. 3 & 4), and 
B. Simandjuntak (1969: 84-93 and 182-186). 
described how agreements over the language issue were reached: 
"The non-Malay'communities set great store on their 
own language and cultures. Let me point out1 that 
in the first instance, the Reid Constitution as 
originally drafted said nothing whatsoever about the preservation and development of Chinese or 
Tamil, or for that matter any other language. When 
it was suggested to the Malay leaders that the 
Constitution should explicitly state that the preser- 
vation and development of both Chinese and Tamil 
should be encouraged and fostered, they readily agreed 
to it. I quote this incident to indicate to those 
outside our immediate circle that the Malay leaders 
are essentially fair and statesmanlike" 
(LCD, July 10,1957: col. 2871). 
The above principle as outlined by Tun Tan Siew Sin was clearly 
visible in Article 152 of the Federal Constitution which stated that: 
"The national language shall be the Malay language 
and shall be in such script as Parliament may by law 
provide: 
Provided that - 
(a) no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using 
(otherwise than for official purposes), or from teaching 
or learning, any other language; and 
(b) nothing in this Clause shall prejudice the right of the 
Federal Government or of any State Government to preserve 
and sustain the use and study of the language of any other 
community in the Federation 
(Federal Constitution, Pt. Xll: Art. 152). 
However, for official purposes the constitution still maintained the 
eminence of the English language. Article 152 (2) for instance, emphasised 
1. A Commission that was formed to devise a constitution for independent 
Malaya was headed by Lord Reid "a distinguished Lord of Appeal" 
from Britain. Henceforth, the Commission is often referred to as 
the "Reid Commission" (see Mohammed Suffian, op. cit.: ll). 
that "Notwithstanding the provisions of Clause (1), for a period of ten 
years after Merdeka Day, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise 
provides, the English language may be used in both Houses of Parliament, 
in the Legislative Assembly of every State, and for all other official 
purposes" (Federal Constitution, op. cit.: Art. 152 (2) ). Also for a 
period of ten years after independence, all Bills that were to be intro- 
duced in both Houses of Parliament or their amendments and "Acts of 
Parliament and all subsidiary legislation issued by the Federal Government" 
(Art. 152 (3) ) and all Court proceedings shall be in the English language 
(Art. 152 (4 & 5) ). 
Basically, the Merdeka constitution did not change the position of 
the various languages. It merely sets the dateline for the change. In 
fact for the first ten years after independence the status-quo on lang- 
uages remained. The open-ended nature of the language clause left many 
questions unanswered and the most important was over the position of the 
national language during that ten-year period. This led to the different 
interpretations as to how Article 152 should be operated. First, should 
the ten-year period be considered as transitional, then what would be 
the position of the national language in relation to English? Some felt 
that during this transitional period and in anticipation of taking over 
the function of an official language from English, Malay should be 
increasingly used to facilitate the change that was to take place. Thus, 
after the end of the ten-year period, the change from English to Malay 
would be effective and complete. Another view was that Malay language 
was still inadequate and wanted more time for the change from English to 
Malay to take effect. This argument was often expressed by ]: embers of 
the Legislative Council during the debates on the Razak Report. For 
example, a Malay member of the Legislature commented that: 
"'sh'e should remember that the educational policy which 
is already in force for decades cannot in a short 
period cause the other languages to disappear through 
legislation. We should implement it gradually because 
we are quite aware of the fact that there is an acute 
shortage of teachers at the moment, shortage in every- 
thing, we even lack the funds" 
(IcD, May 16,1956) . 
In the pragmatic approach of the former, while recognising the 
official role of English, there was also a wish to see that preparations 
were made immediately after independence. The gradualist on the other 
hand, while not as vocal, remained firmly to the words of the constitution, 
i. e. for the next ten years English would be the official language of 
the country. As to the future, it was left to Parliament to decide. 
The way Article 152 of the constitution was interpreted had a strong 
bearing on the direction and pace of the national education policy. The 
Razak Report was explicit in its objective of making the national lang- 
uage as the main medium of instruction in schools. However, the uncertainty 
of the Report being implemented remained, for it also emphasised "that 
progress towards this goal cannot be rushed and must be gradual" (Razak 
Report, para. 12). The Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960 
(paras. 22,28,61 and 299), despite re-affirming the objective of making 
the national language the main medium of instruction in schools, created 
further ambiguity and dubiousness towards the implementation of the 
national language policy in schools. 
If the constitutional objective of Article 152 was to make iialay 
the sole official language of the country, the national education policy 
as envisaged in the Razak Report should also simultaneously be moving in 
the same direction. But while the constitution had a fixed time period 
for the implementation of the national language policy, the Razak Report 
was vague, uncommitted and unscheduled. Since the national language 
policy was enshrined in the constitution, it was inevitable that it became 
the source of reference for those who would like to see its extension 
being felt in the national system of education. At the same time, with 
such importance being attached to the question of language, either as 
the national language or the language of instruction in schools, it was 
also inevitable that the issue would become entwined into the Malayan 
political scene. 
Education and the Politics of Language 
In Malaya, education and politics were closely related and it was 
almost impossible to divorce one from the other. This phenomenon could 
be attributed to the very nature of Malayan society which seemed not to 
view things beyond the perimeter of ethnic interest. The national educ- 
ation policy was one which became the subject of ethnic interpretations 
and misconceptions. Disagreement over this issue varied and much depended 
on how the relevant issues were perceived. This was especially true when 
in most cases formal education became the basis of one's upward social 
mobility and also a major determinant in getting access to the lucrative 
occupational opportunities. On the economic side, education belonged to 
the high investment area. For instance, "private investment in Malaya's 
First Five Year Plan, 1956-1960, amounting to % 2,000 million rose to 
about 12,900 million in the Second Five Year Plan, 1960-1965. The slice 
for education for the corresponding periods was from about q 61 million 
to V 252 million" (Ministry of Educ. Malaysia, 1968: 26-27). In terms of 
numbers, there was also a tremendous increase in enrollment. For example, 
in 1957 the number of pupils that enrolled in the Government assisted 
schools was 983,701. This figure was increased to 1,729,913 in 1967 
(see Table 8), an increase of 76%. Thus, in terms of the economic 
rewards that education could provide and the numbers that were involved 
in their pursuit, it was unfortunate that we had to face the basic political 
question of "Who gets what, when, how" and how much(Lasswell: op. cit. ) 
when analysing the controversy that evolved around the development of 
Malayan education. 
Table 8 
No. of Pupils Enrolled in Assisted Schools 
Primary and Secondary 
Medium 1957 % 1967 % 
% 
increase 
Malay Primary Schools 441,567 44.9 591,560 34.2 34 
English Primary Schools 130,360 13.2 289,056 16.7 122 
Chinese Primary Schools 310,458 31.6 355,771 20.6 14 
Tamil Primary Schools 50,766 5.2 79,203 4.6 56 
English Secondary Schools 48,235 4.9 286,254 16.5 493 
Malay Secondary Schools 2,315 0.2 128,069 7.4 5k32 
TOTAL 
L 
983,701 100.0 1,729,913 100.0 76 
Source: The Ministry of Education Malaysia, 1968 Educational Statistics 
of Malaysia 1938 to 1967, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa & 
Pustaka, figures derived from tables 4,5,6,7,12 & 13. 
The crisis that developed over education began when, as part of 
the country's nation-building programme, a radical change of policy was 
made over the status of languages. Firstly, Malay was made the national 
language and secondly, the national language was ultimately to be the 
main medium of instruction in schools. These changes were received with 
mixed responses from the public. While Malay as the national language 
of the country was acceptable because of its necessity, the same reaction 
was absent when it was to be incorporated into the national education 
system. 
Opponents to the national education policy could be identified 
and placed into three categories distinguishable by their educational 
backgrounds, and their perceptions of the policy differed in accordance 
with different interests and needs. Those with an English education, for 
instance, were in favour of retaining the eminence of the English language 
in schools. The Chinese educated on the other hand demanded that all 
the languages be treated as equal. But the Malays viewed the language 
question differently. While the advocates of the English language 
justified its importance in the context of educational progress and know- 
ledge, and the Chinese viewed the exclusion of their language in the 
educational policy as parochial, undemocratic and "contravened the provisions 
of the United Nations Charter" (The Straits Echo, Aug. 16,1954), the 
Malays perceived the whole issue on the basis of cultural legitimacy. 
1. When presenting the constitutional proposal to the Legislative 
Council (July 10,1957), Tunku Abdul Rahman stated that, "in any 
event, it is very important that our people should converse with 
one another in one common language and there can be no doubt that 
the common language must ultimately be the Malay language. " 
Their argument was that Malay language was native to the country and 
to the region, and the fact that in Indonesia, Malay1 was used at all 
levels of instruction in schools tended to prove that English was not 
indispensable. As Dato' Abdul Razak (The Straits Echo, Nov. 15,1955) 
himself pointed out: 
"The Indonesian Republic has set an example to the 
Federation of Malaya and paved the way for the 
development of the Malay language. We have agreed 
to interchange experts on languages. If the 
languages could be reduced, our task of developing 
the Malay language in the Federation would be greatly 
simplified. " 
Of course the argument here could also be considered as rhetorically 
nationalistic. Nonetheless, viewed from another perspective there was 
some basis to it. Until independence, the Malay language in school did 
not reach beyond the primary level of instruction. It was only in 1958 
that the first Malay secondary classes were opened. Thus there was scepti- 
cism from various quarters about the ability of the language to go beyond 
the enclaves of primary education. However, the Malays were confident of 
their language. They viewed it not in its capacity to fulfil the national 
obligation (such that it could function in the country's administrative 
and educational systems) but whether the language was given any opportunity 
to play that role. It should also be emphasised that the Malay language 
was not given any chance to develop either in administration, school or 
commerce by both the colonial government and the immigrant communities 
alike. An attempt to elevate its position as envisioned by the Barnes 
Report (op. cit. ) failed to materialise because of the opposition from 
1. In Indonesia, Malay language is called "Bahasa Indonesia" or 
Indonesian language. 
the immigrant communitiös and the liberal attitudes of the colonial 
authority. 
Debates on education took a new turn following the official release 
of the Razak Report on May 7,1956. The Report which was supposed to 
embody the aspirations of the country as a whole unfortunately became a 
major source of ethnic discord. Many aspects of the Report were unaccept- 
able to the non-Malays, especially on the position of their language in 
the national education system. In a plural society, it seemed inevitable 
that the issue became eminent considering the strong attachment each 
ethnic group had to their respective languages. In addition, having them 
incorporated into the national education system would even make it more 
important for they were assured of their continuity, development and 
recognition. 
Basically, it was over the vital question of languages and their 
positions in the national school system that put the Government in a state 
of dilemma. The consociational politics, of which the Alliance Government 
was built was not in itself a conflict-proof arrangement. Much of the 
success depended on the willingness of every political leader to compromise 
towards moderation and the ability of the rank and file of the party to 
understand most of the decision-making processes that were taking place 
within the political framework of consociationalism. However, in a 
deeply fragmented society, the politics of moderation were often miscon- 
ceived and misunderstood. Under such conditions, "pressure toward moderate 
middle-of-the-road attitudes are absent" (Lijphart, 1969: 209). Further- 
more, the decisions taken by these "cartel of elites" (Lijphart, ibid.: 213) 
were sometimes incongruous to the basic lines of thought as conceived by 
the masses. In some cases the differences were serious enough to even 
threaten the fragile arrangements which had been made among the various 
political partners. But it was most unlikely for the leaders of any pol- 
itical party to ignore the differences that existed for in the final 
analysis it was the reconciliation of these divergent views that deter- 
mined their position within the party's hierarchy. 
While the politics of accommodation may provide a.. short term consen- 
sus over policy matters, it will nevertheless remain free of conflicts 
as long as the participating group feels that there is no betrayal of 
their interest and there exists a "high degree of commitment to the main- 
tenance of the system" among them (Lijphart, 1968: 204). However, in the 
case of the Razak Report, the controversy that developed was over an 
issue that touched on the very nerve of ethnic interest. Under these 
circumstances, it was inevitable for an ethnic based political party to 
toe the line of its respective supporters rather than be committed to the 
cause that had been agreed upon by the central body. This nature of the 
controversy constantly threatened the fragile partnership of the Alliance 
Government, a political party based on ethnic coalition. 
The Razak Report: Chinese Reaction 
Ethnic related issues are easily vulnerable to chauvinistic appeals. 
For instance, language is one area where ethno-political conflict could 
easily be generated. The interplay of this variable is evident when 
analysing the Malayan educational development between 1955 and 1969. 
This was the case with the Razak Report where the disagreement over 
policy was mainly centred upon the language of instruction rather than 
the effect of the structural changes that were to take place. 
Peculiar in the debates were the demands and justifications made 
by each ethnic group for their respective languages to be incorporated 
into the new educational system. Since language is culturally and ethnic- 
ally linked, the arguments seem to be more inclined towards cultural bias 
and as such they tend to deviate from the scope of education. It was in 
this temper that the Union of Chinese School Teachers Association, UCSTA, 
(Means, 1970: 203) and the Chinese Press (Fennel, 1968: 443) led their 
assault on the Razak Report. While the Alliance Government was successful 
in toning down the educational issues during the election of 1955, the 
same could not be effectively applied once the election was over. With 
the official release of the Report, the voices of dissatisfaction were 
again heard. For example, when the Razak Report was unveiled for the 
first time, The Straits Echo (May 7,1956) hailed the new educational plan 
as "revolutionary". But dissatisfaction over the Report soon emerged. 
The Penang and Province Wellesly Chinese School Teachers Association 
called for the deletion of paragraph 12 of the Report which set the 
"ultimate objective" of making the national language as the main medium of 
instruction in schools. The Association felt that the controversial para- 
graph had contradicted the given terms of reference as expressed in para- 
graph 10 of the Razak Report which stated that "as a guiding principle 
the intention to make Malay the national language of the country whilst 
preserving and sustaining the growth of the language and cultures of non- 
Malay peoples living in the country" (The Straits Echo, May 15,1956). 
The response of the Federation of Indian School Teachers Union was 
also unfavourable to the Report. The Union feared that under the new 
educational policy, the progress of the Tamil language would be retarded 
and the status of Indian school teachers would be affected (The Straits 
Echo, June 23,1956). 
Being an ethnically based political party, the MCA was soon caught 
up in the controversy. Tan Siew Sin, an influential MCA Member of Parl- 
iament, in his attempt to placate the growing discontent among his party 
members gave his assurance to the Chinese educational institutions, teachers 
and the boards of management that he "personally has every confidence that 
there would be fairness in the implementation of the Bill (LCD, March 7, 
1957: col. 2553). Despite the strong opposition from the Chinese community 
the Education Bill, 1957, was passed without any dissent, even from among 
the Chinese members of the legislature. The reason for their support of 
the Bill was to some extent political rather than national. Firstly, 
debates over the Bill were held in March, a few months before independence. 
During this period, the constitution for independent Malaya was yet to be 
finalised and negotiations were still in progress especially on matters 
relating to the position of the country's various ethnic groups. The 
non-Malay members of the Legislative Council were invariably aware of this 
constitutional development and so as not to influence the negotiating 
process, they opted not to vote against the Bill. Secondly, the Razak 
Report was not arbitrarily imposed upon the nation. It was the outcome of 
a series of high-level committee discussions in which the Chinese as 
represented by the MCA and the Indians by the MIC were part of the decision- 
making process. It was therefore most unfortunate for the MCA and the MIC 
leaders to be caught in these two political dilemmas. Under these 
conditions it was imperative for them not to oppose the Bill. 
Being members of the Alliance Government, both the MCA and the MIC 
had to share the burden of responsibility over every policy that had been 
made. At the same time, it was also the party's responsibility to ensure 
that a fair deal was achieved whenever a policy-decision was taken. In 
cases where the decision taken came into conflict with the general demands 
of the party members, an added task emerged over the process of 'selling 
and rationalising" this new programme. The process of reconciling these 
divergent opinions was not easy. It would be even harder if needs and 
demands were diametrically opposed. It was in this sense that the pol- 
itics of compromise began to take their toll. The Razak Report was a 
case where it was perceived to be against the general interests of the 
immigrant communities. This view was especially felt within the Chinese 
community. The effect of the Report subsequently alienated the leaders 
of the MCA from their supporters, creating a crisis of confidence within 
the party that almost broke the consociational principle of the Alliance 
Government. 
It all began in early 1958 when a new group within the MCA was 
consolidating itself in preparation for a challenge to the existing 
leadership. Led by Dr. Lim Chong Eu, this new group was dissatisfied and 
impatient towards their leaders whom they felt had failed to protect the 
interests of the Chinese (The Straits Times, March 3,1958). In the 
leadership contest that followed, Dr. Lim defeated Tan Cheng Lock, the 
incumbent president of the MCA. Among the first acts of defiance initiated 
by Dr. Lim was the sponsoring of the Pan Malayan Chinese Educational 
Conference which strongly criticized the Government's educational policy 
(The Straits Echo, Sept. 22,1958). The Conference urged the Government 
to adopt Chinese as one of the official languages of the country, to give 
Chinese schools the same treatment as other institutions in the Federation 
and called for the Alliance Party to commit itself of the proposal that 
Chinese be made an official language in the forthcoming election manifesto 
(The Straits Echo, Sept. 23,1958). Tunku Abdul Rahman, as the Prime 
Minister and the leader of the Alliance was quick to reject the demands. 
He further stressed that, "no other language except Malay and English 
would be accepted as the official language so that the people could be 
brought faster together" (The Straits Echo, Sept. 29,1958). 
Strategic political changes were also felt in the MCA under the new 
leadership of Dr. Lim Chong Eu. Contrary to the Alliance philosophy of 
"settling the differences within the party, he abrasively made sure that 
whatever transpired in his mind must also be heard by his supporters. 
For instance, he made his stand clear by declaring that the Chinese in 
Malaya demanded equality in status, wanted their way of life, language 
and schools to be protected, and equality of opportunity for economic 
advancement (The Straits Times, Dec. 1,1958). These open demands made 
by the MCA created a political storm within the Alliance. To the UMNO 
and the Malays, Dr. Lim's statement was in violation of the spirit that 
had been embodied in the constitution. Nonetheless, it was on the eve of 
the 1959 parliamentary election that the crisis began to develop in the 
open. This came about when the MCA demanded that the party should be 
given forty seats out of a total 104 in the coming election, and that the 
Alliance manifesto must clearly express its intention to review in general 
the implementation of its educational policy so that the medium of exam- 
ination in Chinese schools could be the medium of instruction (The Straits 
Times, July 10,1959). The turning point came when Dr. Lim's letter to 
Tunku Abdul Rahman was made public and the content of the letter besides 
asking for more seats for the MCA in the coming election also stressed 
that the party would "stand absolutely firm on the issue of Chinese 
education" and was even willing to fight alone in the election (The Straits 
Times, July 10,1959)" In his reply, which was also made public, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman openly expressed his disappointment with the present leaders 
of the MCA. But he was undeterred and willing to fight the election under 
the Alliance banner together with the MIC and the MCA members who disreg- 
arded the stand taken by their leaders (The Straits Times, July 11,1959)" 
The effect of the crisis upon the new leaders of the MCA was devastating. 
The attempt by the "Young Turks" in the party to force changes in the 
Alliance Government's policy by resorting to confrontation rather than 
negotiation seemed to have back-fired. Many of its members who were 
disillusioned with the Alliance policy resigned from the party 
(Vasil, 
1972: 5). Dr. Lim himself resigned from the post of president and left for 
Britain for medical treatment (Means, op. cit: 214). With the new leader- 
ship, calm was restored in the party and its working relationship with 
other parties in the Alliance returned to normal - at least for the next 
few years. 
The Razak Report and the Malys 
The Malay's reaction to the Razak report was a combination of utter 
dissatisfaction and concern. The Utusan N elayu (May 9,1956) in its 
editorial commented that the recommendations as envisaged in the Razak 
Report were not bold enough in the sense that it was willing to oppose 
the position of English in schools. Johor's UMNO even sent a telegram 
stating its position opposing the Razak Report. It considered the Report 
prepared by the Educational Committee as dangerous to the Malay race. The 
statement urged UMNO to reject the Report for accepting multi-lingualism 
as this could destroy the status of the Malay language as the national 
language of the country (Utusan Melayu, May 8,1956). The vehement 
opposition shown by Johor's UMNO was in response to the statement made 
by Dato' Abdul Razak that "the new educational policy will eliminate most 
of the grievances of the Malays" (Utusan Melayu, May 8,1956). The 
Malacca Division of the party, while giving its support to the educational 
plan, at the same time had certain reservations. As one Committee Member 
of the Division commented, "it is a bold step forward and acceptable to 
all communities living in the country. If we want to see it from the 
Malay point of view only, it is not very satisfactory" (The Straits Echo, 
May 15,1956). However, it was the Federation of Malay School Teachers 
Association (FMSTA) that spearheaded Malays' grievances against the 
Report. The Association was particularly incensed by the fact that the 
Razak Report was not even translated into the Malay language (Majallah 
Guru, Feb. 1957: 37). As to this effect, Majallah Guru (ibid. ) in its 
editorial commented: 
"We could not understand the principle taken by 
those who were responsible in the Education Department 
and who refused to produce the translation into Malay 
... according to them this was related 
to the law and 
thus could not be translated into the Malay language. " 
Opposition to the Report by the Association was basically over three 
areas. The first was over paragraph 12 of the Report which was viewed by 
the VISTA as implying that Malay was only made the medium of instruction 
in schools in addition to other languages. To the fl4STA, it was a "ploy 
to develop the English language and preserve other foreign languages" and 
thus placed them at equal status with the national language of the country 
(20 Tahun KPGMS, 1946-1966: 59-60). The Association also felt that the 
existing paragraph was not assuring enough and demanded that the word 
"main" be abrogated and replaced by the word "sole". It suggested that 
paragraph 12 of the Razak Report should be, "that the National Language 
(Malay) should be the sole language of instruction in the national schools 
and schools which are aided by the government" (20 Tahun KPGMS, ibid.: 59). 
The demand that only the Malay language be made the sole medium of 
instruction in all Government aided schools was the common theme among 
the Malays when debating the new educational policy. For instance, a 
call of this nature was made by sixty delegates from twenty-six different 
organisations which met in Penang specifically to discuss the Razak Report 
and its implications for Malay education (Warta Negara, July 9,1956). 
As to this effect the FMSTA even sent a memorandum to the Minister of 
Education asking that Malay be made the sole language of instruction in 
all national and government aided schools (Warta Negara, July 11,1956). 
On its programme of implementation, the Association agreed that 
changes from English to Malay should be made gradually but nonetheless 
within a specific time period. The Association thus proposed two time 
schedules for the Government to consider. In the first, the time period 
it proposed was in line with Article 152 of the constitution. Its second 
recommendation called for the immediate change in the language of instruc- 
tion in the secondary schools. Under this schedule, the change in the 
language of instruction from English to Malay would be complete by 
1963 (20 Tahun KPGMS, op. cit.: 59)" 
Another point with which the FMSTA disagreed was over the establish- 
ment of two types of school as proposed by the Razak Report. It urged 
the Government to set up only one type of school and in cases where the 
schools were privately managed, the national language must be made a com- 
pulsory subject and the curriculum taught must be the same as that being 
offered in government schools (20 Tahun KPGMS, op. cit.: 60). 
Finally, the WSTA disagreed with paragraph 25 of the Report which 
recommended that "special arrangements" be made for Malay school teachers 
to enable them to teach in the standard schools. 
In their meeting with Dato' Abdul Razak on August 24,1956, the 
Association was given a written assurance that the Ministry had agreed that 
all Government schools would be converted to standard schools with Malay 
as the medium of instruction. In addition, Dato' Abdul Razak agreed to 
implement the Malay language as the medium of instruction at university 
level within a period of six years as proposed by the Association 
(20 Tahun KPGMS, op. cit.: 60). 
Seeing that the Government was not responding to the demands made 
by the Malays, Warta Negara (Sept. 1,1956) in its hard-hitting editorial 
stressed that the special privileges of the Malays and their basic rights 
were not items that were to be compromised. To deny the Malays their 
rights would also mean denying that this country belongs to the Malays. 
This implied that the country belongs to all ethnic groups. Majallah 
Guru (. Sept. 1957), also in its editorial stressed that efforts towards 
implementing the Malay language as the sole official and national language 
of the Federation "as the most important attempt towards the development 
of a common identity. " 
In spite of these demands, the Government remained firm on its policy. 
Even up to the beginning of 1957, all the agreements that had been reached 
with the Minister of Education were yet to be implemented. A Special 
Delegates Conference was c, fled by the FMSTA on April 21,1957 and two 
days later a memorandum was sent to the Government calling for the conver- 
sion of Malay schools to standard schools, for the existing l; alay schools 
to use Malay as the medium of instruction in all subjects, and all pupils 
in this school who were in standard seven or in special classes should 
immediately be placed in the first year level of the Malay secondary 
schools (20 Tahun KPGMS, op. cit.: 61). However, the reply given by the 
Ministry of Education could not convince the Association that serious efforts 
were being made towards the development of Malay education as had been 
repeatedly demanded by them. 
Like their MCA counterparts, the leaders of the UMNO encountered 
a similar dilemma over the question of language and education. Since the 
release of the Razak Report, dissatisfaction among the rank and file of 
the party had grown over the Government's 'mishandling- of Malay education". 
In the first place, they were disappointed over the "ambiguous commit- 
ment" of the Razak Report in making Malay the sole language of instruc- 
tion in schools. Secondly, their call for the immediate establishment of 
Malay secondary schools was not at all considered. These two issues, to 
a certain extent, caused a major split within the party. In Penang for 
example, the state's UMNO Special Representatives Assembly made a call 
upon UMNO Councillors at all levels to resign en bloc if Malay secondary 
schools were not established in a month's time (The Straits Echo, Jan. 13, 
1958). In Early February, 1958, at an emergency meeting of the FMSTA, 
about 8,000 members of the Association decided to quit their membership 
of the party as a protest against the failure of the Government to start 
the Malay secondary schools (The Straits Echo, Feb. 1,1958). The crisis 
was threatening enough to warrant the intervention of the Prime Minister 
himself. On September 22,1958, a meeting was held between the represen- 
tatives of the FMSTA and Tunku Abdul Rahman. At the end of the meeting 
the Prime Minister agreed that beginning from 1959, Malay language would 
be made the language of instruction in all Government schools; Malay 
language would be the medium of instruction for Malay pupils in the secon- 
dary schools, and the position of the teachers and supervisors as recommend- 
ed by the Razak Report would be reviewed (20 Tahun KPGMS, op. cit.: 64). 
Nonetheless, despite all these promises, nothing was done for their 
implementation. The Government seemed determined to stick to the Report 
despite the enormous political pressures that were being mounted. 
The Razak Report: Other Views 
While the Federation of Malay School Teachers Association provided 
a platform for the Malay school teachers, others who disagreed with the 
Alliance Government's policy had in the Pan-Islamic Party and the 
People's Progressive Party their new champions. Being a political party 
whose ideology was exclusively based on Malayism and Islamism, UMNO's 
willingness to co-operate with the MCA and the MIC was an anathema to the 
PMIP's basic ideology. In the words of its first president, Dr. Burhanuddin, 
independence merely introduced a new phase in the political struggle of 
the Malay community, and the PMIP was dedicated to carrying out this 
struggle further, so as to "realise the aspirations of Islam" and the 
re-establishment of Malaya as a Malay country (Utusan Melayu, Sept. 7,1957). 
The Government's policy of accommodating the educational needs of the 
immigrant communities as reflected in the Razak Report thus provided the 
PMIP with a powerful political arsenal in discrediting UMNO's position on 
the question of language and education. 
The PMIP which was initially called the All Malayan Islamic Association 
(AMIA) was part of UMNO but withdrew from the party following its consent 
in relaxing the citizenship laws for immigrants. In the 1955 Federal 
election, the party fielded eleven candidates and won one seat in the 
constituency of Krian, Perak. It was the only party in that first election 
which prevented the Alliance from making a clean sweep. The party's 
opposition to the Razak Report was basically along the same line as that 
taken by other Malay organisations. Firstly, no assurance was given by 
the Report that Malay would be the national language or official language 
within ten years after independence. Secondly, by allowing other languages 
to be used as the medium of instruction in schools also implied that these 
languages were also recognised as official. Thirdly, the Razak Report 
did not imply that the status of English was to be lowered (Utusan Melayu, 
June 4,1956). 
As for the Chinese, with the MCA being committed to the policy of 
the Alliance Government, their cause was taken up by the People's Prog- 
ressive Party (PPP). If the PMIP was advocating "Malay Supremacy" in all 
aspects of Malayan life, the PPP on the other hand attempted to abrogate 
all the privileges that had been bestowed on them. The PPP was led by 
the Seenivasagam brothers who with political shrewdness were able to 
exploit the dissatisfied groups within the Chinese community who were 
against the Government's educational policy. For instance, in a party 
political broadcast, D. R. Seenivasagam, the Secretary-General of the party 
stated that "there should be no discrimination on grounds of race or rel- 
igion" (The Straits Times, Aug. 2,1959). The party's attempt to exploit 
communal dissatisfaction over the Government's educational policy was 
evident in its 1959 election manifesto. Among other things the party 
insisted that the language of instruction in schools should be in the 
mother tongue; equal treatment must be accorded to all the educational instit- 
utions and equal employment opportunity should exist for "students from 
all recognised schools" (Ratnam, op. cit.: 171). 
The Razak Report and the 1959 Election 
The results that emerged from the 1959 election tended to confirm the 
fact that in a plural society, political moderation was a risky affair in 
terms of getting electoral support. It also showed that communal issues 
and appeals, properly exploited could be electorally rewarding. As Melson 
and Wolpe (1970: 114) proposed, "In a culturally plural society, the 
competition engendered by social mobilization will tend to be defined in 
communal terms. " This was the case in the 1959 election when both the 
PPP and the PMIP took up extreme communal lines in their campaign trails 
and subsequently made a tremendous impact on the Malayan political scene. 
In the 1955 election, for instance, the PPP was insignificant as a polit- 
ical force but a considerable progress was achieved in the parliamentary 
election of 1959 when it won four of the nineteen seats that the party 
contested (see Table 9). I*s election manifesto, which called for multi- 
lingualism, amendments to the educational policy and equality for all cit- 
izens (The Straits Times, Aug. 1959) had a strong appeal to the Chinese 
voters in particular who saw the party as an alternative to the then dis- 
credited MCA. 
Table q 
Result of the 1959 Election 
Political Parties Number of seats 
contested 
Number of seats 
won 
Alliance 104 74 
PMIP 58 13 
Socialist Front 38 8 
PPP 19 4 
Parti Negara 10 1 
Malayan Party 2 1 
S emangat Pemuda 
Melayu 1 - 
Province Wellesly 
Labour 1 - 
Independents 26 3 
TOTAL 259 104 
Source: Ratnam, op. cit.: derived from Tables 12 and 13: 202-203 
While the PPP was successful in harnessing a considerable propor- 
tion of the Chinese votes, the PMIP's success in attracting the Malay 
voters was even greater. In the parliamentary election of 1959, out of 
the fifty-eight candidates the party fielded, it won thirteen seats 
(see Table 9). In addition, the party was able to wrest control of the 
states of Kelantan and Trengganu from the Alliance. 
It could be safely concluded that the unanimous mandate given to the 
Alliance in the 1955 election was a mandate for independence. But the 
1959 election, the first held since independence, was different in its 
issues and needs. It was a period when the Government was embarking on 
its first programme of nation-building. Notably, it was a critical stage 
in the country's history when varying issues of an explosive kind were 
being discussed and decided. Conspicuous in the debates was the lingering 
question of education which somehow was trapped in the web of ethnic 
politics. 
The Education Review Committee and the Controversies Continued 
The Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960 was not favourably 
received by the public in general. The contradiction that developed was 
again centred on the language of instruction. However, a new phenomenon 
emerged in the debate. This was over the position of the English lang- 
uage in the educational system. While the Malays were particularly con- 
cerned about its continued retention (The Straits Echo, Feb. 4,1960), 
similar reactions were absent among the non Malay communities. On the 
other hand, the continued presence of the language was fully endorsed by 
them. For example, Mr. D. S. Ramanathan, the president of the National 
Union of Teachers was quoted as saying that, "It has always been the 
view of our union that English is the key that opens the door to modern 
knowledge. The notable command of English which so many Malayan already 
possesses is one of our national assets" (The Straits Echo, Aug. 1960). 
The paradox was that Mr. Oh Seng Huat, the president of the Penang and 
Province Wellesley Chinese School Teachers Union even praised the Report 
of the Education Review Committee, 1960 for giving such prominence to 
the English language (The Straits Echo, ibid. ). 
To the Malays, the Report of the Education Review Committee marked 
another step of the Alliance Government's ambiguity and uncertainty in 
its objective of developing a national system of education, especially 
with regard to making Malay the sole medium of instruction in schools. 
For instance, paragraph 30 of the Education Review Committee's Report 
stated "that it has not yet been possible to provide appropriately 
trained teachers to start converting former Government primary schools 
into Standard or National schools. We understand that the Minister of 
Education intends as from 1961 to introduce Malay medium streams into 
these schools as and when suitable teachers become available and we recom- 
mend that this should be done gradually". The Education Review Committee 
therefore did not provide any remedial changes towards the deiyelopment 
of Malay education and the establishment of the Malay secondary schools 
in particular. The Report thus prolonged the Malays discontent over the 
Government's educational policy. 
The non Malays also viewed the Report with dismay and disappointment. 
For instance, Mr. Lim Lian Geok, the Chairman of the A11-Malayan Chinese 
School Teachers Association urged all Chinese school teachers to reject 
the Report (The Straits Echo, June 13,1961). Among the reasons cited 
were that the Report did not provide any protection for the development 
of the Chinese language and in the long run this would destroy the Chinese 
ancestral culture (ibid. ). This sort of argument continued unabated and 
the subsequent ethnic contradictions that emerged posed a serious problem 
for the realisation of the objectives as stated in both the educational 
m eports. 
While the Malays had the PMIP as their anti-government spokesman in 
Parliament, the non-Malays had their representatives in the £PP. With 
two political parties which were diametrically opposed in both ideology 
and membership and at the same time sitting together as members of the 
opposition, more often than not eruptions broke out between them rather 
than them being united and confronting the Alliance Government. However, 
it should also be pointed out that political parties such as the PPP, the 
PMIP and later the United Democratic Party (UDP) were all regional in 
character. Despite the fact that these political parties had attracted 
nation-wide attention due to the extreme views they adopted on matters 
related to language and culture, their main bastion of support remained 
isolated. The PMIP for instance, had its stronghold in the North-eastern 
states of Kelantan and Trengganu, and in the Northern state of Kedah. 
The PPP had its support within the urban centre of Ipoh, in Perak and the 
UDP mainly had its roots in Dr. Lim's home city of Georgetown, Penang. 
Since these political parties differed ideologically, they were not able 
to provide a united front against the Government. In fact, by expressing 
their extreme views, they enhanced the position of the Alliance Government 
as the only sensible political party in the country. 
Although the debates over the educational policy remained unabated, 
it somehow temporarily lost its sensational appeal with a new twist of the 
political development that emerged in the country. This began on May 27, 
1961. When addressing a luncheon gathering of the Foreign Correspondents 
Association in Singapore, Tunku Abdul Rahman suggested that the states of 
Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei should merge with Malaya in 
a Confederation of Malaysian States (The Straits Times, May 29,1961). 1 
This new political development diverted the country's attention from 
internal issues like education which was considered to be parochial and 
chauvinistic but nevertheless important and controversial, to an issue 
that was vague and yet had national appeal. The sense of national fervour 
was even strengthened by the fact that the Malaysian Federation which was 
formed on September 16,1963 was opposed by Indonesia and the r hillipines. 
The "confrontation policy" adopted by Indonesia towards the new Federation 
put the country almost in a state of war. Indonesia's avowed "crush 
Malaysia" policy and the Government's diplomatic efficiency in handling 
the crisis enhanced its public standing and prestige. It was with this 
strength and the issue of "patriotism" that led the Alliance to a thumping 
electoral victory in 1964. The result of the election was devastating to 
the opposition parties which had been against the formation of Malaysia 
ever since the idea was first expressed. For example, theiIP's seats 
in Parliament were reduced from thirteen in 1959 to nine, and the PPP 
which had four seats previously managed to retain only two. But the party 
1. For details of the formation of Malaysia, see Noordin Sopiee, 
From Malayan Union to the S ration of Singapore from Malaysia 
K. L. 1974; and Simandjuntak B., Malayan Federalism 1945-1963, 
K. L. 1969, rt. VI, pp. 118-171. 
that suffered most was the Socialist Front (SF)l. This party was accused 
of collaborating with Indonesia in its "crush Malaysia" policy and had 
its seats in Parliament reduced from eight to two (see Table 10). Warta 
Mingguan (April 25,1964), a weekly Malay newspaper commented on the 
Alliance victory as the "people's choice". The paper further commented 
that, "If they had acted as a judge, the result of the judgement were 
already known". 
Table 10 
Comparison of the Parliamentary Election Results in 1959 and 1964 
Political Parties Seats won in 1959 Seats won in 1964 
Alliance 74 89 
PP: IP 13 9 
Party Negara 1 0 
Socialist Front 8 2 
PPP 4 2 
Malayan Party 1 0 
UDP 0 1 
PAP 0 1 
Independents 3 0 
Source: Derived from Filihan Raya Parlimen dan Negeri 1964, 
K. L. Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia 1964: 1-5, cited in 
Means, op. cit.: 338. 
1. The Socialist Front was a merger between the Labour Party and the 
People's Party. Both parties shared a common socialist ideology. 
It was the only party in Malaya which was non-communal in its ideology 
and membership. 
The 1964 election was significant in that for the first time the 
nation closed ranks with the Government in facing the threat from 
Indonesia and the Phillipines. It was also the only time when the country 
got a respite from the perennial problems of education, language and cit- 
izenship. But the period of national reconciliation which provided inter- 
nal unity for the country did not last long. It ceased as soon as the 
threat of invasion disappeared. Another important aspect of the election 
was the emergence of the Singapore based Peoples Action Party into the 
Malayan political scene. Somehow its egalitarian ideology failed to 
attract the Malayan electorate. During the early period of 1965, an 
important strategic change was evolved when the party developed the 
"Malaysian Malaysia" concept which added a new flavour to the tempo of 
communal politics in the country. Under the slogan of "Malaysian Malaysia", 
the party advocated a policy of national unity based on the principle of 
equality and respect among the country's ethnic groups. The non-Malays, 
seeing the issue as relevant to their cause, responded enthusiastically to 
this new development, As Vasil (1972: 13) noted, "the PAP through its 
criticism of the MCA and its demand for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' had not 
only brought once again to the surface the outstanding issues of the 
political role of the non Malay communities and the position of their 
cultures and languages but also through the debates that took place it 
had acted as a catalyst and had articulated the views of the non-Malay 
communities. " 
This new political development was not viewed lightly by the Malays. 
While the "Malaysian Malaysia" concept was well received by the non Malays, 
the Malays likewise responded by demanding for a more pro-Malay policy to 
be enacted. Syed Nasir, the Director of the Language and Literary Agency 
for instance, urged the central Government to table a motion in Parliament 
to stop the use of English as an official language in Malaysia from 
September 1,1967. He said that by doing so it would reflect the 
Government's determination to make the national language the only official 
language by 1967 (The Straits Times, June 10,1965). 
Even after the separation of Singapore from the Nalaisian Federation, 
demands by the Chinese community for the recognition of their language 
in the national school system remained unabated. In fact, there was a 
semblance of militancy on the part of the Chinese in inciting demands 
that their language be recognised as one of the official languages of 
the country. A deomonstration was planned but was aborted when the 
Minister of Home Affairs warned the sponsors of the repercussions it 
might cause (The Straits Times, August 6,1965). It was at this point 
that the Chinese Associations and Guilds of Malaysia sent a memorandum 
to Tunku Abdul Rahman "requesting a place for the Chinese language" in 
the country. The Memorandum (1965: para. 3) stated that the educational 
report, especially the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960, 
was discriminatory towards the Chinese language. It further emphasised 
that: 
"Due to partiality of the 1960 Education Review and 
the actions of the extremists in the National 
Language movement, the Chinese language has now 
reached its critical stage and it is obvious that 
the children of Chinese have been deprived of their 
opportunity of receiving nine years of mother tongue 
education when there is no Comprehensive secondary 
school system using Chinese as the medium of instruc- 
tion and examination. In Clause B No. 21 of the 1961 
Education Ordinance, the Minister of Education is 
vested with the power to change the Chinese, English 
and Indian schools into National schools at the 
appropriate period. We are trembling with fear when 
we review the past, see the present, and think of 
the future. " 
In addition, the Memorandum (1965: para. 9) also called for the 
expansion of the Chinese language through proper legislation; demanded 
that the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960 be amended for 
not giving "due respect to the Chinese language", and wanted the Chinese 
language to be made the medium of instruction and examination in the 
comprehensive secondary schools. 
This move by the Chinese could well be understood considering that 
the end of the ten-year period was approaching and the position of their 
language and education was still unresolved. It was while waiting for 
the year 1967 that nervousness developed within each community. The 
year was important for it would be the time when the fate of the various 
languages of the country would be constitutionally decided. 
National Language Act, 1967 
The Malayan constitution provided a period of ten years before Malay 
would be made the sole official language of the country 
(Federal Constit- 
ution, Art. 152: op. cit. ). September 1,1967 was thus looked upon with 
hope that the national language would finally have its proper status 
and this would mark another stage of its nation-building process. This 
enthusiasm was not only shared by the Malays. As Awang Had and Ibrahim 
(1980: 52) observed, "the Chinese and Indians too showed their interest 
in learning and developing the language. In 1958,400 Chinese students 
of the Nanyang University in Singapore opted for Malay language I and III' 
as part of their courses. 
Preparations for the full implementation of Article 152 of the 
constitution began soon after independence. First, as proposed by the 
Razak Report (para. 26), "Balai Pustaka" which was formed in July 1956, 
had its name changed to "Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka"1 in March 1957. It 
had a new role in the development of the national language. 
2 As a Govern- 
ment agency, it was given the major responsibilty for facilitating the 
production of books in the national language for use in schools. 
Secondly, a Language Institute (also recommended by the Razak Report, 
para. 19,20 & 21) was established where teachers were specially trained 
to teach the national language as a subject in the school curriculum. 
However, in 1960 the role of the Institute began to change. In addition 
to training the national language teachers, the Institute also started 
to train teachers who would be able to teach in secondary schools by 
using the national language as the medium of instruction. Thirdly, and 
in the same year, the Government launched its first series of campaigns 
throughout the country to familiarise the public with the importance of 
the national language. Until September 1967, posters bearing the words 
"Bahasa Jiwa Bangsa"3 and "Jayakan Bahasa Kebangsaan"4 could be seen 
almost everywhere in the country. Fourthly, in July 1964, the National 
Language Action Front was formed. The Front's main objective was to fight 
1. "Balai Fustaka" means Literary Agency and "Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka" 
means Language and Literary Agency. 
2. See Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Ordinance, 1959- 
3. "Bahasa Jiwa Bangsa" means "Language is the soul of a race". 
4. "Jayakan Bahasa Kebangsaan" means "make the National Language a success". 
for the wider use of the language so that it could become the sole 
official language in 1967 (The Straits Times, July 20,1964). All these 
developments were in anticipation of the September 1,1967 date. 
However, the National Language Act, 1967 (see Appendix C), which was 
passed by Parliament on March 3,1967 fell far below expectations. The 
Act did not resolve the national language controversy. In fact, it 
created further ethnic discord among the various ethnic groups of the 
country. Enloe (1967: 209) described the Act as a "non-solution". It was 
never a panacea to the language problems as it was meant to be. The 
Malays were particularly bitter seeing that the Act had not fulfilled the 
linguistic promise as entailed by the 1957 constitution. Led by the 
National Language Action Front, several demonstrations were held in 
Kuala Lumpur which denounced the compromising attitude adopted by the 
Government over matters of national importance. The biggest of all the 
demonstrations was held on March 3,1967, the day when the Act was to 
have its second reading in Parliament. At the "Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka" 
more than 1500 delegates respresenting Malay Associations from all over 
the country gathered to express their anger and disappointment over the 
Act and to the Malay leaders in particluar whom they felt had betrayed 
their cause (Utusan Melayu, March 3,1967). The president of the National 
Writers Association, Hassan Ahmad, sinisterly commented that "if all the 
time we compromised, we will never make the national language as the sole 
official language of the country" (Utusan irtelayu, Feb. 24,1967). In its 
hard-hitting editorial, Warta Negara (Feb. 27,1967) described the Act as 
"a form of compromise or a way out to overcome the demands by the non- 
Malays who wanted their languages to be the official language of the country. 
" 
Within the UMNO itself, controversies developed over the Act. The Kampung 
Pandan Branch of the party sent a telegram to the Prime Minister asking 
that Parliament should postpone the second reading of the Act (Warta 
Negara, Feb. 28,1967). The Penang UMNO youth even resigned "en bloc" 
while disagreeing with the action taken by the party's leadership (Warta 
Negara, March 1,1967). Criticisms of the Act did not merely confine them- 
selves to the Malays. Even Sim Mow Yu, the president of the United 
Chinese School Teachers Association said that the states of languages 
other than English had not been guaranteed under the Act (The Straits 
Times, Feb. 25,1967). 
In the Malayan Parliament, it was the PMIP that became the most out- 
spoken critic of the Act. Its president, Dato' Mohammed Asri bin Haji Muda, 
described the Act as an attempt on the part of the Prime Minister to 
legitimise his compromising policy, the strategy that the Alliance Govern- 
ment adopted on matters related to citizenship, language and recruitment 
into the civil service (PD, March 3,1967: col. 6029). He further stressed 
that, "who can deny that the Act intentionally strengthened the position 
of English language? Or in other words, the Act which is being proposed 
in front of us today is an Act which indirectly tries to place the position 
of English language in this country in a situation which is even stronger 
than before " (ibid.: col. 6038). Dr. Lim Chong Eu, another member of the 
opposition described the National Language Act, 1967 in the following 
terms: 
"When I first looked through this Act, at first 
glance, I thought I was not just reading what is 
called the National Language Act but I was reading 
the National Language Act and the preservation of 
the special position of the English Language Act" 
(PD, ibid.: col. 6178) . 
Essentially, the Act while ignoring the demands of the ? Malay pop- 
ulation in general, was accommodative to the pressures mounted by the 
non-Malays and the English educated groups. In so doing, the Government 
intended to demonstrate that it was on the basis of political compromises 
and accommodation that national policies were formulated. This philosophy 
was embodied in Tunku's speech in Parliament when he emphasised that, 
"besides making the Malay language as the official language of the country, 
we mustalso allow the English language to be used and also the wider use 
of other languages as presently being practised be continued" (PD, March 2, 
1967: col-5992) " 
But nevertheless, the Alliance Government's effort in trying to 
please the various ethnic groups by enacting a "non-solutions" Act failed 
to materialise. The accommodative politics of the Alliance were henceforth 
viewed with scepticism as it easily succumbed to communal blackmail by 
any of its partners. The National Language Act, 1967 was one example 
where communal pressures seemed to take prior consideration over any other 
issues of national importance as in the case of the national language 
itself. 
For various reasons, the Malays were particularly hostile to the 
March 3,1967 linguistic legislation. For example, Clause 3 of the Act 
stated that, "Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the Federal 
Government to use any translation of official documents or communications 
in the language of any other community in the Federation for such purposes 
as may be deemed necessary in the public interests" This part of the 
Act was interpreted by the Malays as contrary to the principle of making 
Malay the sole official language of the country. ?: pith its ambiguity 
and dubiousness, it was in fact interpreted as an official sanction for 
multi-lingualism. Undoubtedly, it was intentional on the part of the 
legislators to do so. The dubiousness of the clause was in itself a 
strategy for it provided the Alliance Government with political space in 
which to manoeuvre whenever issues over the national language emerged. 
With the Act, the Government intended to assure the Malays, albeit 
without success, that it had fulfilled the constitutional obligation to 
official 
make Malay the sole,, language of the country. To the non-Malays, the 
Act gave assurance that their languages would continue to be used, "for 
such purpose as may be deemed necessary in the public interest" 
(National Language Act, 1967: Clause 3). 
Another aspect of the Act which caused considerable dissatisfaction 
among the Malays was the continued use of English as an official language. 
Clause 4 of the National Language Act, 1967 stated that "the Yang Di 
Pertuan Agong may permit the continued use of the English language for 
such official purposes as may be deemed fit. " 
The continued retention of the English language for official purposes 
was the last thing that the Malay nationalists had been asking for. They 
argued that the position of Malay as an official language would be threat- 
ened as long as English remained eminent and sanctified. There was no 
question as to the validity of the argument. From whatever perspective 
it was viewed, the Malay language was in no position to compete with 
English which had already entrenched itself into all facets of Malayan 
life and bureaucracy. Being officially incumbent, the strength of its 
position was again buttressed by the educational background of the post- 
independence Malayan leaders who were mostly the products of the English 
school system. By comparison, Malay education was still at its infant 
stage. It was only after a year of independence that the first Malay 
secondary classes were opened and in 1965, the first group of these Malay 
medium students entered the university (The ; traits Times, July 15,1965). 
In the Malayan case, it seemed that it needed more than the proven 
ability of the Malay language to be the medium of instruction in schools. 
More important, it needed a strong political will from all sections of 
the community to ensure its success and this implied the reduction of the 
status of English. This political will was sadly lacking among the 
leadership. To these leaders, the English language was indispensable if 
the country was to progress and develop. But for a new nation like 
Malaya, it was a mark of political naivity to think only in terms of 
material development. What was also important was the spiritual strength 
and character from which a nation could consolidate and form the basis for 
development - be it spiritual or material. 
The concern for the development of the Malay language vis-a-vis 
English could again be justified by understanding the quantitative devel- 
opment in the national school system between 1957 and 1967. In 1967, for 
instance, the average enrollment for any Malay primary school was 202 
pupils. The number was increased to 255 pupils in 1967. This was an 
increase of 26%. As for the English schools, their average enrollment 
was 519 pupils in 1957 and the number increased to 788 pupils in 
1967, an 
increase of 52%. Taking 40 as the average class size for the Malayan 
primary school, in 1957 the average number of classrooms in any Malay 
primary school was 5 and in 1967 the number was increased to only 6. For 
any English school, the average number of classrooms was 13 in 1957 and 
by 1967 this had increased to 20. 
Table 11 
Comparison of Enrollments in Assisted Primary Schools for 1957 and 1967 
Pupils Enrollment in Number of Pupils 
Assisted Primary Schools per school 
Medium 1957 1967 % 1957 1967 increase increase 
Malay 441,567 591,560 34 202 255 26 
English 130,360 289,056 122 519 788 52 
Chinese 310,458 355,771 15 329 359 9 
Tamil 50,766 79,203 56 57 115 102 
TOTAL 933,151 1,315,590 41 277 379 37 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit. Figures derived 
from pages 32,33,34 and 35. 
Another aspect of the disparity could be noted in the development 
of assisted primary schools between 1957 and 1967 (see Table 12). In 1957, 
the number of assisted Malay primary schools was 2,190. This number was 
increased to 2,324 in 1967, an increase of 6% within a period of ten 
years. During the same period, the assisted English primary schools saw 
an increase of 116, or 46; x. 
Table 12 
Number of Assisted Primary Schools 
Medium 1956 1957 1967 
Malay 2,172 2,190 2,324 
English 224 251 367 
Chinese 941 943 990 
Tamil 877 888 686 
TOTAL, 4,214 4,272 49367 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit.: 53. 
Figures derived from table 25. 
As for the expansion in secondary schools, in 1958 the number of 
assisted English secondary schools were 148. By 1967, the number had 
increased to 408 (see Table 13). Within that period, the assisted English 
schools had increased by 260, or 176%. The secondary Malay classes which 
were started in 1958 were initially attached to the English secondary 
schools. It was only in 1963 that they had their own premises. 
In 1964, 
there were 22 such schools and by 1967 the number had increased to 
298 
(see Table 13) " 
Table 1 
Number of Assisted Secondary Schools 
Medium 1957 1958 1962 1964 1967 
Malay n. a. n. a. n. a. 22 298 
English n. a. 148 231 271 408 
Chinese n. a. 53 nil nil nil 
Tamil nil nil nil nil nil 
TOTAL n. a. 201 231 293 706 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit.: 54. 
Figures derived from table 26. 
It could be observed that from the time of the Razak Report and the 
Education Review Committee Report of 1960, which unequivocally stated 
that the ultimate aim of the national education policy was to make Malay 
the main medium of instruction in schools, and from the constitutional 
promise of 1957, which intended to make Malay the sole official language 
of the country, a parallel development was also taking place that was 
contrary to the interests of both the constitution and the national educ- 
ation policy. It was assumed that by the middle of the 1960s the 
national education policy as envisaged in both the reports would have 
already taken its course. But, until 1967, the year when the legislation 
on the national language was to take effect, the increase in the number 
of assisted English secondary schools was more than double (see Table 13). 
In terms of pupil enrollment, between that same period, the number that 
entered the English secondary schools was more than quadrupled (see Table 141 
Table 14 
Enrollment in Assisted Secondary Schools Between 1960 and 1967 
Medium/Year 1957 1960 1964 1967 
Malay 
English 
2,315 
48,235 
4,953 
72,499 
28,067 
151,386 
128,069 
286,254 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit.: 40-41. 
Figures derived from tables 12 and 13. 
Again, if we analysed the number of teachers that were being trained 
for both the primary and secondary schools between 1960 and 1967, the bias 
was glaringly in favour of the English rather than the national medium 
stream (see Table 15). Despite the fact that the objective of the national 
education policy was to make Malay the main medium of instruction in 
schools, the Government kept on training teachers that could fit into the 
English rather than the national schools. It was only in 1965 that a sig- 
nificant development was seen in the training of teachers for the national 
schools. 
1 As for the residential teachers training colleges, except for 
1. In this year the Government abolished the Secondary School Entrance 
Examination. Pupils were then automatically promoted to the secon- 
dary level of education. In order to cope with the increase in the 
secondary school enrollments, especially in the national schools, 
large scale teacher training programmes were carried out by 
the 
Government. 
the Language Institute which provided instruction in the national 
language, the rest of the colleges used English as the medium of instruc- 
tion. This was discontinued only in 1970 (Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, 
June 1971: para. 12.4). 
Table 15 
Number of Teachers Between 1957-1967 
Medium/Year 1957 1960 1965 1967 
Pri. 14,351 18,260 20,925 21,554 
Malay 
Sec. nil n. a. 2,256 4,945 
Pri. 5,867 5,634 7,181 8,206 
English 
Sec. n. a. 3,054 8,474 11,835 
ri. 10,091 11,503 11,548 11,215 
Chinese 
Se. nil 1,336 nil nil 
Pri. 1,735 2,233 3,008 3,085 
Tamil 
Sec. nil nil nil nil 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit.: 50 & 5. 
Figures derived from tables 22 & 23. 
The Malays thus felt that without any firm assurance to reduce the 
status of the English language, any attempt to elevate 
the position of 
their language would remain futile. As the statistics showed 
(see Table 14) 
English secondary schools had a far higher preference 
that the national 
schools in terms of choice. Even when 
the ten-year period was approaching 
its end, the trend in enrollment was still towards the English rather 
than the Malay schools. The National Language Act, 1967 therefore did not 
elevate the position of the Malay language nor did it reduce the import- 
ance of English; it merely juxtaposed them. This generated widespread 
discontent among the Malays for the Act had far reaching consequences upon 
the development of the country's national education policy. 
National Language Act and the National Education Policy 
One could develop a bluBprint for national integration, but it would 
be absurd to expect it to be realised within a specific time period, for 
integration is not only vague in its conception, it is also intrinsic in 
nature and process. Therefore, it is two different things when taking 
language as an instrument for national integration and viewing its status 
within the framework of the constitution. In the former it is an open- 
ended programme with its finality hard to determine. While in the latter, 
the goal is subjected to human manipulation. As an example, Article 152 
of the Federal Constitution was explicit in setting the time for change 
over the status of the various languages of the country. The National 
Language Act of 1967 was the outcome of the constitutional amendment 
which defined the position and status of every linguistic group within 
the country. As has been observed, the Act was disapproved of and immed- 
iately became a focus of resentment among the Malays. Many felt that for 
the language to play its role effectively as a national language, it had 
to be unequivocally and legally sanctified. Without any effective legis- 
lation, its position and practical importance would remain marginal and 
uncertain. This was well expressed by Boynton and Kim Lim (ed. 1975: 16) 
when they noted that, "since laws are important for setting goals for 
society, one anticipates that legislatures will be important agencies in 
the goal setting of a society". The statement could never be more rel- 
evant than in Malaya when legislation on language was considered as 
another step towards the realisation of its linguistic goal. In this 
light, any forms of linguistic legislation had an important bearing upon 
the status of the national language in the national school system. 
It had often been assumed that by 1967, following the constitutional 
amendments that made Malay the sole official language, the objective of 
the national education in making the national language as the only medium 
of instruction in schools would be immediately enforced. But, the 1967 
Act did not accord this change of status outright. The Act in fact main- 
tained the status-quo of all the languages with the position of the 
English schools becoming even stronger than ever. In 1957 (see Table 11) 
for example, the number of pupils enrolled in all assisted primary Malay 
schools was 441,567. By 1967 this figure had increased to 591,560, a 
difference of 149,993" In terms of percentage the increase was only 34; Z. 
Within the same period, the increase in the enrollment of pupils in all 
assisted English schools was 158,695. This was an increase of 122%. 
The trend towards English schools was felt even more after the passage 
of the Bill. In 1967, the enrollment for Malay secondary schools was 
128,627. The figure continued to increase in the next two years but by 
1970 the enrollment returned to its 1967 level (see Table 16). Zainal 
Abidin Wahid (1976: 153) in his survey in the state of Selangor found that 
there was a significant decrease in the number of students enrolled 
in 
the Malay medium schools, while during the same period, a substantial 
increase in enrollment was seen in the English medium schools. 
Table 16 
Enrollment in Malay Secondary Schools Between 1967 and 1970 
Malay Secondary Schools Malay Secondary Students 
31.1.67 302 (including 4 private 31.1.67 128,625 
schools) 
31.1.68 306 (including 6 private 31.1.68 136,349 
schools) 
31.1.69 310 (including 11 private 31.1.69 134,889 
schools) 
31.1.70 311 (including 8 private 31.1.70 128,143 
schools) 
Source: The Ministry of Ed. Malaysia, op. cit.: 40,44,54 54 & 55" 
Figures for 1968,1969 and 1970 were taken from mimeographed 
publications of the Ministry of Education. These were 
cited by Zainal Abidin in Lim and Lowe, 1976: 145. 
The reason for this development was not difficult to envisage. Since 
1963, the products of the national school system were already competing 
in the labour market. With English being the language of the Government 
their chances of gaining employment in the public sector were less when 
compared to those who had their education in the English schools. In 
addition, job openings in the private sector were hardly opened to them. 
What was available to them were those jobs that had been exclusively for 
the educated Malay masses since colonial times - such as serving in the 
armed forces, orderlies in the Government offices and becoming Malay 
school teachers. This resulted in social disenchantment and loss of 
ým 
confidence among the Malays towards the national schools. Their response 
was to send their children to the English schools, but then, not every- 
body would be able to do so. English schools were fee-paying institutions, 
urban in their location and restrictive in their policy of admission. 
Politically, the Language Act, 1967, was a victory for the principle 
of consociationalism. It had been the hallmark of the Alliance Govern- 
ment's administration to compromise over matters related to the question 
of language and education. This policy had been consistently pursued 
since it took over the reigns of power in 1955. Being a political party 
that was based on the coalition of three different ethnic groups, the 
Act could not provide more, fearing that it would disturb the delicate 
partnership that had been established. However, the middle-of-the-road 
strategy that the Alliance Government adopted did not solve the controversy 
that had been raging in the country for more than a decade. The Act in 
fact sowed the seeds of suspicion and anger towards the Government. This 
was particularly felt during the election of 1969 which saw not only the 
manifestation of linguistic nationalism and communal politics at its 
zenith but also the erosion of confidence in all Government policy. 
Language and the Political Leadership 
It was when deciding between English and Malay that the dilemma of 
choice fell upon the Malayan leaders. English was the language of the 
bureaucracy, judiciary and being used in the higher institutions of 
learning. It had been the preserve of the Malayan middle-class and its 
prominence in the upper crust of society manifested the status attached 
to it. With the exception of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, the rest 
of the political parties in the country were all led by those who had an 
English education. Since independence, the members of the Malayan Cabinet, 
with the exception of one, 
l 
had all been the products of the English 
school system. 
While the leaders were English or Western educated, the rank and 
file were mostly educated in the vernacular schools. The differences 
in educational background and experience often led to severe contradic- 
tions within the parties. Enloe (op. cit.: 147) for instance observed that 
the language question "highlights the gap between the elites of all 
ethnic groups and the majority of Malaysians. The elites of every group 
have a personal stake in the perpetuation of the English language. " 
The leaders of UMNO for instance, while paying lip-service to matters 
related to the national language, was at the same time ambivalent on the 
prospect of reducing the importance of English. Khir Johari, in his 
speech at the Penang Free School, assured the English educated that the 
English language would remain important despite the fact that Malay was 
being chosen as the national language. He emphasised that English was 
necessary "to help this country produce the professional men and women 
we so badly need to build up this country of ours, and obtain the benefits 
from the best of higher education here and abroad" (The Straits Times, 
October 22,1965). 
Throughout the linguistic debates, two pertinent questions emerged. 
1. The only member of the Malayan Cabinet who was fully Malay educated 
was Abdul Ghafar bin Baba. He joined the Cabinet in 1969. 
First was the view which argued that the national language issue was 
of national importance and anything that was linked to it must be dealt 
with squarely on a national basis. At the same time, any attempt to 
retard or obstruct its development would be construed as unsympathetic 
towards the national cause and aspirations. Being the national language 
of the country, it was felt that everybody who professed loyalty to the 
country was duty-bound to ensure its success. As Asmah (OP. cit.: 30-31) 
pointed out: 
"Nation-building needs the support of each and every 
one of its citizens as well as their acceptance of 
the national ideology which includes language policy. 
Defiance of the language policy can mean defiance of 
the national ideology. " 
Secondly, there was a gross misconception over the issue that was 
at stake. The vehement opposition the A'ialays had towards the National 
Language Act, 1967 was over the continued retention of English as the 
official language of the country. Paradoxically, instead of making an 
assault on the colonial left-overs, the non-Malays side-stepped the issue 
by reinforcing their demands for recognition of their respective languages. 
By this very act, one could envisage that their quest for equality in 
status was to some extent a failure to understand both the integrative 
philosophy and the historical legitimacy that the Malay language had in 
the country. 
In the final analysis, if there was anybody that deserved the respect 
and admiration, it was the Malay masses who despite all the odds, kept on 
their pressure for the recognition of their language. However, as the 
National Language Act showed, their efforts came to a disappointing 
conclusion. The hopes and aspirations that had been nurtured for the 
past ten years finally came to nothing. Far from being solved, the 
language question remained and this undoubtedly prolonged the mood of 
discontent among the Malays. 
Chapter Six 
The Nation Divided 
Background to the Crisis 
The context for the development of educational policy in Malaya 
from independence was the unresolved tension between different ethnic 
groups, particularly as this related to language and education. The 
Razak Report, especially was a focal point of disagreement and frustration 
for both the Malays and the immigrant communities. The Education Review 
Committee of 1960 further enhanced the controversy. For instance, 
teacher's organisations which had been advocating the use of English wel- 
comed the Report but this was not so with their Chinese counterparts who 
saw that their language was not given proper recognition by the Government 
(The Straits Echo, August 5,1961). The debates went on and the issue 
became particularly important in the election years of 1959 and 1969. 
A call to neutralise education from being made a politically charged 
issue was made by Aminuddin Baki, Malaya's Chief Education Advisor, when 
he urged all sections of the community to make "a truce on education for 
the sake of the rising generation" (The Straits Times, Dec. 21,1963)- 
He further added that "even today, despite these compromises, we still 
find education not fully resolved and settled but daily becoming a ratter 
of public controversy, a delicate and explosive political issue and not 
unknown to have been a gamble and determinant of many elections" (ibid. ). 
The call by Aminuddin Baki was timely and appropriate but the public 
in general refused to take any cue from him. They seemed to perceive 
that education as an issue was too important to be left to the discretion 
of the bureaucrats. The assumption was that it was through political 
means that their demands would be heard and considered. In the Malayan 
context, this sort of thinking seemed to dominate. The communal nature 
of the Malayan political system made it imperative that only through 
political means such an important issue like education would be assured 
of all the necessary attention. 
When discussing the Malayan educational system, one could not help 
but to also debate the language problem. The two were symbiotically 
linked by virtue of Article 152 of the Federal Constitution and paragraph 
12 of the Razak Report. The implication of giving official recognition 
to one language over the other would provide consititutional legitimacy 
for the language to be used as the medium of instruction in schools. Thus, 
in the ensuing debates over education, it was inevitable that the question 
of language should become the most dominant. The Chinese community for 
instance, were united in their demand that their language be recognised 
as one of the official languages of the country. Without this official 
status attached to it, they felt their language would remain stagnant 
and undeveloped, and this in turn would hamper the growth of their culture. 
With the official publication of the 1960 Educational Report, the 
position of the Chinese language was perceived to be even more precarious. 
As a result of this Report, all Chinese secondary schools were required 
to conform if they wished to continue receiving any form of financial aid 
(see Chapter 5). It was therefore a matter of survival that they demanded 
their language be made official and thus have the advantage of being used 
as one of the languages of instruction in the Malayan school system. 
Chai (1977: 40) highlighted the educational problems of the Chinese in 
the following terms: 
"At the heart of the problems of conversion was the 
question, in the minds of the Chinese educationalists, 
of Chinese language and culture which, to them, would 
be seriously attenuated if not destroyed if the Chinese 
schools were abolished. It should be added that there 
was no question about accepting Malay as the national 
language, or teaching the national language in the 
Chinese schools: for Chinese educationalists the prob- 
lem was Chinese as a medium of instruction. " 
Scepticism over the National School System 
After the election of 1964, the controversy over the national lang- 
uage and education became even more tense and politically provocative. 
This restless political atmosphere became more apparent as the ten-year 
period of independence was approaching when Malay would be made the sole 
official language of the country in accordance with Article 152 of the 
Federal Constitution (see Chapter 5). Pressure groups were formed by all 
contending parties in their quest to legitimise their demands. For 
instance, in July 1964 "the National Language Action Front" was formed 
to fight for the wider use of the language so that it could become the 
sole official language in 1967. This newly formed association planned 
to hold demonstrations against those who were not in favour of the national 
language (The Straits Times, July 21,1964). At the same time, pressures 
were also emerging from those who were in favour of retaining English as 
the official language of the country. In the Malayan Parliament for 
example, much concern was expressed over the future of the English educated 
and English education in the country (Warta Negara, June 1,1965). 
A number of reasons could be attributed to the belligerent nature 
of these linguistic entrepreneurs. 
1 Firstly, the Government itself was 
unsure and sometimes showed extreme ambivalence towards the national 
language. Conflicting statements were often expressed by the Prime 
Minister over its future status in the country. For example, in his 
reply to the letter sent by the Supervisors of the Selangor's Religious 
School Teachers and the Organizers of Adult Education, the Prime Minister 
gave a written guarantee that "when the time. comes, Malay will be made 
the sole national and official language of the country (Warta Negara, 
Sept. 16,1965). But a fortnight later he announced that concessions 
would be made regarding the language issue raised by the non-Malays. 
He stressed that if the non Malays could give their support in the nat- 
ional language, then "reciprocal arrangements can be made to give due 
regards to the languages in use in this country besides Malay" (The 
Straits Times, Sept. 28,1965). The Prime Minister did not elaborate 
further but emphasised that "I will try and meet, part of the way, the 
wishes of the non-Malays" (ibid. ). This statement by Tunku caused much 
concern among the Malays and created a considerable disquiet within the 
UMNO's political circle. Syed Nasir Ismail, the Director of the Language 
and Literary Agency and who was also the Chairman of the National 
Language Month Central Executive Committee expressed the hope that Tunku's 
remarks on language did not mean compromising on the national language 
as the sole official language (The Straits Times, Sept. 29,1965). 
The ambivalence on the part of the Government had a far reaching 
1. They included the "National Language Action Front", teachers' 
organisations and the Malay Language Society, University of Malaya. 
consequence for the development of the national school system. As has 
been mentioned earlier (see Chapter 4), both the Razak Report and the 
Report of the Education Review Committee did not enhance the character 
of the national school by establishing its own identity at the secondary 
level. Both the Reports merely recommended the establishment of Malay 
medium classes. It was only in 1963 that the first Malay secondary 
school was set up. The delay in its establishment created a crisis of 
confidence in the national school system. This feeling was further 
reinforced by the Government's uncertain policy towards the national 
language. 
In addition, confusion developed on the future of the national 
schools especially when the senior members of the Malayan Cabinet began 
to comment freely on matters related to language and education. Pro- 
ponents of the national school system felt strongly that any shift in 
policy would affect their struggle towards achieving the national objective 
as envisaged in the national education policy. This was especially true 
when considering the fact that the whole issue of the national school 
system hinged strongly on the recognition of Malay as the sole official 
language of the country. Thus, speeches made by Ministers were construed 
as statements of policy and this further fuelled the state of disarray 
that was already prevailing. Of particular political significance was 
the statement made by Khir Johari, a senior member of the Malayan Cabinet 
and who held the post of Minister of Education. On one occasion he even 
stressed that "the national language will not be the sole medium of instruc- 
tion in all schools, colleges and universities even after 1967" (The 
Straits Times, Dec. 8,1965). The Minister further outlined the structure 
of the future secondary schools which would be bilingual and the students 
would receive their instruction in either Malay or English (ibid. ). 
Khir's statement on language and education was important in two 
respects. In the first place, as a Minister of Education he was responsible 
for the country's educational policy especially on the development of 
secondary education (see Chapter 4). The Education Review Committee, 1960 
added further clarification by stating that "the executive and legislative 
authority in all educational matters should rest with the Federal Govern- 
ment and that the educational policy in general should be directed by the 
Minister " (para. 65). Secondly, the statement was made in the light of 
the concessionary remarks made by Tunku (The Straits Times, Sept. 28, 
1965) and amidst the pressure on the Government from the MCA youth move- 
ment which demanded that Chinese be made one of the official languages 
of the country (The Straits Times, Aug. 24,1965). Thus, much discomfort 
was generated when a Minister of Education made a policy statement of 
such importance, for he was backed by the power that emanated from his 
office. It was a power which became a source of much concern to all. 
Articles 152 and 153 
Richard Pratte (1978: 148) appropriately described the concept of 
"diversity" as the product created out of human ingenuity. He further 
noted that "the distinction that men make to create groups or factions 
may be drawn along regional, economic, ideological, political, occupat- 
ional, etc. lines, and among the most persuasive distinctions that divide 
mankind are those which we designate as "ethnic" that is, those distinc- 
tions based on race, religion, or national origin". It was also as the 
result of human ingenuity and weakness that these social divisions were 
often being exploited towards certain ends. It is not difficult to 
draw the same philosophical parallelism with what happened on May 13,1969 
when the country experienced its worst ethnic crisis. The extent of 
cultural differentiation and animosity that emerged during the crisis 
was not difficult to gauge. Articles 152 and 153 of the Malayan Federal 
Constitution which were basically cultural in their definition and 
implication were relentlessly questioned and scrutinised to their very 
core by all political parties during the period of electioneering. 
Article 153 (1) defined the "special position of the Malays" which assured 
them of positions in the public services, privileges in educational 
facilities, and being favoured in attaining scholarships and in obtaining 
licenses for business purposes. Those who were entitled to these privi- 
leges were the Malays, defined constitutionally as "a person who professes 
the Muslim religion, habitually speaks the Malay language, conforms to 
Malay custom" (Federal Const. Pt. XII, Art. 160). These "special privi- 
leges" accorded to the Malays were strongly challenged by the non- 
indigenous communities. They questioned the very basis of the constitution- 
al discrimination against them. They felt that as citizens of the Federation 
they should not be discriminated against in terms of language, religion 
and ethnic background. They demanded that equal treatment must be accorded 
to all who lived under the "Malayan sun". From here emerged the concept of 
"first-class and second-class citizens" (Raja Mukhtaruddin, 1982: 15) which 
was often invoked to spread further discontent among the communities. 
However, while highlighting the discriminatory part of the constitution, 
these same groups failed to give prominence to the second part of Article 
153 (1) which safeguarded the "legitimate interests of other communities". 
The dissatisfaction towards the constitutional provisions that 
accorded "special privileges to the Malays was not a 'new phenomenon in 
Malayan politics. It dated back to 1948 when the clause was enshrined 
in the Federation of Malaya Agreement in place of the abortive Malayan 
Union scheme (Ratnam, 1965: 54). This was again seen in 1956 when the 
country was formulating its constitution in preparation for independence, 
but opposition to it subsided following the compromise formula made among 
the country's major ethnic group (see Chapter 5). Following the country's 
independence, the feelings of discontent remained but were restrained due 
firstly to the state of emergency that was proclaimed throughout the 
country Secondly, their new citizenship status acquired under the 
"compromised formula" (see Chapter 5) restrained them from being assertive 
and vocal. Thirdly, there was no political party during that time which 
was willing to champion their cause 
2 
But political development began to 
change in the sixties. New political parties emerged which were willing 
to focus their attention on the cultural grievances of their constituencies. 
They were the People Progressive Party (PPP) and the Democratic Action 
Party (DAP) an off-shoot of the People Action Party of Singapore. These 
two political parties were quick to identify themselves with the grievances 
of the immigrant communities and were unwilling to compromise over matters 
related to their language and education. It was in this light that a 
1. For detailed discussions on the state of emergency and the activities 
of the Malayan Communist Party, see Short, 1975. The Communist 
Insurrection in Malaya 191+8-1960. London, Frederick Miller. 
2. Before the advent of any other political party, MCA was the sole 
spokesman for the Chinese. Initially the Chinese community was 
obliged to this party for its efforts in getting citizenship for them 
and also in protecting their business interests. But, in the late 
sixties, the party was rejected for associating with policies purported 
to be pro Malay and not radical enough in protecting the interests of 
the Chinese. 
bitter indigenous-immigrant confrontation was set which ushered itself 
into the 1969 election. 
At the same time, in any form of ethnic confrontation, it would be 
grossly unfair to put a wholesale blame on one communal group and absolve 
the other from any participatory role in it. If the non Malay political 
parties were harping on the cultural elements as enshrined in the constit- 
ution and which had been the main source of dissatisfaction among their 
followers, the same was true with the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party. The 
party took advantage of the Government's policy which in certain cases 
showed remarkable concessions towards the immigrant groups. The PMIP 
considered that any concession was translated as a "sell-out" on the part 
of the Government and UMNO in particular. It was on this theme that the 
party embarked on its campaign trails which ultimately scored considerable 
success among those who shared the same radical view (Bass, 1970: 156). 
The party's extreme advocation of "Islamism and Malayism" thus created 
much concern among the non-Malays. Although this was a "vote-catching" 
strategy adopted by the party, all the same it created fear among the 
immigrant groups which was equivalent to the fear the Malays had when 
their rights were challenged outright. With this development, it was 
inevitable that when two opposite forces of contradicting ideologies were 
able to harness forces of insecurity and fear, the outcome was the poli- 
tics of confrontation rather than those of reconciliation. 
Added to this already grim scenario was the suppressive discontent 
that prevailed among the Malay community at large. Since the 
National 
Language Act, 1967 was passed by Parliament (see Chapter 5), scepticism 
grew over the ability of UMNO as a party in power to protect the interests 
of the Malays. As the 1969 election results showed, the PYIIP made an 
"impressive" gain at the expense of UMNO's language policy (Bass, ibid, 156). 
All through this study, there has been considerable discussion on 
the language issue. This is for two pertinent reasons. The first is on 
matters of cultural relevance, where the Malays in particular regarded 
their language as inseparable from their future well-being and survival. 
This is not to deny the attachment that the other ethnic groups have to 
their respective languages. To the Malays, the stake over the language 
issue was not only high but crucial. They saw their language as the last 
bastion of hope in their struggle against the domination of alien cultural 
elements. Similar to the development that took place in Indonesia 
(Alisjahbana, 19+9: 388-392), the Malay language was also the product of 
Malay nationalism. The Malays attached so much importance to the lang- 
uage that it became a central force in the development of their national- 
ism. This phenomenon was expressed by Ismail Hussein (Dewar Masyarakat, 
Oct. 15,1968: 18) when he suggested that the development of Malay national- 
ism was basically linguistic in nature and it was on the issue of language 
that sprang a new culture or the forms of economic and educational better- 
ment of the Malays. 
Language was thus looked upon as the springboard for other forms of 
development, be they cultural or material. Hence, when the Government 
showed its ambivalence towards the national language policy, there was an 
outcry from the Malay community knowing that the policy could permeate 
through all the bureaucratic institutions of which education would greatly 
be affected. 
At the same time, Article 152 of the constitution did not provide 
a full guarantee over the status of the national language. Unlike Article 
153, this Article on the national language was not definite and assuring 
in its implication. Their worry came to a practical reality when 
Parliament passed the National Language Act, 1967. Being a hotly contested 
issue, it was envisaged that as an instrument of legislation, Parliament 
could have institutionalised the national language question and instan- 
taneously protected it from being politically exploited. The failure on 
the part of Parliament to do so created a ferment of anger, hopelessness 
and despair among the Malays. 
In September 1968 for instance, a year after the National Language 
Act, 1967 was passed by Parliament, a symposium on "Malayan Educational 
Policy" was held at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. The symposium 
was worth noting not only in terms of the working papers that were presen- 
ted but also for the atmosphere of despair and frustration that surrounded 
the proceedings. Two cases could be cited to add further relevance to 
the issue under discussion. The first was the opening speech made by the 
chairman of the symposium. Among other things he pointed out was that 
"the present problem is not that we want to create a new educational 
policy but we ask the government to implement the policy that is already 
in existence" (Dewan Masyarakat, op. cit.: 12). A more pathetic note was 
expressed when the discussion was centred upon the establishment of a 
"National University". Ismail Hussein (Dewan Masyarakat, op. cit.: 18) 
cautioned the audience not to be the victim of any political illusion. 
He suggested that "if the establishment of a National University would 
only perpetuate the characteristics of the existing national schools and 
produce second-class graduates and second-class citizens who will be 
foreigners in their own country, I feel that we should start changing 
our orientation so that we do not sacrifice our future generation. " 
It could be seen here how disillusioned were the Malays seeing their 
language being degraded to a second-class status and they were even more 
bitter when it all happened in their own motherland. With the accumulation 
of disappointment, there developed a sense of hopelessness. Independence 
did not accord the identity that they had been asking for. It was the 
aspiration that only through education they could recoup the lost ground 
which they had suffered in the economic field. Their position had almost 
reached the stage of an "unidentified group", like the Lapps in Sweden, 
living as "exiles in their own lands" (Cohen, 1976: 37-38). The last 
straw came when they were denied the recognition of being the indigenous 
members of the country. It was a defensive mechanism, in defence of their 
cultural heritage and rights that the Malay community responded in kind. 
The 1969 Crisis 
It was in the light of these developments that the Federal election 
of 1969 left a vital scar on the nation's history. The election was a 
prelude to a national tragedy, for hardly three days had elapsed when 
the 
world witnessed the Malayan capital of Kuala Lumpur experiencing 
its 
worst ever ethnic crisis. The incident shook the very foundation of ethnic 
co-existence and tolerance assumed to have prevailed and on which 
indepen- 
dent Malaya was built. It also brought into the open the fragile nature 
of ethnic arrangements initiated by the ruling Alliance 
Government when 
it laid the country's foundation of nationhood. 
The intensity of the violence that engulfed the country and the 
number of lives that were lost tended to demolish the basic philosophy 
and definition of politics that had been proposed by Maurice Duverger 
(1972: 179) that: 
"Men and organizations in conflict with each other use 
various kinds of weapons in the political struggle. 
Depending upon the period of history, the type of 
society, the political regime, and the social groups 
or classes in conflict, one weapon or another pre- 
dominates, but one kind of weapon is ruled out, in 
principle - that which involves the use of physical 
violence. When groups or individuals confront each 
other with fists, clubs, rifles, or machine guns, we 
are outside the domain of politics. The first objec- 
tive of politics is to eliminate violence, to replace 
bloody conflicts with more temperate forms of civil 
strife, and to eliminate wars, either civil or 
international. " 
Kogan (1978: 15) concurred with this view when he suggested that, 
"politics are those processes of discourse through which members of society 
seek to assert and ultimately reconcile their wishes. " What happened on 
that eventful evening in Kuala Lumpur was the transformation of the 
electoral process from an instrument which mediated the various conflict- 
ing ideological elements to one beyond the realms of civil political 
procedures. At the same time, it was also a paradox that the election 
which was meant to elect members to the House of Parliament with the 
purposes as envisaged by Duverger (op. cit. ) resulted in that same instit- 
ution being placed under suspension. 
What happened on that evening of May 13,1969 has been widely detailedl 
1. See Majlis Gerakan Negara, 1969. Tra'edi 13 Mei. Kuala Lumpur: 1969, 
also Turku Abdul Putra al-Haj, 1969. Sebelum dan Selepas Mei 13. 
Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Melayu. 
and has also been the subject of academic discourses. 1 The analyses 
are varied, ranging from Marxist to theories of social and cultural 
pluralism. 
At a glance, the May 13 incident could be easily analysed on the 
basis of the Marxist point of view which saw the conflict as the by- 
product of a class struggle between the peasants and the urban workers 
on one side against the new elites that had emerged since independence 
on the other. Cham (1975: 450) for instance, strongly argued that the 1969 
riot was essentially a class conflict, commenting: 
"The racial riots in 1969 were not accidental; they were 
the logical and cumulative result of a long period of 
communal mobilization and agitation practised by the 
ruling class. They did not originate in the fact of 
cultural pluralism; they arose from racial tension and 
strife within the lower class whose aspirations for 
social mobility into higher positions were fanned but 
not fulfilled and whose frustration, discontent and 
resentment had been directed away from its culprit towards 
its fellow victim along racial lines. " 
For those who argued along the line of ethnic pluralism, it was 
assumed that such an occurence was typical of any society where strong 
ethnic sentiments prevailed. Goh (1971: 13) for instance, perceived the 
incident as the product of a zero-sum game between the indigenous and 
the immigrant communities. He argued that the crisis of confidence among 
the Malays had developed when its political power was seen to be eroding 
"from the Malay race to the immigrant minorities" (Goh, ibid.: 13). All 
1. The May Tragedy in Malaysia: A Collection of Essays (Monash University, 
July, 1969) and Comber, L., 1983.13th May 19 7: A Historical 
Survey of Sino-Malay Relations. Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann. 
these reasons had their own justification. However, the root of the 
problem went far beyond the above arguments. It lay in the very foundation 
of Malayan society itself and the failure on the part of the "national 
leaders" to identify and solve them. 
With the achievement of independence, Malaya inherited a society 
which was compartmentalised in terms of its ethnic composition, economic 
activities, geographical distribution and cultural orientation. In a 
nutshell, there was a clear absence of a national character for the pop- 
ulation to be rightly associated with. The laissez-faire rule adopted 
by the colonial government became a copy-cat model for the new independent 
government. No attempt was made to adjust the various colonial leg- 
acies, be they institutional, social or cultural. With colonial policy, 
which was meant for colonial purposes, being prolonged and utilised, it 
became a misfit to the governmental machinery due to the difference in 
politics and objectives which the newly independent state had. As an 
example, the bureaucracy, seasoned by years of colonial rule and which was 
meant for colonial ends, was preserved intact without any changes made 
that could efficiently serve the needs of the new state. The educational 
system remained colonial in its essence and orientation without reflecting 
any form of national character which any independent nation could be 
proud of. In describing the colonial educational system in Indonesia, 
Kroef (1954: 24) made the following observation: 
"Throughout the present century the chief malady of the 
colonial educational system was, then, that it was not 
integrated in the social structure of Indonesia and that 
it had little or no connection with existing social 
needs. There can be no question of the high academic 
quality of this system, especially of the Western school, 
but as for preparing the student to take a satisfactory 
place in society, in conformity with the realities of the 
colonial system and economy, it was a dismal failure. " 
The failure on the part of the new leaders to invoke changes in 
the system of education, the orientation of the bureaucracy and all the 
relevant colonial frameworks and policies had far reaching implications 
upon the country. Swayed by the aura of colonial institutions, these 
leaders tended to ignore the basic essentials that made up a viable 
nation state. Thus, they avoided the basic questions that every new nation 
should ponder upon at the very moment of independence. These were the 
questions related to the kind of society that the country intended to 
build (Nyerere, op. cit.: 50) and the type of people that it planned to 
produce. This lack of philosophising on the future of the nation made 
the first decade of independence ambiguous in its definition, vague in 
its conception and uncertain in its objectives. As a result, for a period 
of more than a decade, Malaya was following a course of uncertainty in 
dealing with the problems of ethnicity and its related process of nation- 
building. 
In -this chapter, it would be appropriate to retrace the factors that 
provoked the ethnic crisis. Majlis Gerakan Negara (MGN) 
1 
published a 
detailed account of the incident. The Report did not record the crisis 
in isolation but rather treated it as a climax that resulted from the 
chains of events that began immediately after the Second World War. The 
Report made no apology towards the immigrant communities and in fact was 
blunt when discussing the main source of the conflict. According to this 
Report, the May 13 incident was the outcome of various developments among 
which was the "absence of direct communication among the generations and 
1. '4ajlis Gerakan Negara" - National Operation Council. 
the different interpretation by different ethnic groups towards the 
constitution which led to the increase in political aggression by the 
immigrant communities over the basic constitutional elements that are 
related to the Malay language and the position of the Malays, especially 
on Articles 152 and 153" (MGN, 1969: xi). 
The May 13 tragedy was the aftermath of the 1969 national election 
which saw the manifestation of communal politics at its zenith. During 
the campaigning period, most major political parties tended to emphasise 
issues that were ethnic in nature. In this context, ideological leanings 
became a "non-issue" unless they were related to the interests of specific 
ethnic groups. Thus, when Articles 152 and 153 of the constitution be- 
came the springboard of the election campaign, the concept of "equality" 
that was generated was subdued in the morass of ethnic complexity and 
irrationality rather than treating the issue within a specific ideolo- 
gical framework. Hence, the campaign trail was left not with issues of 
policy per se, but rather with a long list of accusation and counter- 
accusation over the questions of political and national legitimacy. 
Under these circumstances, it was not hard to see ethnic issues be- 
coming a source of political mobilisation and thus paving the way for 
confrontation. As Nelson and Wolpe (1970: 1115) suggested: 
rr... men become tribalists not only out of insecurity 
but also out of the many opportunities created by 
social mobilization in a communal milieu. In cultural- 
ly plural societies, citizens tend to perceive their 
competitive world through a communal prism and to be 
responsive to communal appeals. Communalism therefore 
becomes a matter of opportunism. It matters not that, 
in any given competition, communal criteria are in- 
appropriate to the determination of the outcome and 
may not in fact have been operative. What is important 
is that the personal fortunes of individuals are gene- 
rally believed to depend on their communal origins 
and connections. " 
Apparent in the rioting was the communal element that was involved. 
It was hard to deny that it was an ethnic confrontation between the 
Malays and the immigrant communities. To put the blame on the communists 
(Turku, 1969: 10-17) was to shirk from the responsibility of what had 
happened. At the same time, to say that it was a "crisis of confidence" 
on the part of UMNO and the Malays seeing that the opposition parties 
had made in-roads into the eledtoral process (Goh, 1971: 12-13) and the 
"Malays were shaken" due to the electoral defeat (Vasil*, 1980: 182), was an 
indirect way of putting the blame on the Malays for the whole incident. 
The fact that another opposition party, the PMI1 retained the state of 
Kelantan, wrested almost half of the State Assembly seats of Trengganu 
and had a considerable increase in influence in the state of Kedah 
(see Table 17 ) tended to demolish the accusation levelled on UMNO and 
the Malays for being belligerent in actions and attitudes. In these 
states, UMNO-PMIP ideological differences and rivalries were even more 
serious than those between UMNO and the other non-political parties. But 
in these same states, not even one incident of note was reported. The 
fact that the rioting happened in Kuala Lumpur, the capital city inhabited 
predominantly by the immigrant communities could suggest that it was 
their arrogance over the newly gained electoral successes that provoked 
the conflict (MGN, op. cit.: 40). 
At the same time, there must not be any attempt to deviate from the 
core of the matter. It must be accepted that for such a large scale 
rioting to occur, there must be an all round dissatisfaction among 
the 
population. As has been described earlier, ethnic 
issues and problems 
had been the mainstay of Malayan politics before and after independence. 
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Even a few months before the country achieved its independence, communal 
tension was already growing (MGN, op. cit.: 17-19). For instance, in 
May 1959, an incident was reported and again in July 1964, the country 
experienced a Malay-Chinese confrontation which resulted in the loss of 
lives (MGN, op. cit.: 20-23). But, despite these experiences, it was 
strange to note that the Government's programme for national development 
did not explicitly include the vital aspect of ethnic relations. Both 
the economic and educational institutions, two important instruments 
that could be utilised towards a purposeful national cause, remained iden- 
tifiable with their pre-independent outlook and function. In addition, 
whenever the problems of racial conflict arose, the Government preferred 
to side-step the issue by putting the blame on extraneous forces like the 
communists or secret societies. As a short-term measure, this policy of 
"scapegoating'' was effective but it did not provide a long and lasting 
solution. With the arrival of the new "Merdeka" generation into the 
Malayan political scene, the ethnic status-quo that was in existence began 
to be disturbed. Various aspects of the "constitutional compromises" 
(see Chapter 5) were unknown to this new generation and their validity 
was thus questioned. At the same time, no efforts were made to educate 
them. The educational system that was provided did not prepare them for 
understanding the evolution and development of their own society and the 
different values that were attached to it. Thus, the country produced a 
generation who possessed the knowledge but without the education and 
wisdom that it needed. It was with this background that saw Malaya exper- 
iencing its most serious ethnic crisis. 
May 13 Crisis: Its Implications 
The crisis began on the evening of May 13,1969 when sporadic ethnic 
clashes spread into most parts of Kuala Lumpur and turned it into a riot 
torn city. In its efforts to restore order, a state of emergency was 
declared by the Government and this was later extended throughout the 
country. Following this move, Parliament was suspended and all political 
activities were banned. The day to day affairs of the country were placed 
under the National Operation Council (Majlis Gerakan Negara) of which 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak became its first Director 
(The Straits Times, May 17,1969). 
The formation of the National Operation Council which included the 
top police and military personnel (Goh, op. cit.: 27) is significant in 
understanding the political development following the May 13 incident. 
Under this new administrative set-up, Malaya was to a certain extent 
governed by a "military-backed civilian government". As will be seen 
in 
the next chapter, this new administration brought along sweeping changes 
in the country's governing institutions, never before seen in Malayan 
history. 
The crisis also revealed that despite the political 
bargaining that 
was reached between the Malays and the non-Malays 
(Zakaria Haji Ahmad, 
1982: 89) grievances still persisted over the related 
issues of language 
and education. To a certain extent these problems created a considerable 
tension among the coalition members of the Alliance 
Government. As a 
result of the 1969 national election which saw the 
MCA suffer a humiliating 
defeat, the relationship within the Alliance and the distribution of 
power among its members was never the same again. 
Lastly, in the history of Malayan education, the May 13 incident 
was a catalyst in the full implementation of the national education policy 
which the Razak Report had recommended a decade earlier. 
Chapter Seven 
The New Realism 
Towards National Reconciliation 
The calamity that occurred on that eventful date of May 13,1969 
was a tragedy on a national scale, represented by the number of lives that 
were lost, 
1 
where violence became an outlet for the manifestation of 
extreme frustration. It was unfortunate that communal and political rival- 
ries could come to such a bloody conclusion. In the context of the Malayan 
plural society many felt that conflict potential was always latent and 
that it was just a matter of time before it would be ignited. The Econ- 
omist (May 17,1969: 31) commented wryly that "the communal spectre that 
has always haunted Malaysian politics has become a savage reality. " 
The extent and intensity of the racial riot suggest that it was the 
result of a long subjugation of anger, disappointment and despair follow- 
ingindependence. Nonetheless, this accumulation of frustration among the 
population was not perceived by the Government in power. It failed to 
visualise the institutional defects that had been the main source of the 
crisis. On the other hand, the Government was more concerned about main- 
taining ethnic solidarity rather than solving the problems of diversity. 
1. The number of people that died in this conflict could not exactly 
be ascertained, but The Times, May 20,1969 gave the figure as 
147 believed to have been killed. The figure released by the 
National Operation Council was 196. 
As Vasil (1980: 1) suggested: 
"Problems - social, political and economic - and the 
failure of governments and leaders to solve them are 
readily presented in ethnic terms and blame is often 
put on ethnic adversaries. " 
As such, the leaders in general were not readily responsive to the demands 
that emerged over certain policies and issues which were of national rel- 
evance. The failure to foresee the various social and cultural problems 
that beset the nation and the inability to deal seriously with the deter- 
ioration of ethnic relations tended to suggest that the Government was 
inept and irresponsible. As a result of its own making, the May 13 
incident caught the Government by surprise. The fact that it took not 
less than four days before order was restored in the capital of Kuala 
Lumpur tended to prove this argument. Out of uncertainty and panic, 
Parliament was suspended and the country was placed under a military-style 
administration - the National Operation Council 
(see Chapter 6). 
At the same time, May 13,1969 will always be remembered in the annals 
of Malayan history as a demarcator between the old and the new, the failure 
of the past and the hope of the future. The memorable incident was like 
a "new renaissance" which created an impetus towards the re-awakening of 
the country in general. Mistakes were admitted by the Government 
(The 
Straits Times, July 18,1969) and the country began to embark on the pol- 
itics of reconciliation, albeit with the force of legislation. 
Thus, the 
episode was also significant in that it generated the sense of new-found 
realism among the population. 
Coser (1968: 126) had suggested that conflicts could be productive 
in two related ways. Firstly, they "lead to the modification and the 
creation of law". Secondly, 'the application of new rules leads to the 
growth of new institutional structures". This suggestion was not far 
from what happened in Malaya, for the greatest of all the impact that 
resulted from the ethnic conflict of 1969 was the re-definition of the 
ethnic position particularly in relation to the indigenous and the immig- 
rant communities. The sweeping changes that were made not only brushed 
aside the ethnic consensus that had permeated through the political and 
economic institutions but, at the same time, through the process of legis- 
lation, the Government invoked a device which discriminated positively on 
the "have-nots" of the country. Firstly, there was a thorough re-examin- 
ation of the institutional structures that existed during the pre-1969 
period. Secondly, there was a re-definition of all policies of national 
importance. Thirdly, an ardent effort was made towards the development of 
a common value system as seen in the emergence of a "national ideology" 
(Rukunegara). Fourthly, legislative procedures were taken to ensure that 
items that were termed as "sensitive" such as the national language, the 
special position of the Malays and the position of the Malay rulers were 
prohibited from public discussion. 
Political Structures Re-examined 
The poor showing of the Alliance Government 
in the 1969 election and 
the subsequent ethnic riots that occurred exposed 
the question of credib- 
ility towards the existing political system. The politics of compromise 
and accommodation as advocated by the Alliance were 
in themselves not 
conflict-proof. In a real sense, they could not cushion 
the pressure of 
ethnicity from its divergent tendencies. The burden was upon the leader- 
ships (Lijphart, 1968: 122) who had to create an equal balance between the 
pressures of their respective constituencies and their official role of 
governing. At the same time, the mandate they had over the country was 
not permanent. It depended on the voting pattern of their respective 
electorates. The failure to fulfil their expected aspiration could ultim- 
ately lead to the withdrawal of this mandate and thus prevented them from 
returning to power. This was the impression given in the 1969 general 
election when the support which the Alliance Government had all along been 
receiving was withdrawn. As a result, both the MCA and UMNO suffered a 
severe crisis of confidence within the rank and file of the parties. 
This crisis had far reaching implications upon the ruling party. The 
fragile relationship, which had been the mainstay of the coalition almost 
cracked when the MCA decided not to participate in the Government both at 
Federal and State levels of administration. Tun Abdul Razak's statement 
which blamed the Chinese electorate for the loss of MCA candidates which 
thus paved the way for Malay rule, (Warta Negara, May 14,1969) further 
aggravated the political rift that was developing. 
To the extremists within the UMNO, the absence of MCA from the 
Government would pave the way for Malay political supremacy which they 
had been advocating. They felt strongly that it was due to the pressure 
from the MCA that many of the programmes which were of national importance 
were being compromised to accommodate the demands of the 
MCA. They cited, 
for example, the National Language Act, 1967 
(see Chapter 5) which was 
passed by Parliament, as a document which was ineffective 
in its intention 
of making Malay the sole official language of the country. 
They also cited 
the case of the educational system where Malay language was yet to be the 
main medium of instruction in all Government schools as proposed by the 
Razak Report (para. 12). Their grievances were many. These groups 
within UMNO were willing to go alone to form the Government for they felt 
that it was UMNO who had won the election and the MCA as a political 
partner had failed. They also claimed that it was UMNO's inconsistency 
and ambiguity in its policies over language and education that caused the 
party to suffer reverses in some of the states during the election 
(Goh, op. cit.: 29-30). It was with this in mind that a group of UMNO 
leaders called for the top leadership of the party to hold an Emergency 
General Assembly to enable the party to study its policy in relation to 
its component partners within the Alliance (Utusan Melayu, May 14,1969). 1 
On the economic side, this same group within the party felt strongly 
that the pre-independence quid-pro-quo arrangement made between the 
Chinese and the Malays which became the basis of the Alliance framework 
was more to their disadvantage. While the Chinese had a share of the 
country's political power, the Malays were offered nothing for their 
economic advancement. Vasil (1980: 218) highlighted the problem when he 
wrote: 
"The basis of accommodation between the Malays and the 
non-Malays was the quid-pro-quo arrangement that 
guaranteed the Malays political paramountcy and allowed 
the non-Malays free play in the spheres of trade, 
commerce and industry. The significant result of this 
was that the fundamental ethnic antipathies remained 
1. Among them were Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, a member of the UMNO Supreme 
Council; Syed Jaafar Albar, former secretary-general of UMNO; 
Hamzah Alang, former UMNO youth leader and Syed Nasir Ismail, also 
a member of the party's Supreme Council. 
alive, especially among the Malays. The quid-pro-quo 
arrangement also precluded any substantial improvement in the economic lot of the Malay rakyat and in this 
added to their fears about their future in their own 
country". 
Under these circumstances there was a strong justification for the 
Malays to be fearful of their economic future. The quid-pro-quo 
arrangement had rendered the Government ineffective in its attempt to 
uplift the economic well-being of the Malays. A case in point occurred 
in 1960 when the Minister of Agriculture, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, was 
removed from his portfolio for trying to curb the activities of the 
Chinese middle-man in the state of Kedah. His attempt to improve the 
marketing facilities of the rural Malays clashed with the interests of the 
Chinese business sector and this was against the principle that had been 
agreed upon between the MCA and UMNO (Vasil, 1971: 278-289). 
"To go all alone" in governing the country was not beyond the capabil- 
ity of UMNO. In terms of electoral strength, the party could form a 
government without the participation of the MCA or the MIC. This was 
attributed to the structure of the nation's electoral boundaries which 
was based on spatial distribution rather than the proportion of the popul- 
ation. Under this arrangement, the Malays being geographically scattered 
in their patterns of settlement had a greater advantage over the Chinese 
who were mostly concentrated in the major urban areas. For instance, 
in 1964, out of the 104 parliamentary constituencies 57 of them had more 
than 50% of Malay electorates. In 1969, the number was 55 but still 
favoured the Malays in terms of an electoral victory (Vasil, 1972: 97-100). 
Based on the past election results (see Table 18 ) UMNO alone, without 
the benefit of any form of coalition with other parties could still form 
a government in Malaya. In the election of 1964, for example, UMNO was 
able to win 59 seats, a majority of 7. In the 1969 election, it won only 
51 seats, short of two seats to enable the party to control the Government. 
It should also be noted that in all these Malay dominated constituencies, 
the other contending party was the PMIP. Under the extreme atmosphere of 
ethnic politics it was not impossible for these two parties to coalesce 
and thus pave the way for an absolute Malay rule if they so wished. 
Table 18 
The Alliance in the Malayan Federal Elections (1964-1969) 
Entered Won Lost 
1964 
UMNO 68 59 9 
MCA 33 27 6 
MIC 3 3 0 
1969 
UMNO 68 51 17 
MCA 33 13 20 
MIC 3 2 1 
Source: Goh, op. cit.: Table 1, p. 12. 
But this was not the thinking of the ruling elite of the UMNO. The 
party felt that it was politically unrealistic to negate the existence of 
the non-Malays which constituted almost half of the country's population. 
Furthermore, the UMNO MCA Alliance had been specially closed since their 
experiment in partnership which began during the Kuala Lumpur Municipal 
elections of 1952. Added to that, it had been an accepted fact that 
while UMNO would represent the interests of the Malays, the same role 
would be played by the MCA towards the Chinese community. Thus, the 
MCA's declared intention not to participate in the Government created 
an atmosphere of disquiet among the old stalwarts of UMNO, especially the 
Tunku. However, a different reaction emerged from the radical group 
within iThINO. Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, the most outspoken of them all "even 
voiced strong objection to MCA 's participation in the Cabinet" (Goh, op. 
cit.: 30). His remark offended the Tunku who out of sentiment cherished 
the relationship with the MCA . In the controversy that followed, 
Dr. Mahathir bluntly accused the Tunku of "consistent capitualtion to 
Chinese demands" (Goh, ibid.: 30). He further called on the Prime Minister 
to resign as Party Chairman and Prime Minister, claiming that the Malays 
"whether in the civil service, police, army or elsewhere, had lost every 
shred of confidence in his leadership". 
The Tunku-Mahathir controversy was significant for it brought out 
into the open the Malay's displeasure towards UMNO's policy of "capitu- 
lation" when pressured by the immigrant communities. Although the 
country's leaderships remained intact even after the crisis, there was 
undoubtedly a significant shift in the relationship. The most important 
was the end of the policy of ethnic appeasement and the politics of 
compromise and accommodation which had been the guiding philosophy of the 
Alliance during the pre-1969 period. The final demise of this policy 
began on September 20,1970 when Tunku Abdul Rahman, who embodied the 
spirit of consociationalism stepped down as the Prime Minister and as 
the President of UMNO. 
Educational Policies Reviewed 
A basic and pertinent question that emerged after the May 13 crisis 
was over the progress of the educational system as envisaged by both the 
Razak Report and the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960. It 
had been argued earlier (see Chapter 6) that the political and philosoph- 
ical contradictions that developed between the indigenous and the 
immigrant communities over certain aspects of the policy, was to some 
extent a contributory factor in creating a position of "stalemate" and 
thus hindered its due course of implementation. Under the institutional 
set up of the Alliance Government, the period of "stalemate" was essential 
as a "cooling down" mechanism. This was one way of preventing the issue 
from further deterioration and controversy. The method was preferred for 
it allowed members of the coalition government to re-assess the political 
climate that developed among the masses. At the same time, for any member 
of the coalition to stretch any controversial issue to its limit would 
result in offending the other partner who had an opposing view of the 
subject. The fear of offending each other's point of view was a charac- 
teristic of the Alliance Government that resulted in many issues being 
frozen. This "icebox policy" (Lijphart, 1966: 164-177) thus stagnated 
any programme of implementation. 
Education is a crucial matter for any country. Its policy could 
not afford to be the victim of uncertain political or philosophical altern- 
atives. Again, on matters related to policy, the slower the decision of 
its implementation is made, the more aggravated the issue would become. 
As Lijphart (1968: 124) observed, "Decisions on controversial matters 
have to be made, and continuous inaction would have disastrous consequen- 
ces*" 
The paradox was that out of the controversies which surrounded the 
implementation of the national system of education, a new phenomenon 
emerged as a compromised alternative. 
1 
This was in the form of the 
English language. Since independence, its position in the school system 
had increased in importance. The failure on the part of the Government 
to implement the national language policy in the school system as outlined 
by the Razak Report (para. 12) incurred institutional defects upon the 
development of national education in general and towards the growth of 
the national schools in particular. By virtue of the difference in the 
language of instruction at the tertiary level of education, pupils from 
the national school streams were hampered in their quest for improved 
educational status. Their educational advancement, being limited to only 
the secondary level, was cause for much despair. Furthermore, the medium 
was English, the language which was considered to be an obstacle to their 
future educational advancement. 
1. It was assumed by the leadership of the Government that the 
neutrality of English would be acceptable to all. By taking this 
view, they also hoped to strengthen their middle-class ideology 
of favouring the retention of English language in the country. 
By 1967, the position of the English language both in the bureau- 
cratic processes and in the country's system of education appeared to be 
unassailable. While preparations were made for the crowning of the nat- 
ional language as envisaged by Article 152 of the Federal Constitution, 
attempts were also made for the English language to be retained permanently. 
The English educated, particularly the bureaucrats and the political 
elites, were concerned as the time for the switch was approaching. Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, in sensing this development, was quick to issue a statement 
assuring them that the use of English "must continue" (The Straits Times, 
October 22,1966). The Tunku further stressed that "if we were to substit- 
ute English altogether with the national language, the machinery of the 
government will be thrown out of gear. The teaching of English in our 
schools must therefore go on" (The Straits Times, ibid. ). This statement 
of Tunku on the need for the continued use of English was fully endorsed 
by the State Assembly of Penang. The House approved by 15 votes to 6a 
motion supporting the views expressed by the Prime Minister on the con- 
tinued use of the English language in this country" (The Straits Times, 
November 25,1966). 
Even after the National Language Act, 1967, despite the assurances 
that the role of English would be reduced', the stalemate over its implem- 
entation in the educational system remained. Scepticism mounted over its 
function and ability as the language of instruction in schools. Dr. Lim 
Chong Eu, a prominent leader from Penang, sensing this state of affairs 
urged the Government to review the progress of the Malay language. In 
1. This type of assurance was often given by Tunku in defence of the 
Act. See Warta Negara, Feb. 2,1967. 
his speech at the Congress of The Teaching Profession, he openly stated 
that, "I do not think we can achieve the goal of making the national 
language the main medium of instruction for several generations" (The 
Straits Times, January 2,1968). His statement reflected the lack of con- 
fidence over the national language and also the frustration that had 
developed over the "neither here nor there" policy adopted by the 
Government. 
The Government b underlying policy towards the English language became 
clearer when it rejected the call for the establishment of the "Merdeka 
University"1 which proposed to use Chinese as the medium of instruction. 
But in order to pacify certain sections of the Chinese community, the 
Government backed the MCA sponsored College which used English as its 
instructional medium. In addition, the Government also agreed to give 
financial assistance on a dollar to dollar basis and agreed in principle 
to recognise the diploma that it awarded (The Straits Times, July 15,1968). 
The support the Government gave to this College was significant in 
two ways. Firstly, it reminded us on the compromising principle that 
embodied the UMNO4"ICA relationship. In this case the Chinese demanded 
the setting up of a Chinese language university but were rejected on the 
grounds that it was against the national education policy. As a compro- 
mise, it supported the establishment of the MCA proposed College, although 
by doing so it enhanced the development of English language and this in 
fact contradicted the basic principles enshrined in both the Razak Report 
1. "Merdeka University" - "Independent University". 
and the Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960. Secondly, it 
was a tacit attempt by the Government to strengthen the position of the 
English language at the tertiary level of education. By supporting the 
establishment of the College it also attempted to achieve a dual political 
objective. In the first place it was to pacify the Chinese over the 
issue of the "Merdeka University" in view of the pending general election, 
albeit without much success. The other was to strengthen the position of 
the English language in preparation for the dual language policy that it 
was advocating all along. The subsequent events that emerged tended to 
prove that the above argument was far from being empty speculation. In 
early March 1969, the obsession towards the English language and education 
was again openly pronounced. Khir Johari, the Minister of Education, was 
caught up in this development when he suggested the setting up of an Eton 
and Harrow type of public school in Malaya (The Straits Times, March 1, 
1969). To some extent his statement was in defiance of the call for his 
resignation made a few months earlier by the University of Malaya Malay 
Language Society which adopted a resolution calling for the removal of 
Khir Johari as Minister of Education "to avoid adventurism in the imple- 
mentation of the educational policy" (The Straits Times, Sept. 30 and 
Oct. 2,1968). 
The continued retention of English especially at the higher level of 
education generated much concern and frustration among the Malays. It 
was even viewed as a form of institutional discrimination against Malay 
pupils who mostly attended the national schools. Since the 
language of 
instruction at university level was still English, the chances of entering 
the institution favoured those who attended the English schools. Due to 
historical and geographical reasons, it was the non Malay communities 
who benefitted most from the English school system. With this develop- 
ment in education, it was inevitable that they monopolised the enrollment 
of the University of Malaya at least during the first ten years of the 
university's inception. This was evident when one analysed the ethnic 
composition of the University of Malaya's student population between 1959, 
when it was first established, and the 1969-1970 academic session. During 
this period, the number of Malays entering the university was 8,956 as 
against the total enrollment of 30,523. This constituted only 29.3% as 
compared to the non-Malay's share of 70.7% (see Table 19 ). 
Table 19 
Number of Students Enrolled in the University of Malaya 
Between 1959-1960 and 1969-1970 Academic Sessions 
Academic Malays Non-Malays Total 
Year No. % No. % 
1959-1960 62 19.2 260 80.8 322 
1960-1961 144 22.1 509 77.9 653 
1961-1962 217 21.5 793 78.5 1,. 010 
1962-1963 274 20.4 1,067 79.6 1,341 
1963-1964 368 20.6 1,378 79.4 1,736 
1964-1965 543 24.4 1,682 75.6 2,225 
1965-1966 721 25.4 2,114 74.6 2,835 
1966-1967 1,038 28.8 2,565 71.2 3,603 
1967-1968 1,401 30.7 3,159 69.3 4,560 
1968-1969 1,825 32.8 3,741 67.2 5,566 
1969-1970 2,373 35.6 4,299 64.4 6,672 
TOTAL 8,956 29.3 21,567 70.7 30,523 
Source: Abdul Majid Report, 1971. 
Figures derived from Table 1, p. 31. 
The figures as revealed by the Majid Ismail Report (1971) were even 
more disappointing when they were analysed in terms of faculty enrollments. 
In the faculty of Arts, for example, the number of Malays enrolled during 
the university's first eleven years was 6,351 out of the total enrollment 
of 15,009. This was only 42.3% (see Table 20 ). There was also a 
marked disparity between the numbers of students in terms of faculty 
distribution. Between the 1959-1060 to the 1965-1966 academic sessions 
more than 80% of the Malay students' population were enrolled in the 
faculty of Arts, while the remaining 20, % were following courses in science 
(see Appendix D). 
If in the faculty of Arts, the enrollment ratio did not favour the 
Malays, the picture was even worse when one analysed their enrollment in 
the Faculty of Science. During the period of study, the number of Malay 
students taking various courses in the sciences was only 1,269 out of 
a total enrollment of 12,221. This figure constituted only 10.4% 
(see Table 21). In the Faculty of Engineering for example, between the 
1959-1960 and the 1969-1970 academic sessions only 56 Malay students were 
admitted out of the total enrollment of 2,847. The figure was only 2% 
of all the total enrollment in that Faculty (see Table 22 ). Even in 
the Faculty of Education, the number of Malays enrolled was only 381 
which constituted 28.7% out of the total enrollment of 1,328 
(see Table 23 )" 
Table 20 
Total Number of Students in the Faculty of Arts and their Distribution 
by Race Between 1959-1960 and 1969-1970 Academic Sessions .. r 
Academic Malays Non-Malays Total 
Year No. % No. % 
1959-1960 58 35.8 lo4 64.2 162 
1960-1961 128 36.3 225 63.7 353 
1961-1962 193 34.7 363 65.3 556 
1962-1963 247 34.2 476 65.8 723 
1963-1964 310 34.1 598 65.9 908 
1964-1965 459 38.6 729 61.4 1,188 
1965-1966 606 40.5 890 59.5 1,496 
1966-1967 780 42.5 1,056 57.5 1,836 
1967-1968 966 36.7 1,666 63.3 2,632 
1968-1969 1,115 47.8 1,217 52.2 2,332 
1969-1970 1,489 52.7 1,334 47.3 2,823 
TOTAL 6,351 42.3 8,658 57.7 15,009 
4 
Source: Abdul Majid Report, 1971. 
Figures derived from Table II, pp. 32-33. 
Table 21 
Total Number of Students Enrolled in the Faculty of Sciences and their 
Distribution by Race Between 1959-1960 and 1969-1970 Academic Sessions 
Academic Malays Non-Malaya Total 
Year No. % No. % 
1959-1960 4 2.5 156 97.5 160 
1960-1961 16 5.2 290 94.8 360 
1961-1962 24 5.3 430 94.7 454 
1962-1963 27 4.4 591 95.6 618 
1963-1964 38 4.8 755 95.2 793 
1964-1965 56 5.7 893 94.1 949 
1965-1966 88 7.4 1,101 92.6 1,189 
1966-1967 155 10.7 1,288 89.3 1,443 
1967-1968 255 12.5 1,571 87.5 1,796 
1968-1969 296 13.9 1,827 86.1 2,123 
1969-1970 340 14.2 2,050 85.8 2,390 
TOTAL 1,269 10.4 10,952 89.6 12,221 
Source: Abdul Majid Report, 1971. 
Figures derived from Table II, pp. 32-33. 
Table 22 
Total Number of Students Enrolled in the Engineering Faculty and their 
Distribution by Race Between 1959-1960 and 1969-1970 Academic Sessions 
Academic Malays Non -Malays Total 
Year No. % No. % 
1959-1960 1 0.8 128 99.2 
1960-1961 4 2.5 155 97.5 
1961-1962 4 2.0 194 98.0 
129 
159 
198 
1962-1963 5 2.2 221 97.8 226 
1963-1964 2 0.8 255 99.2 257 
1964-1965 .41.5 258 98.5 262 
1965-1966 3 1.1 278 98.9 281 
1966-1967 5 1.6 306 98.4 311 
1967-1968 11 3.4 316 96.6 327 
1968-1969 6 1.8 332 98.2 338 
1969-1970 11 3.1 348 96.9 359 
TOTAL 56 2.0 2,791 98.0 2,847 
Sources Abdul Majid Report, 1971. 
Figures derived from Table II, pp. 32-33" 
Table 23 
Total Number of Students Enrolled in the Faculty of Education1 and 
their Distribution by Race Between 1963-1964 and 1969-1970 Academic Sessions 
Academic Malays Non Malays Total 
Year No. % No. % 
1963-1964 10 29.4 24 70.6 34 
1964-1965 28 31.8 60 68.2 88 
1965-1966 27 18. o 123 82.0 150 
1966-1967 54 28.3 137 71.7 191 
1967-1968 51 23.7 164 76.3 215 
1968-1969 109 33.0 221 67.0 330 
1969-1970 102 31.9 218 68.1 320 
TOTAL 381 28.7 947 71.3 1,328 
4. 
Source: Abdul Majid Report, 1971. Figures derived from 
Table II, pp. 32-33" 
1. The Faculty of Education was established in 1963. 
When analysing the student enrollment in the Faculty of Sciences 
between 1964 and 1970, the Majid Ismail Report (1971: para. 88) commented-* 
"Thus in the past six years, the University of Malaya has 
produced a total of 119 Malay graduates in all the sciences 
put together. It will be noted that as long ago as 1965, 
there were 126 non-Malay graduates from the Faculty of 
Science alone and that the first two graduating classes in 
Medicine have already produced 117 non-Malay doctors. The 
national implications of these figures are obvious and 
ominous. For the limited purpose of our study, the implic- 
ations are equally obvious as they point to racial segre- 
gation by faculty and to the inevitable resentment and 
frustration on the part of the Malay students. " 
The pre-1969 educational development was conceived by the majority 
of the Malays as discriminatory towards them. After more than a decade 
of independence they still remained within the enclaves of the depressed 
and deprived. The ideal that education would be the key to their social 
and economic improvement seemed to have disappeared and thus could not 
find the hope that they had anticipated. 
Educational Policies Implemented 
It has been the thrust of this thesis that the May 13 conflict was 
the result of the cumulative dissatisfaction over certain policies, 
especially in relation to Article 152 of the Federal Constitution and the 
failure to implement the national system of education as proposed by both 
the Razak Report, 1956 and the Report of the Education Review Committee, 
1960. Both the Government's policies over language and education have 
been the source of much political contradiction in terms of objective and 
philosophy. These problems, together with the Government's tacit intention 
of deviating from the original policies, greatly hampered their due course 
of implementation. The post-1969 period waw a serious attempt by the 
Government to redress some of its past mistakes. In fact the re-definition 
of the national education policy was the first major programme embarked 
upon by the Government after the May 13 conflict. This stemmed from the 
realisation that in the Malayan context, education was too important and 
volatile an issue to be the victim of an excessive political manipulation. 
In an attempt to place education out of the political centre, a 
political figure from Sarawak was appointed as the country's new Minister 
of Education. The appointee was Abdul Rahman Yaakub who first joined 
the Malayan Cabinet following the formation of the Malaysian Federation 
in 1963. Before being appointed to the key post of education, he was 
a Federal Minister for Lands and Mines. His appointment to such an 
important and controversial portfolio raised much speculation. As Minister 
in charge of education he had a wide range of power over matters related 
to the development of education in the country. His authority was 
enshrined in the Education Ordinance, 1957 (para. 5) which stated that 
"It shall be the duty of the Minister to secure the effective execution 
of the educational policy of the Federation including the progressive 
development of educational institutions where the national language is 
the medium of instruction". 
It was therefore assumed that giving such an important portfolio to 
an outsider1, the Government had the intention of neutralising the issue, 
thus preventing it from being subject to political compromise and 
1. He was considered as an outsider to the Malayan political scene. 
Because he was not a member of UMNO, he did not belong to the "ia- 
group" of the party which influenced most of the Government's 
decisions. 
appeasement. At the same time, it was also envisaged that not being a 
member of TJMNO he would be able to reduced the inherent conflict potential 
that had characterised Malayan education since independence. 
Contrary to all the speculation that had been heaped upon his appoint- 
ment, he single-handedly issued a statement of policy that radically 
changed the direction of the country's educational system. By invoking 
the power bestowed on him, he once and for all cleared the ambiguity 
that had surrounded the national education policy for more than a decade. 
He announced that "a dynamic educational policy" would be implemented 
by the Government only two weeks after the May 13 crisis (The Straits 
Times, May 28,1969). The important statement was made amidst the crisis 
that was developing within the Government and among the UMNO leaders in 
particular. According to Goh (op. cit.: 32), the "unilateral declaration 
of policy" that Abdul Rahman Yaakub made over the implementation of a 
dynamic educational policy in the wake of an anti-Tunku campaign by 
students from colleges and the university, helped to restore confidence 
in the Government. Goh (op. cit.: 32) even suggested that Abdul Rahman 
Yaakub's declaration of policy was "without the Tunku's knowledge or 
authority". But in a statement a week later (The Straits Times, June 6, 
1969) he denied that it was a unilateral declaration of policy as had 
been widely speculated. He acknoweldged the fact that the plan for a 
more dynamic educational system had been from his own initiative, but that 
it had been agreed by both the Tunku and Tun Abdul Razak (The Straits 
Times, ibid. ). 
Apparently, the decision that he made stunned the nation which was 
still recovering from the trauma of the ethnic crisis. To the Malays, 
his appointment as the Minister of Education was inititally viewed with 
resignation. It was assumed that being an "outsider" he would safely 
initiate the freezing of all the controversial matters related to educ- 
ation and hence preserve the existing status-quo. The news that he had 
made changes in the direction of the national education system was thus 
viewed with extreme jubilation. To them it was a turning point as far 
as their national aspirations were concerned. Nonetheless, the paradox 
remained in the sense that it took a complete outsider to Malay politics 
to have the courage to make this important breakthrough. 
The focal point of Abdul Rahman Yaakub's statement was the announce- 
ment that effective from 1970 all subjects except English and the pupil's 
mother tongue would be taught in Malay, beginning in standard one in all 
national-type English primary schools. He also announced that as from 
1978 onwards, the form five examinations in all Government English 
secondary schools would be conducted in the national language. He further 
added that "we hope by 1978, all subjects except English and the pupil's 
mother tongue, will be taught in the national language in all English 
schools. As for the institutions of higher learning, by 1983 the medium 
of instruction and examination would be in the national language" (The 
Straits Times, July 12,1969). About two weeks later, he again stated 
that by 1975 all subjects apart from English and the pupil's own language 
would be taught in "Bahasa Malaysia"1 in the "Remove classes". Under 
1. This was formerly the Malay language (Bahasa Melayu). The change 
from "Bahasa Melayu" to "Bahasa Malaysia" was to generate wider 
acceptance of the language. 
the new programme it meant "a complete integration of the English medium 
with the Malay medium Remove classes" (The Straits Times, July 22,1969). 
He further stressed that under this arrangement, English language would 
come into its rightful position as the second language in the school 
system. Finally, the Minister made an observation that "the greatest 
single benefit to be accrued from the implementation of "Bahasa Malaysia" 
will be the accelerated pace of national integration and unity" (The 
Straits Times, ibid. ). 
The response from the Chinese community was immediate and at the 
same time isolated. One was from the President of the Chinese Chambers 
of Commerce, Tan Sri T. H. Tan, who urged the Government to continue the 
use of English in the teaching of science subjects even in primary schools 
(The Straits Times, July 12,1969). He further noted that "many other 
independent nations, notably India, had found it impossible to teach 
science subjects in their own national language especially in the advanced 
stage" (ibid. ). To Tan Sri T. H. Tan, the teaching of science subjects 
in English was imperative if the country was not to lag behind in the 
scientific field (ibid. ). 
This statement made by the President of the Chinese Chambers of 
Commerce was significant in that he appealed for the preservation of 
English rather than promoting the use of Chinese language which was usual 
by the Chambers. This change of strategy revealed one important aspect 
of the language controversy. It gave a clear indication that the promo- 
tion of the Chinese language by this business group was meant for political 
consumption among the Chinese educated groups and the Chinese masses in 
general. In reality, it was the English language that it was concerned 
about and which the Chinese community tried desperately to defend. 
However, the call by Tan Sri T. H. Tan for the retention of English 
received a sharp rebuke from the Minister of Home Affairs, Tun Dr. Ismail. 
In his interview with "Utusan Melayu"1, he conceded on the weakness of 
the Alliance Government in the past. Firstly, he admitted that the 
Government was "lax" in seeing that Malay special privileges were not 
questioned by others. Secondly, he agreed that the Government was "soft" 
in carrying out the national educational system and stressed the correct- 
ness of the policy which was based on the Razak Report, 1956 and the 
Report of the Education Review Committee, 1960. Thirdly, on the question 
of Malay as the official language, he gave the assurance that the Govern- 
ment would not allow any group to challenge it and the Government would 
not entertain the demand that other languages be given equal status 
(The Straits Times, July 18,1969). 
Here, it would be important to provide further elaboration on the 
political and educational development that has just been mentioned. The 
first was in relation to the proclamation of the "New Education Policy" 
by the Minister of Education. Secondly, the remark made by Dr. Ismail 
admitting the Government's previous weaknesses. Thirdly, the unprecedented 
statement made by the President of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce. 
The announcement made by the Minister of Education over the full 
1. "Utusan Melayu" -a Malay language newspaper written in Jawi scripts. 
implementation of the national education policy was timely and appropriate 
to the political climate that prevailed. As an outsider to the Alliance 
political centre, he was aware of the controversial nature that education 
had created and the frustration that stemmed from the Government vacill- 
ating in its implementation. Being a Federal Minister from Sarawak in 
charge of the Lands and Mines portfolio before being appointed as the 
Minister of Education, he was an unknown figure except among the Kuala 
Lumpur intellectual circles. His "Melanau"1 background did not pose an 
obstacle for him to be accepted and trusted especially by the Malay lang- 
uage activists at the University of Malaya. For instance, in 1966, he was 
given the honour to officiate the opening of the "National Language 
Seminar"2 organised by the Malay Language Society, University of Malaya. 
The choice of Abdul Rahman Yaakub over other senior Malay ministers in 
the Malayan Cabinet showed the confidence the society had in his leader- 
ship. At the same time, his association with the society (PBMUM, as it 
was commonly known) 
3 
was also important for it was in this Malay student 
movement that the aspirations of the Malay society were embodied. 
The PBMUM was at that period becoming the "keeper of Malay's conscience". 
Again, in September, 1968, the society held a symposium on the "National 
1. "Melanau" is one of the ethnic groups in Sarawak. 
2. The Seminar which was held on October 29 and 30,1966, was aimed at 
reviewing the progress in the development of the national language. 
The writer was a participant in this seminar. See "Seminar Bahasa 
Kebangsaan", 1966 organised by "Persekutuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti 
Malaya". 
3. PBMUM - "Persekutuan Bahasa Melayu Universiti Malaya" 
(Malay 
Language Society University of Malaya). 
Education Policy" with the following objectives: 
"a. To discuss and expose the deviation from the existing 
educational policy as stated in the Razak and Rahman 
Talib Reports (Education Review Committee, 1960). 
b. To attract the attention towards the Malay medium stream 
who had been the victims of this deviation. 
c. To stress the importance for a country to have a dynamic 
educational policy. 
d. To call for the immediate establishment of a National 
University" (Noordin Abdul Razak, cited in Raja 
Muk)itaruddin, 1982: 43). 
To what extent Abdul Rahman Yaakub was influenced by the PBMUM is 
hard to gauge, but the announcement he made on May 28th, 1969 (The Straits 
Times) that "a dynamic educational policy" would be implemented by the 
Government was in fulfilment of the third objective porposed by the PBMUM 
during the symposium on the "National Education Policy" held in 1968. 
At the same time, his rapport with Malay student organisations was hard 
to conceal. This was clearly manifested when Malay students from the 
National University and the University of Malaya demonstrated on hearing 
that he had resigned from the Cabinet (The Straits Times, July 10,1970). 
To placate the restless atmosphere that developed among the Malay population 
due to his untimely resignation1 the acting Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak 
even had to issue a statement assuring that the national education policy 
would not be changed (Malay Mail, July 13,1970). A fortnight later, and 
again to reassure the public, Tan Sri Hamdan, the Chief Education Advisor 
1. It was rumoured that he was pressured to resign by senior IMNO members 
on seeing his popularity among the Malay population was overwhelmingly 
increasing. But the official version was that -he had to be Chief 
Minister of Sarawak, to solve the political crisis that emerged in 
that state (see Goh, op. cit.: fn. p. 37). 
stressed that there was no going back as far as the national education 
policy was concerned (The Sunday Times, July 26,1970). He emphasised 
that "All Government-aided national type schools (English) will be con- 
verted into national schools by 1980" (ibid. ). 
However, it was the "non-p-olitical" atmosphere of the post May 13 
crisis that gave Abdul Rahman Yaakub the confidence in announcing the 
changes in the educational system. His confidence, together with the will 
to implement, was apparent when it took him less than two weeks between 
the announcement he made over the implementation of a "dynamic educational 
policy" to the time when his Ministry issued a professional circular to 
all the Chief Education Officers directing them on the changes that were 
to take place in 1970 (see Appendix E ). Under normal political circum- 
stances, it would be unimaginable for him to have done so without being 
reprimanded or removed from his post. 
Adding to this "non-political" atmosphere was the new found realism 
that had emerged in the country. This stemmed from the realisation that 
the Government in particular was ambivalent and had failed to commit 
itself over some vital national policies, in preference to short term 
political gain. For example, Articles 152 and 153 of the Federal Constit- 
ution were not implemented in earnest and the educational policy became 
subjected to much political manipulation. It took almost twelve years 
for the leaders to realise these errors as Dr. Ismail himself admitted 
(op. cit. ) It also took the same length of time for UMNO to realise the 
failure of its policy of compromise and accommodation at the expense of 
some vital national issues. 
For a policy of compromise to function, it needed reciprocal 
responses from all participatory groups. The failure of a group to respond 
likewise would mean the failure of the policy. Speaking in the debate 
on the Report of the Education Committee 1956, Tun Dr. Ismail made the 
following remarks: 
"One essential thing when we achieve, independence is 
that we should not engage in crystal gazing. The 
various communities living in this country was not of 
our making, it was brought about by colonialism. 
This burden had to be faced. If we want to achieve 
independence we should not be imperialists and those 
who are loyal to this country must be considerate and 
accept the language of the country" 
(LCD, May 16,1956). 
Paradoxically, the offer made by UMNO was not heeded and it took more than 
a decade for both the party and Dr. Ismail to realise it. 
The open admission made by Dr. Ismail that there were flaws in the 
implementation of the national education policy was important for it 
sanctified the statement of policy that had been made by the Minister of 
Education. Being the Minister of Home Affairs, Dr. Ismail's position 
in the National Operation Council was both influential and powerful. 
Being in charge of the country's internal security, he was thus responsible 
for the preservation of law and order. It was Dr. Ismail who proclaimed 
on national television, in the midst of the 1969 ethnic riots, that 
"Democracy is dead"in Malaya (The Times, May 17,1969). It was with 
such a political backing that there was no turning back for Abdul Rahman 
Yaakub. There was no alternative but to proceed with more vigour in 
implementing the national language policy in schools. In April 1970, 
when the policy was beginning to take shape he stated that he "no longer 
accept the attitude of compromise" and stressed that "Bahasa Malaysia 
must be made the medium of teaching in schools" (Malay Mail, ibid. ). 
On the other hand, the statement made by the President of the 
Chinese Chambers of Commerce was contradictory to the spirit of the new 
realism that was emerging. It was a repetition of the musty old record 
that would be of relevance a decade earlier. At the same time, his plea 
seemed to be an attempt to galvanise support among the English educated 
elites for the retention of English for the teaching of science subjects 
in schools at least. But it was of no avail. Under the new spirit of 
realism the country was set to follow a new ccurse. 
Rukunegara1 - the Emergence of a National Ideology 
The impact of the May 13 tragedy also called for the thorough re- 
examination of the country's basic ideological framework vis-a-vis the 
nation-building process. The shattering effect that resulted from the 
ethnic conflict was in itself evident and reflected the uncertain course 
the country was taking. At the same time, it could not be denied that 
the country had failed to develop the much needed centripetal values among 
the population. The institutional growth within that period had not been 
successful in inculcating a sense of shared interest in the new state. 
In short, the country had failed to harness the various divergent values 
into a common national outlook. As a result, the ethnic gaps became 
even wider, conflict potential became even more rampant, and the ethnic 
consensus that was formulated on the eve of the country's independence 
was collapsing. 
1. Rukunegara - Principles of the Nation. More or less, the word 
could mean "the National Ideology". 
Unlike Indonesia, where its "Pancasila"1 became a source of national 
guidance and philosophy, Malaya did not develop such an ideology upon 
independence. No contract of that sort was formulated and in a plural 
society it was imperative to define the individual roles in their relation- 
ships among themselves and towards the state. What emerged was mostly 
based on a common understanding of "live and let live" simplistic type 
of philosophy. But this liberal philosophy did not invoke the correspond- 
ing response of national responsibility among the population. The weakness 
lay in the assumption that everybody understood their roles and commitment 
towards the new nation. True to the saying that "to understand everything 
makes one very indulgent" (Evans, ed., 1978: 716) the test came after 
more than a decade of independence when the trauma was severely felt and 
realised. It was with this perception of the Malayan society after the 
May 13 incident that the nation began to assess itself in the light of 
the experience and the failings of the past. In the words of Ghazali 
Shafie (1978: 173): 
"What is now needed is a new binding energy to replace the 
old ones which has lost its effectiveness; we must provide 
a new energy that could cut across the obstacles of 
racialism, that could provide an overall satisfaction to 
all, be they Chinese or Malay, capitalists of labourers, 
Islam or Hindus, old or young. The people of Malaysia 
is determined to instill a better spirit of unity and 
retaining a democratic way of life. We determine to build 
a just, fair, liberal and eemocratic society, where the 
wealth of the nation could be shared by all. It is with 
this belief and determination that Rukunegara is born, which 
will be the guidance and principles of the country that will 
1. Upon independence Indonesia created the "Pancasila" as its national 
ideology. "Pancasila" means "five principles" and they are: 
Nationalism, Internationalism, Representative government, Social 
Justice and Belief in one God (see Kahin G. M., 1970: 122-125). 
The five principles of "Rukunegara" are: Belief in God, Loyalty to 
the King and Country, Respect for the Constitution, Respect for 
the Law and Morality. 
unite the population when confronting with all the tasks in future. Rukunegara will be the basis that will determine how the people can have dialogues among each 
other in their search for equality which has been the 
aspiration of the people. Rukunegara will be the basis that will determine how the people communicate among themselves and with the country. " 
Rukunegara was declared on August 31,1970, exactly twelve years 
after the country had achieved its independence. Basically, it was in 
response to the tragedy that struck the nation ab. out fifteen months 
earlier. It was an attempt to fill in the philosophical vacuum which 
could be the basis for the nation's ideology in future. In the words of 
Ghazali Shafie (ibid: 174-5) : 
"Rukunegara is a comprehensive document. It is a 
guidance and principle for the country and the people 
when determining their future. It does not only 
determine the relationship among the people, but also 
between the people and the state - what is expected by 
the state from the people, and even more important, 
what is expected by the people from the state. In other 
words, Rukunegara voiced the concept, trust and the 
determination of the people towards the Malaysian nation. " 
It was therefore as part of the new realism that Rukunegara was 
formulated. The ideology was not imposed but jointly developed by all 
members of Malayan society. They included representatives from the pol- 
itical parties, from the press, trade unions, employers, religious bodies, 
the public services, professional groups and the minorities of the country 
(Ghazali Shafie, ibid.: 175). What was important about the Rukunegara 
was that it laid the philosophical foundation for the country when pursuing 
its policy of national development and integration. Thus, when the 
programme for national reconstruction was launched in the form of the 
Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (1971: 1), a sense of direction was 
observed when it categorically emphasised that, "national unity is the 
over-riding objective of the country". The whole plan itself was des- 
cribed as such: 
"It represents an important stage in the series of development plans designed to eradicate poverty among the Malaysia, irrespective of race and to restructure Malaysian society in order to correct racial and 
economic imbalance, in the context of an expanding 
economy, leading towards the creation of a dynamic and just society" (Second Malaysian Plan, 1971-1975,1971: 1). 
The Plan further stated that "to achieve these objectives, it will 
be guided by the principle of Rukunegara" (ibid.: 2). At the same time, 
the Plan also admitted the institutional defects that existed and which 
in some respects contributed towards the May 13 conflict. As a remedial 
measure, the Plan (ibid.: 9) specified that: 
"the fundamental objective of the New Economic Policy 
is to create the institutions and processes by which 
Malaysia will have an enduring national harmony and 
unity and by which all Malaysians will share in the 
progress and prosperity of the nation. " 
The New Economic Policy which was entrenched in the Second Malaysia 
Plan, encompassed all aspects of social, economic and institutional recon- 
struction. It recognised the existence of the economic and occupational 
disparity among the races and it was therefore its main objective that 
such social inequalities should be eradicated. In his forward to the 
Second Malaysia Plan (1971: V), the Prime Minister stated: 
"The Plan is a blue-print for the New Economic Policy. 
It incorporates the two-pronged objectives of eradicating 
poverty, irrespective of race and restructuring Malaysian 
society to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification 
of race with economic functions. " 
What was also important about the Second Malaysia Plan was the 
emphasis it gave towards education for the purpose of promoting national 
integration and unity. The Plan (op. cit: 231-2) provided a balanced 
insight which the national education policy should pursue and this was 
outlined into four major areas: 
rri. Consolidation of the educational system to promote 
national integration and unity; 
ii. Orientation and expansion of education and training 
programme towards meeting the manpower needs of the 
country; 
iii. Improvement of the quality of education for the 
building of a progressive society oriented towards 
the modern science and technology, and 
iv. Improvement of the research, planning and implementation 
capability to meet the above objectives". 
The Second Malaysia Plan, besides recognising the integrative functions 
of education, also reinforced the need to implement the Bahasa Malaysia 
) 
policy in schools and at the same time called for the narrowing down of 
the gaps in educational opportunities among the regions and races. With 
the implementation of Bahasa Malaysia as the main medium of instruction 
in schools, the Second Malaysia Plan thus "establishes English as a 
second language in all schools" (The Second Malaysia Plan, op. cit.: 236). 
This ended the era of political ambiguity and ambivalence of the past over 
the state of the English language in relation to the status of the national 
language. As it was, the effort was an overt form of social engineering 
necessitated by the urgent need for a genuine programme of national 
r econstruction. 
1. The Second Malaysia Plan was merely to re-affirm the need for 
implementation. In reality the implementation had started in 1970. 
Cultural Legitimacy and the Constitutional Process 
It has been argued earlier that certain provisions of the constitution 
had been subjected to vigorous scrutinization during the 1969 election. 
The complexity of the unwritten constitutional compromises left many 
items in the constitution vague and hard to understand. 'Majlis Gerakan 
N egara'(1969: 85) in its report put the primary causes of the May 13 dis- 
turbances on the failure of the people to understand some of the entrenched 
provisions that were written in the constitution. Thus, as a safety 
valve, that such a conflict would not recur, it was felt that an amendment 
to the constitution was needed to protect certain clauses that had been 
the source of much ethnic controversy. This was explicitly emphasised 
by the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak when proposing the Constitutional 
Amendment Bill, 1971. He pointed out: 
"The election campaign in April and May 1969 provided 
these irresponsible elements with the opportunity to 
arouse racial emotions to a pitch. These elements 
created fear and anger by questioning and ridiculing 
the provisions of the Constitution relating to Bahasa 
Malaysia and the special position of the Malays, which 
further exacerbated the growing sense of insecurity 
felt by the Malays when they see the widening gap between 
them and the non Malays particularly in the economic and 
educational spheres" (Official Report, House of Represen- 
tatives, Third Parliament, 1971: 53). 
This speech was important for it was given at the opening of the 
Parliament, suspended following the May 13 disturbances. At the same time, 
the speech also revealed the new philosophy of the Government which the 
new Malayan leaders were advocating. Apparent in the new administration 
was the adoption of a more pragmatic and realistic approach towards 
governing. The "new government" felt that in a plural society and with 
the absence of any common will among the population, the execution of 
policies that were of national relevance would be impossible without the 
sanctification of the legislature. 
Basically, it was with this prevalent line of thought that a new 
"social contract" was drawn to institutionalise the position of the 
various ethnic groups in relation to each other and towards the state. 
Unlike the previous practices where the consensus that was agreed upon was 
confined to a few ruling elites, the new "social contract" had no atmos- 
phere of secrecy. It was thrashed out openly with a long term view of 
instilling a national commitment rather than for the immediate political 
exigency. This was done on February 23,1971 when the Prime Minister 
presented to Parliament a Constitutional Amendment Bill which called for 
the removal of certain "sensitive issues" from being the subject of 
public discussion and to correct certain imbalances that prevailed in 
the country (The Straits Times, February 24,1971). The amendment sought 
to empower Parliament to enact laws prohibiting Articles 152,153 and 
1811 of the Federal Constitution from being questioned and discussed. 
The Bill also sought to revoke the immunity from judicial proceedings 
enjoyed by Members of Parliament and State Assemblies in relation to their 
statements in both those Houses. Lastly, the Bill sought to give power 
to the Yang Di Pertuan Agong to direct higher institutions of learning 
to reserve a certain proportion of places for Malays and other indigenous 
1. Article 152 was over the National language of the country. 
Article 153 was on the Special Position of the Malays. 
Article 181 was over the position of the Malay Sultanates. 
communities (The Straits Times, Feb. 24,1971). According to Vasil 
(1980: 191), the issues were debated "for a week in a highly charged 
atmosphere". But, nonetheless, on March 3,1971, Parliament passed 
the Bill by a majority of 125 to 17. 
It has to be admitted that any act of legislation would mean the 
imposition of the rule of law. The painful fact was that by utilising 
this strategy, values were externally imposed which might result in the 
subjugation of a group to another and the supression of ideas among the 
articulate members of the society. Although it was not a sweeping piece 
of legislation that was motivated by selfish political ends, it remained 
like a "Damocles sword" that could at any time fall on the unfortunate. 
That it was all done within the ambit of the democratic processes, 
revealed the flaws attached to this institution which Giretty (1967: 9) 
appropriately described as the "tyranny of the majority". In the context 
of the Malayan plural society, the disadvantages of parliamentary democ- 
racy were many. Mohammed Suffian (OP. cit.: 348-349) Malaya's foremost 
judge described the weaknesses of the institution in this tone: 
"It is slow and cumbersome because Government has to 
consult and take into account the views of every 
section of the community. A democratic government 
tends to take decisions that are popular rather than 
right, because it has to think of the next election. 
Individual politicians have to appeal more often than 
not to the worst instincts of the electorate; this is 
especially marked in a multi-racial country where it 
frequently pays to exploit racial issues. The bulk of 
the electorate is unsophisticated and their power of 
reasoning minimal; and it is easiest to appeal to pop- 
ular prejudices. Consequently, persons who are skilled 
in creating issues, irrespective of their relevance, and 
in exploiting popular prejudices easily get to the front, 
and persons who are able but unwilling to go to the 
hustings stay out of power and have little or no share in 
public life. " 
Despite what had been described by Mohammed Suffian about parliamentary 
democracy, we could not deny the basic institutional function it had in 
providing the power to the voters in determining the form of government 
they wished to see in their country. 
In Malaya, parliamentary democracy was developed through the accident 
of history. Being a former British colony, much of it was modelled on 
the Westminster type. The system fitted well into the monarchial form of 
establishment which had long been in existence. But, the time given 
for political socialization was short. With independence the various 
institutions that emerged were not cherished but rather taken as "given". 
As such, scant attention was given to reflect and reappraise the fragile 
nature of Malayan society. In a democratic society every citizen "is 
supposed to be rational in his approach to politics, guided by reason, 
not byemotion" (Almond and Verba, 1965: 29). But this was not the case 
in Malaya. Democratic processes were considered as licences for embarking 
on political excessiveness and adventurism which went beyond the realm 
of that much revered institution. 
The first decade of independence thus saw the failure to translate 
the exuberance of the political will into the much needed national will 
which the country was lacking. Presumably, it was an attempt to redress 
this defect that the Government in power imposed certain national values 
and ideologies as guidelines for any future political acts. Unpopular as 
it might be, it was the end of an exhaustive search for an alternative, 
which in the main was directed towards the prevention of another ethnic 
conflict. At the same time, it was in response to the new found realism 
which had been described earlier. 
Chapter Eight 
A Study in Policy Im lementation 
Problems and Issues 
When analysing the issues and problems that stalled the development 
of Malayan education between 1957-1969, two pertinent questions emerge. 
The first stems from the defects of the policy which are traceable to the 
country's governing institutions. In this- instance, the Alliance political 
structure which incorporated all ethnic representation into the Government 
while providing a short term political solution to the country's multi- 
ethnic problems, constituted a major obstacle to both the formulation of 
and the implementation of educational policy. Secondly, in relation to 
the first was the vital question of political leadership. As educational 
issues became more political and ethnic in their character, the strain fell 
on the leaders who feared the virtual breakdown of the coalition. To 
ensure its political cohesion, educational policy became subjected to the 
process of compromise, negotiation and accommodation. Thus, even after 
the policy was formulated and the necessary legislation enacted, it was 
to receive further rectification from the Government before any form of 
implementation could take place. Hence, the implementation stage was 
even more critical for it was here that the main focus of the controversy 
was directed. 
If the politics of compromise were meant to provide a lasting stabil- 
ity to the state, this was yet to be proved. In the Malayan case for 
instance, the strategy of compromise did not provide a useful or long term 
solution. The practice might be effective for the routines of governing 
but coming to certain essentials like implementing an educational policy, 
efforts towards realising the policy objective were aborted and became 
the victim of the newly created political machine. As a result, there 
was an absence of any straightforward implementation. What emerged 
was what Bachrach and Baratz (1963: 641) termed as "nondecision. " This 
happened "when the dominant values, the accepted rules of the game, the 
existing power relations among groups, and the instruments of force, singly 
or in combination, effectively prevent certain grievances from developing 
into fully-fledged issues which call for decisions" (ibid. ). This was 
in fact the problem of the national education policy where the stated 
objective did not match the expected outcome mainly because of the policy 
itself and the failure on the part of the leaders to provide a firm and 
coherent decision for its implementation. 
"Policy means a statement of intention" and implementation is a pro- 
cess towards the realisation and achievement of stated goals and objectives 
(Pressman & Wildavsky, 1973: xiv-xv). While policy and implementation are 
complementary and inter-related, it takes two different processes for 
them to be realised. As Pressman and Wildavsky (ibid.: xv) noted, "whether 
stated explicitly or not policies point to a chain of causation between 
initial condition and future consequences". Therefore, all policies 
remain unrealised and untranslated into action unless they are being 
implemented. At the same time, for a process of implementation to take 
place it needs a policy, for implementation in itself is not independent 
in its implication. It depends firstly, on the policy itself and secondly, 
on its execution. Whether any given policy is implemented again depends 
on the urgency of the intention as perceived by the leaders, the amount 
of resources available to carry out the implementation and the commitment 
on the part of the leadership towards the policy. 
With this understanding, it should be realised that implementation 
as a process is not smooth and immediate in its application. The inter- 
vening variables are many. There existed the whole array of complexities 
between the period of policy formulation to the period of implementation. 
These variables could be real or imaginary. As Grindle (1980: 3) said: 
"Implementation has captured their attention because it 
is evident that a wide variety of factors - from the 
availability of sufficient resources to the structure 
of inter-governmental relations, from the commitment 
of lower level officials to reporting mechanisms 
within the bureaucracy, from the political leverage of 
opponents of the policy to accidents of timing, luck, 
and seemingly unrelated events - can and do frequently 
intervene between the statement of policy goals and their 
actual achievement in the society. " 
If the implementation process itself proves to be cumbersome and 
fraught with obstacles, the same goes with the policy-making process. 
Milstein and Jennings (1973: 8-9) for example, viewed policy-making "as a 
cycle involving movement from unsatisfactory conditions to greater satis- 
factions with conditions". They further observed: 
"The cycle is fraught with high-risk situations. The 
policies that emerge on the implementation end of the 
cycle are but a fraction of those that are proposed at 
the dissatisfaction end. Even these few policies are 
usually severely modified by the weathering of time, 
expediency, challanges by other policies, and harassment 
by the opposition. Nor is the process static. Modified 
laws or new laws are open to challanges by groups that 
feel disadvantaged by them. In short, the cycle often 
begins anew as groups are constantly forming around 
dissatisfactions" (ibid.: 9). 
This implies that policy formulation itself is an arduous process. 
Archer (1979: 3) in describing the emergence of the educational system 
makes an observation that "the nature of education is rarely, if ever, 
the practical realization of an ideal form of instruction as envisaged 
by a particular group. Instead, most of the time most of the forms that 
education takes are the political products of power struggles. They 
bear the marks of concession to allies and compromise with opponents. 
Thus to understand the nature of education at any time we need to know 
not only who won the struggle for control, but also how: not merely who 
lost, but also how badly they lost. " 
Since a statement of policy is important in determining the direction 
for its implementation, they "should be mutually supportive rather than 
contradictory" (Pressman & Wildavsky, op. cit.: 133). Secondly, there must 
be clarity in the statement of policies for "ambiguity provides a means 
for negatively inclined judges or bureaucrats to evade the intent of 
policies through deliberate misinterpretation" (Baum, 1981: 50). 
It is in the light of this theoretical framework of policy and its 
implementation that the development of Malayan education is analysed. 
Specifically, the analysis intends to highlight the vital problems and 
issues that led to the non-implementation of the educational policy. 
The Razak Report which outlined the statement of educational objec- 
tives for independent Malaya emerged as the by-product of political con- 
sultation and conciliation among the various ethnic groups of the country. 
The Report did not reflect any dominance of one group over the other. 
In fact, it was sensitive to the demands and needs of all the communal 
groups. If there was any bias, it was visible when it gave recognition 
to Malay as the national language of the country and its plan to make the 
Malay language the main medium of instruction in schools (The Razak 
Report, para. 12). But at the same time, the committee did not deny the 
existence of other languages. In fact, Chinese and Tamil innguages were 
given recognition as the medium of instruction in primary schools (The 
Razak Report: para. 63) while at the same time assurances were also given 
for their preservation aid sustenance (The Razak Report; para. la). The 
Report, therefore, attempted to accommodate the national needs on one 
hand and the demands of the various ethnic groups on the other. 
Paradoxically, the public failed to respond justly to the proposals. 
Instead they were sceptically viewed from all quarters. In Majallah Guru 
(Sept. l, 1956: 285) for example, a writer even suggested that "if there is 
no revolution in the society especially on the part of the Malay school 
teachers, there would never be any change. Only a revolution could pro- 
duce a glorious result for the people and the country". 
Central to the argument was the question of language and in this 
case the debate was between the indigenous and the 
immigrant communities. 
The issue was the choice between monolingualism as against multilingualism. 
The debates that transpired became perennial and resulted in the emergence 
of language and education as a "single-issue politics" 
(Goodwin & Ingram, 
1980: 279-297) in Malaya during the first decade of independence. 
Politicians, sensitive to public opinion and reaction acted cautiously 
fearing that any wrong move might result in the loss of electoral support. 
Out of this uncertainty, pressure groups emerged and became omnipresent 
in several national elections where they strongly influenced the "single- 
issue politics" of language and education which often became a major 
determinant in the electoral outcome. Out of cautiousness and at the 
same time being aware of the political implications that might develop, 
the commitment given by the Government to this issue became vague and 
dubious. It was in this light that the Ratak Report as a policy document 
of importance became ineffective. As Richardson and Jordan (1979: 153) 
correctly put it, "a policy that can be eroded or sabotaged by a powerful 
group or agency is not worth the paper it is written on". 
Emergence of Interest Groups 
Both the Razak Report and the Report of the Education Review Committee 
were the products of the in-group political deliberation within the 
Alliance Government. It was not an open forum where concerned groups were 
invited to participate in the discussion. Rather, it was in the form of 
memorandum that the public's point of view was channeled. Since it was 
an elected government, the claim was that any policy that emerged had the 
consent of the public from whom its power derived. In terms of 
the national 
educational policy, the claim was far from the truth. As reflected 
by the 
all round dissatisfaction towards the policy this became a symbol of 
the 
alienation of the Government from the mainstream of public opinion. 
The 
Reports, therefore, mirrored the aspiration and thinking of the ruling 
elites rather than that of the masses in general. 
At the same time, it must not be denied that there existed factional 
interests within the ruling circle who were concerned that any emergent 
policy should conform to the wishes of their respective constituencies. 
This phenomenon was inevitable in any form of government elected through 
the democratic process but it became even more felt when the power to 
rule was based on ethnic coalitions. 
In this sense, the task of the policy-makers was essentially two-fold. 
In the first place, they were aware of the demands of their respective 
constituencies and secondly, these needs had to be reconciled within the 
framework of national policies and objectives. It was in their attempt 
to reconcile these differences that resulted in the lack of clarity and 
in the conflicting statement of objectives in the Razak Report (see Chap- 
ter 4). What appeared was a policy which was not endorsed by the public 
in general. Put simply, its effort to please all resulted in pleasing 
none with the exception of those who were to benefit from it. Nonetheless, 
this is typical of any centralised system of education which does not 
provide "a channel through which external and consumer demands can be 
filtered and satisfied" (Archer, op. cit.: 256). 
It was with this background that interest groups developed reflecting 
the dissatisfaction of the public towards the proposed education policy. 
The source of these grievances centred on the question of language as 
defined by the Federal Constitution (Article 152) in relation to other 
languages and its future role in the proposed national education system. 
.1 
The making of Malay as the national language of the country did not gener- 
ate much publicity or grievances among the non Malay population, but a 
row developed when other vernacular language were not recognised as 
official languages. The Federal Constitution accorded English and Malay 
as the only official languages and this recognition was important for 
it penetrated the national education system as proposed by the Razak 
Report. 
The Chinese community was particularly concerned over this develop- 
ment for if the policy were to be implemented, it would place the Chinese 
schools at a dead-end without any future in terms of gaining entrance to 
the tertiary level of education or getting gainful employment in the 
public sectors. It was the concern for the future of their language 
and education that led to the creation of interest groups which were 
mobilised by the Chinese Schools Teachers Union and the Chinese Guilds. 
Initially the group did not have a strong political constituency that 
could exert its influence upon the decision-making process of the 
Government. Thus, when the Report was first released, their opposition 
was marginal and less audible. It was only in 1959 that the group was 
able to mobilise mass support among the Chinese community that it became 
a force which any political party had to identify specifically for 
electoral purposes. 
Within the continuum of disagreements about educational policy, the 
reaction of the Malays, vis-a-vis the non-Malays, was poles apart. While 
agreeing that English would remain as one of the official languages during 
the first ten years of independence which they considered as transitional, 
their objective was towards the achievement of a "one nation and one 
language" philosophy. Dato' Onn bin Jaafar in denouncing the demands of 
of the non-Malays gave a stern warning that: 
"We cannot give rights to people in this country who by 
accident of birth or by privilege of entry are bodily 
with us, but who in mind and in heart are not with us. We cannot give rights to those who demand rights but 
who are not prepared to shoulder the duties and oblig- 
ations of a nation of Malaya" 
(The Straits Echo, Feb. 8,1955). 
A few months later Dato' Onn again pointed out that, "under no 
circumstances will it recognise any other languages other than Malay as 
the National Language and English as the second or the official language 
of the Federation of Malaya. One country - One Nation - One Language. " 
(The Straits Echo, July 6,1955)" 
The advocate of this policy felt strongly that it could be achieved 
through the newly formulated educational system. In fact, even long 
before the policy was initiated they had been aspiring to see that "Malay 
language once again be restored to its original position" (Majallah Guru, 
Jan. 1954: 1). Thus the Razak Report was an utter disappointment to them. 
It was the first set-back in their quest for national fulfilment. 
The Malays being aware of the various shortcomings of the Razak 
Report were concerned about the effect the policy would have on the future 
of Malay education once it was implemented. What they sought was clarity 
and a firm commitment on certain issues especially in relation to the 
position of the national language in a national education system and its 
relation with other languages. The Chinese, on the other hand, did not 
let the matter rest. They took every opportunity to exploit the issue in 
the hope of enhancing their claim for the recognition of their language 
in the proposed educational system. 
The interest groups that emerged over the question of language and 
education were undisputedly ethnic in character. The pull towards ethnic 
alignment and extremism seemed to be greater than the force of moderation 
and national commitment. Their demands were far apart and under such 
circumstances the process of reconciliation was almost impossible. As 
has been observed earlier (see Chapter 5), the problems became even more 
controversial and intensified when these interest groups associated them- 
selves with political parties which survived mainly on ethnic related 
issues. 
Ambiguity: Effects on Implementation 
For a policy to be effectively implemented, it had to be clear in its 
objectives so as to avoid being subjected to multiple interpretations. 
To quote Grindle (1980: 10): 
"the form which policy goals themselves are stated may 
have a decided impact on implementation. Whether goals 
are stated clearly or ambiguously and whether political 
and administrative officials are in agreement about what 
the- goals are will be shown to have been decisive for the 
implementation of a specific programme. " 
The effect of an ambiguous policy was therefore far-reaching. 
Besides the dissatisfaction it generated, it also created frustration for 
those who sincerely felt that any policy of national importance should not 
be subjected to factional interest or any form of political expediency and 
horse-trading. In the case of Malaya, the question of education was 
national in its implication and as such it had to be placed within the 
matrix of national priorities. Being a part of the nation-building process, 
educational programmes had to take precedence over other mundane matters 
of politics, sectional or even ethnic interests. But paradoxically this 
was not the case with the Razak Report. The national scope of the Report 
was vague and minimal to suit the "body politcs" of the country. Added 
to that, the essential elements that characterised the colonial system 
of education remained and this created further psychological problems for 
the national education policy to be fully realised. 
Independence which was meant to be a "grand finale" where the curtain 
would fall and the last vestiges of colonialism would be shown the exit 
door, did not materialise as expected. The forces of neo-colonialism were 
too strong for that radical development to occur. The retention of 
English language as the official language of the country was one such instance 
and its continued existence was hard to justify. That it was indispens- 
able for reasons of educational and bureaucratic purposes was a rational- 
isation given by national leaders who apparently lacked the spirit of 
national consciousness and the "political will" to be free of any colonial 
influence. This lack of firmness in getting rid of English as the official 
language of the country provided a strong justification for the Chinese 
community to exert a similar claim for their language. In fact, their 
reasons were even more valid considering they were in the country and in 
terms of numbers made up more than a third of the population. It was this 
nature of the debate that saw the Chinese vehemently opposed the Razak 
Report. 
The Malays reacted differently. They wanted a guarantee and assur- 
ances that their language would be the sole official language of the 
country. The Razak Report, with its conflicting and ambiguous statement 
of objectives (see Chapter 4) was considered by them to be unsatisfactory. 
While agreeing to the importance of Englis', they nevertheless wanted 
the official status given to the English language to be terminated. 
On this account they agreed to the ten-year transitional period after 
independence as envisaged by Article 152 of the Federal Constitution. 
However, as far as the national education policy was concerned, the delay 
in implementing the national language policy as recommended by paragraph 
12 of the Razak Report was considered to be unnecessary. At the same 
time, the retention of the plural school system at the primary level was 
viewed as inimical to the philosophy that schools could be the initiating 
ground, towards the inculcation of a common Malayan identity and hence 
would facilitate the process of national integration. A corollary to 
that, the sanctification of the separate school system, a legacy of the 
"divide and rule" policy of the colonial government (Loh, 1975) was seen 
as an obstacle to the development and growth of the national education 
policy as envisaged by the Razak Report. By preserving the status-quo, 
it was felt that it provided legitimacy towards other languages and this 
again was perceived as being against the country's language policy. 
At this juncture, it was clear that there were conflicts in the 
pursuit of educational objectives which in turn frustrated the process of 
implementation. What followed was a state of "policy stalemate" where 
neither of the ethnic demands were considered nor entertained. Under 
these circumstances, questions began to emerge as to the state of the 
policy itself. Firstly, was the policy too ambitious and thus unrealisable? 
1. Even the PMIP agreed to this point. See Parliamentary Debates, 
August 10,1960: col. 2174, 
Or was the "policy content corresponds partially to the interest of the 
national elites" (Cleaves, 1980: 285) which the masses had failed to 
comprehend. As Ingram and Mann (1980: 20) suggested: 
"The goals of policy are often not what they seem 
to be, and it is a mistake to take stated purposes 
too literally. Government often lacks the power 
and will to address problems straightforwardly; 
thus roundabout means are chosen. " 
This statement was of relevance to the state of affairs that surround 
the national education policy. For more than a decade, the Government 
played around the policy of ambiguity while at the same time enhancing 
the interest of the "national elites" (Cleaves, op. cit.: 285) by tacitly 
paving the way for anglicizing the national education system. 
Officially, English and Malay were recognised as equal in status, 
but in terms of their utility this was far from being the case. Compara- 
tively, the national language was in no condition to match the English 
language which had established itself in both the administrative and 
educational systems of the country. Admittedly, Malay language was only 
re-emerging. After being neglected for so long, its importance was felt 
following the country's independence. Its success therefore had to be 
evaluated not in juxtaposing it beside English but by the way it was 
accepted and the confidence everybody gave towards its development. 
It 
was here that the "missing link" lay. The language had 
failed to gain 
the confidence of the country's national elites and consequently 
this led 
to its non-implementation in the national education system. 
The fact that 
no attempt was ever made to get it implemented showed 
that the Government 
was not only evasive but also irresponsive towards this issue. To quote 
Ingram and Mann (op. cit.: 14) : 
"Politicians and political systems are expected to 
solve problems, not ignore them. Policy failure, 
however painful it may be to the parties who 
expected to benefit from it and to the taxpayers 
who pay for it, may be evidence of a political 
system that responds to problems, even if knowledge 
may be limited and appropriate policy tools 
unavailable. 11 
Another indication of the Government's ambiguous policy was the 
National Language Act, 1967, which also failed to resolve the national 
language question (see Chapter 5). The Act symbolised the prevalent 
state of stalemate which has been described earlier. By playing upon the 
ethnic sentiments of the various communities, the Government pushed 
through legislation which provided the continued use of English and at 
the same time preserved the existing linguistic status-quo. 
From the National Language Act, 1967 it is not difficult to conclude 
that it was the Alliance political framework that had won the day. Its 
policy of compromise and accommodation paved the way for middle-of-the- 
road legislation. Hence, the process towards implementation became even 
more remote than ever. Thus the Act inflicted a final blow towards the 
full implementation of the national education policy. 
As the blue-print for national education, both the Razak Report and 
the Report of the Education Review Committee were passed by Parliament in 
1957 and 1961 respectively. Nonetheless, the passage of the Bill did not 
imply any sense of urgency for implementation. During the parliamentary 
debates, for exämple, there was nothing to suggest that there was a need 
for the Bill to be implemented immediately. Instead a call was made for 
it to be carried out cautiously with the underlying "spirit of tolerance, 
goodwill and understanding" (P. D., March 7,1957: col. 2558). Since most 
of the members of the Razak Committee on Education were also Members of 
the Federal Legislative Council, it was assumed that the final product 
of the policy had been agreed by most, or at least what they all envisaged 
was faithfully included in the Report. This could also account for the 
full consensus the Bill received in the Legislative Assembly. According 
to Archer (op. cit.: 622), this was typical in a centralised system where 
"legislation always involves concession, compromise and dilution of the 
goals pursued by those who help to pass it. " What emerged was an Education 
Bill which was not only concessionary in its implication but also ambiguous 
in its philosophy. The effects were far-reaching for in the absence of 
clarity, it created a serious obstacle in the way of implementation. As 
Van Meter and Van Horn (1975: 466) have suggested: 
"the prospects of effective implementation will be 
enhanced by the clarity with which standards and 
objectives are stated and by the accuracy and 
consistency with which they are communicated. " 
In the absence of clarity, uncertainty developed over the course of 
direction which the policy had to pursue. It thus paved the way for 
"adaptive implementation" defined as "a process that allows policy to be 
modified, specified and revised - in a word, adapted - according to the 
unfolding interaction of the policy with its institutional setting. Its 
outcome would be neither automatic nor assured, and it would look more 
like a disorderly learning process than a predictable procedure" 
(Berman, 
1980: 210). 
Directly or indirectly, the process of "adaptive implementation" 
occurred in 1968 when a minor implementation of the national language 
policy in the national-type schools (English) was carried out. 
l 
Beginning 
from January of that year these schools were to give instructions in the 
national language on subjects like Physical Education, Art and Crafts, 
Local Studies and Music in all primary One to primary three classes. Some- 
how speculation grew over these changes. Firstly, it appeared as a com- 
pensatory measure for the defective National Language Act of 1967 which 
still remained as a source of Malay frustration. Secondly, since the 
national election was only a year away, this mini-change that was intro- 
duced looked like an attempt to woo back the disgruntled UMNO members and 
the Malay population in general who were disappointed over the Government's 
language policy. 
However, it should also be realised that in the case of the national 
education policy, and in non-political terms the implementation was not 
as complex as it was assumed to be. In the first place, all the hurdles 
related to policy-making and its legislative processes had long been 
cleared. Secondly, education in Malaya was a centrally-controlled 
instit- 
ution with the Minister of Education having a wide range of power over it. 
Since the Minister of Education was central in the policy implementation 
process, the way he defined the policy was thus a major factor in 
deter- 
mining the direction of its implementation. At the same time, his per- 
ception of the policy was again influenced by the prevalent political 
1. Ministry of Education, Report on the Implementation of the 
National 
Educational Policy, 1971. 
climate, the amount of political tradings and manipulations and also the 
strength of his personality. Since"the fate of policies cannot be separ- 
ated from the course of politics" (Ingram & Mann, 1980: 27) it was 
inevitable that the decision-making process was much dictated by political 
considerations rather than educational or national considerations. It 
was in terms of the next five years that generated the state of vacillation 
and "non-decision" on the part of the Government. 
Again, this brings us to the question of who in reality was in 
control of the Government? Was it the party or the Cabinet? In the 
Malayan case it was the party that presented the policies to the public 
through its election manifesto. In most cases this manifesto was usually 
written in general and vague terms. They only intended to outline the 
general principle of the policy if the party were to be elected to form a 
government. Usually when a party came to power it adopted an approach 
that would encompass the interests that came not only from within the 
party but also from the public at large. In a representative form of 
government it was the Cabinet that was responsible for providing the details 
and thus fulfilling the election promises. 
' The final decision of 
implementing these policies again rested with the Cabinet. Therefore, it 
became the collective responsibility of the Cabinet for any policy that 
was implemented, stalled or deviated from (Mohammed Suffian, op. cit.: 53, 
Wilson, 1976: 72-76). It would be in this light that the non-implementation 
1. While the politicians provide the policy, it is the bureaucrats 
that have to work out the details of the plan. This again has to 
be approved by the Cabinet (an interview with one ex-senior civil 
servant who preferred to remain anonymous). 
of the educational policy would be examined next especially in terms of 
leader-member relationships in UMNO and the neo-colonial psychology that 
prevailed within the party. 
Political Alienation, Neo-colonialism and the Implementation Problems 
The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) which was formed on 
May 11,1946 in the wake of the Malay's opposition to the Malayan Union 
scheme, symbolised the embodiment of the Malay traditional society. Its 
conservative ideology and the pattern of leadership was reminiscent of 
the ruler-ruled social structure that was prevalent during the pre- 
independent period. While its organisational structure and networks were 
based on the modern concept of political thought, traditionalism and 
conservatism remained the bastions of its operational ideology. As Vasil 
(1980: 64) observed, "even the UMNO Charter did not make any mention of 
independence". During the initial period of its formation, the party was 
"unwilling to use the slogan 'Merdeka' (independence)" which was commonly 
used by "the left-wing organizations" at that time (S. Husin Ali, 1975: 29). 
As to the question of leadership, since its formation, the party was 
always led by a person who either had an aristocratic or royal background. 
' 
At the same time, the position of the party leader was never challenged 
although other political posts came in for open competition. 
2 
1. Dato' Onn bin Jaafar who was ÜPNO's first president came from an 
aristocratic family in Johor. Tunku Abdul Rahman, who replaced 
Dato' Onn, came from the Royal House of Kedah. Tunku's successor, 
Dato' Abdul Razak was a Pahang aristocrat. 
2. This was another Malay tradition. During the days of the Malay 
Sultanates, to oppose the Sultan was considered as "derhaka", or 
treason in its English equivalent. 
The trust the Malays gave to the UMNO leadership seemed to be a 
natural transfer from the loyalty they gave to their respective traditional 
rulers to the present political elites that emerged from within a modern 
framework. As S. Husin Ali (ibid.: 161) observed: 
"The political leaders of the past were made up entirely 
of what may be termed the 'aristocracy of birth'. The 
basis of their power lay largely in their control over 
both economic and military resources. However, with the 
superimposition of western-style political and admin- 
istrative systems and institutions, many direct and 
indirect changes occurred in the nature of this leader- 
ship. " 
By virtue of being conservative in its outlook and philosophy, the 
party was able to harness the support of the Malays towards the new pol- 
itical centre without disrupting the traditional social fabric of the 
Malay society. S. Husin Ali (ibid.: 162) described the growth of this new 
power structure in the following terms: 
"With the establishment of a bureaucracy, new personnel 
are needed to serve as the main channels between the 
government and the public. Besides that, the adoption 
of parliamentary democracy as the underlying basis for 
politics and government has not only brought about new 
institutions, but also new political personalities. 
Leadership and power are determined through the process 
of election, and although the top order requires only 
a small selected number, yet there has grown beyond it 
a large body of people who, although they do not seem to 
assume very important functions in politics and government, 
nevertheless appear to be necessary appendages in the 
whole system. These are the parliamentarians and coun- 
cillors who, together with the bureaucrats, constitute the 
largest segment of the present Malay political leadership 
at the supra-village or national level. " 
Although the development of modern administrative and political 
frameworks had diminished the ascriptive criterion of leader-follower 
relationships, their structural dichotomy still remained. The new 
political elites became a class of their own by positioning themselves 
at the top of the political structure with their supporters forming the 
base. In other words, the feudal concept of leadership and led still 
remained entrenched in their system of values and thought. 
The psychological dichotomy that existed was again reinforced by the 
different set of education they received. While the top political leaders 
were English educated, the supporters were mostly the product of the 
Malay vernacular schools. This dichotomy in both tie social and educational 
backgrounds inevitably produced different ways of perceiving and reacting 
to certain issues, and in fact, they produced a different set of 
"weltanschauung" altogether. Despite these divisions, UNMO as a political 
party remained strong and unchallenged. The main reason was that no 
Malay political party of its stature could provide an alternate for govern- 
ment. Hence, the continued support the party received from the captive 
Malay electorate made it complacent and the top leaders became alienated 
from the main stream of local political thought. In fact, even as early 
as 1958 the signs of alienation were already showing. For example, when 
the Federation of Malay School Teachers Association demanded the estab- 
lishment of Malay secondary education, failing which their members would 
resign from UMNO, Khir Johari, the Minister of Education interpreted the 
the intention as self-seeking. He accused the teachers of being "concerned 
more for their own pockets than for the good of education, for they hoped 
that by forcing the immediate conversion of secondary schools to the Malay 
medium of instruction such would be the shortage of teachers that they 
(mere primary teachers) would be able to benefit from secondary wage 
scales " (cited in Margaret Roff, 1967: 321). 
Khir's statement was significant in that it reflected the state of 
political alienation between the leaders and the followers. 
) 
At the same 
time he also attempted to negate the role of these Malay school teachers 
who were mostly UMNO's activists and who also provided the base for the 
party's super-structure (S. Husin Ali, op. cit.: 31). Furthermore, it was 
the aspiration of the Malays at that time to see Malay secondary schools 
being established as soon as possible. 
A corollary to the above argument was the question of colonialism 
from which the Malayan leaders had failed to dissociate themselves. For 
instance, the ambiguous educational policy, besides having its own polit- 
ical motive, was also explicit in its favour of retaining the English 
language in the school system. Hence, the colonial school system, to some 
extent had reaped its harvest by creating a state of dependency upon its 
post colonial predecessors. As Samir Amin (1975: 51) observed: 
"Colonial education had the merit of being consistent in its 
cynical brutality. It set itself two goals. On the one hand 
the destruction of the complex traditional system of auton- 
omous education, with a view to uprooting the national culture 
and consciousness, and on the other hand the training of an 
'elite' of subordinate servants ... Neither the content of 
this education nor the quality of men trained in this way 
could lead to any autonomous development of society. " 
These statements of Samir Amin had some relevance to what was happen- 
ing in Malaya during the first decade of the country's independence. None- 
theless, this was not to deny the contribution of colonial education 
towards the production of leaders who advocated strong social and political 
radicalism upon independence and freed their country from colonial influence 
l" Syed Nasir made a remark that some sections of the English educated 
remained isolated from the'rakyat because English did not constitute 
a bridge between them (The Straits Echo, Feb. 4,1960). 
2. President Sukarno of Indonesia was one such leader. 
in all its forms. But this phenomenon was practically non-existent in 
Malaya. The products of the English school system were too comfortable 
in the rewards they got and thus were unprepared to disrupt or sacrifice 
their existing way of life. It was also this group of people who took 
the helm of UMNC's leadership especially at the top of the party's 
hierarchy. 
With the existing leadership structure, UMNO as a political party 
thus epitomised the force of moderation in Malaya. During its long history 
the party was yet to embark on any policy of social radicalism common to 
most of the new independent states. The party even viewed the concept of 
"republicanism" and "economic nationalisation" as politically taboo and 
having no place in its ideology. 
1 Its position as a political force was 
due to its ability to harness the support of the Malay masses who were 
paradoxically rural in their background and educated in Malay schools. 
By and large, UMNC's position was unchallenged until the middle of the 
sixties when the PMIP, another Malay based party began to make in-roads 
into the Malayan political scene. 
Under these circumstances and in retrospect, it was quite improbable 
that the national education policy would be implemented if another UMNO 
personality were given the education portfolio. Most probably the status- 
quo would have been preserved. The reason was due to UMNO itself -a 
political party which embodied the elements of moderation and buttressed 
by the twin forces of feudalism and neo-colonialism. 
1. The Federal Constitution of which UMNO was its chief architect 
reflected this tendency. A talk with one Senior Cabinet Minister 
from UMNO tended to confirm this view. 
Thus, the appointment of Abdul Rahman Yaakub to the post of the 
Minister of Education during the National Operation Council administration 
was extremely important. His ability to exploit the authority that 
emanated from the Education Ordinance 1957 and his will to implement the 
very controversial national language policy in the Malayan school system 
seemed to be a personal and political decision "par excellence". 
Theoretically, in the Malayan case in particular, it could therefore 
be observed that the Minister of Education had a prerogative in implemen- 
ting any educationally related policies. It was within his discretion 
and power to decide whether a policy be implemented, deviated from its 
original objective or placed in a state of oblivion. As Dato` Abdul 
Razak himself had expressed as early as 1957, "the power in this Bill is 
discretionary. Naturally in the implementation of the provisions of the 
Bill, the Minister will certainly use his discretion, and I hope he will 
trust that the discretion will be used reasonably and judiciously" 
(L. C. D., March 7,1957: col. 2560). But even with these assurances, he 
had to get the "blessing" of the Cabinet of which the Prime Minister was 
the head. Under normal circumstances, a unilateral decision on matters 
of policy was rare. All major decisions that emerged were collective 
decisions. Failure to agree with Cabinet decisions gave the member a 
moral obligation to resign (Mohammed Suffian, op. cit.: 53). 
Thus, as a Minister in charge of education, Abdul Rahman Yaakub had 
the advantage of the post May 13 political development. Together with 
his insight and the will to implement, his unilateral declaration of the 
national education policy became the most successful political coup 
in 
the country's history. 
The Implementation Process 
It has been pointed out in the early part of the chapter that the 
problems that led to the non-implementation of the national education 
policy were two-fold. The first, it was argued, had its roots in the 
country's governing institutions and the second was traceable to the 
political leadership which failed to commit itself to the policy that was 
formulated. What emerged was that policy implementation was linked closely 
to the political philosophy of the government in power. Implementing a 
policy was therefore a political decision and not a routine departmental 
matter. As has been shown, it was the politicians who had the final 
decision whether the policy should be implemented and if so, what form it 
should take. In the Malayan case, the consequence was that the education 
policy was stalled for more than a decade while waiting for the political 
decision for its implementation. The discretionary power of the Minister 
concerned was open-ended and the decision was mostly dictated by the 
expediency of politics rather than any long term national goals and objec- 
tives. In the Malayan plural society, it was obvious that the dynamics 
of ethnicity became a major determinant in both policy making and its 
implementation. The hard fact was that the politicians being the policy 
makers themselves were aware of the difficulties of trying to reconcile 
the demands of their respective constituencies while at the same time 
trying to invoke certain programmes of national importance. What emerged 
from these conflicting demands was a policy which was incoherent, vague 
and often subject to multiple interpretations. The dilemma was at the 
implementation stage when clarity and specificity were needed in order 
for the vital aspects of the policy to be fully realised. But the criteria 
for effective implementation were markedly absent in the Ratak Report. 
Generally, this was the background that beset the Malayan educational 
policy as enshrined in the Razak Report. The vagueness and ambiguity of 
the Report provided leeway for those who were sceptical about the policy. 
By invoking vague national objectives, the Report also attempted to 
provide constitutional satisfaction for those who had been demanding that 
their needs be fulfilled. The outcome was a period of vacillation and 
uncertainty over the fate of the policy which in turn prolonged the 
status-quo of the pre-independent educational system besides the extreme 
frustration it created. The delay in the implementation process in turn 
had a negative effect and implication upon the policy itself. As Peter 
S. Cleaves (op. cit.: 289) pointed out: 
"If the policy lends itself to rapid execution, the 
policy-makers can reduce uncertainty to a minimum. 
On the other hand, the greater the duration of 
sequential steps involved in the implementation 
stage, the greater the possibilities for existing 
actors to alter their goals, for leadership to turn 
over, for new actors to enter the scene, or for 
unintentional consequences to take their toll. " 
Between 1957-1969, there was an interplay of competing variables, 
all geared towards different needs and objectives. These competing 
demands took a heavy toll on the Razak Report which under such conditions 
rendered itself as "non-implementable". It was only after a 
decade of 
vacillation that a process of "adaptable implementation" was carried out. 
Previous to that the Governemnt resigned itself to the existing set-up 
which saw the increasing role of the English language 
in the school system. 
As has been observed, the process of implementing the national educ- 
ation policy was not done within the normal framework of political consensus. 
Instead it was done in the midst of a national crisis and at a time when 
national consensus that had been agreed upon a decade earlier came under 
thorough re-examination. It was therefore an extreme form of opportunism 
on the part of the Minister of Education to announce the implementation 
of the national policy in the wake of such political and social confusion. 
For instance, it was only two weeks after the May 13 outbreak that the 
Minister made a declaration for a "dynamic system of education". A 
fortnight later a directive was issued to all the Chief Education Officers 
of every state outlining the Government's plan to implement the national 
language policy in schools, (see Chapter 7). Thus within a short period 
of one month, the implementation procedures and directives were completed. 
All these came about in the aftermath of the country's worst ethnic crisis 
where the impact was great enough to warrant the re-structuring of 
society and its basic institutions. This development produced drastic 
changes that were seen immediately after the ethnic crisis.. As Archer 
(op. cit.: 71) appropriately pointed out, "large scale change only occurrs 
if the existing structural relations are destroyed and replaced by new 
ones. " This observation made by Archer fitted well into the post 
1969 
development of education in Malaya. 
In discussing the policy implementation process, Smith 
(1973: 204-5) 
gives three key variables that had certain 
influences in any policy imple- 
mentation. These were "the structure and personnel", 
"the leadership of 
the administrative organization", and tithe 
implementing program and 
capacity". During the first few years of 
the country's independence these 
criteria had some relevance to the'4ion-implementation" state of 
the 
educational policy. But towards the end of 
the decade, the justification 
for the vacillation and "non-decision" no longer remained valid. This 
was mainly because preparation for the national language policy was 
incorporated in the Razak Report (para. 12) where it was explicitly stated 
that the "ultimate objective of the educational policy in this country 
must be to bring together the chý_'_ldren of all races under a national 
educational system in which the national language is the main medium of 
instruction. " At the same time, the general public was made aware of 
this development through the national language campaign which was carried 
out extensively throughout the country. Hence, the sense of awareness 
was there to be exploited and it was a procedural matter of translating 
the desired objectives into an official directive as being done by the 
Minister of Education on July 10,1969. But paradoxically, this 
opportunity was not seized upon by the "previous government". 
Concurrently, the argument that the implementation failure was a 
direct result of the centralised system that was adopted had a certain 
validity although in a limited way. The inherent weakness in the central- 
ised system was that it was often subjected to political manipulation. 
As Archer (op. cit.: 261) pointed out: 
"Political manipulation is by far the most important form 
of negotiation in centralised systems. Because education 
as a whole has so little autonomy from the government 
and because groups seeking change have few alternative 
means of obtaining them, most pressures converge on the 
political centre. " 
Under these conditions, could the de-centralised system 
be proved 
otherwise then? But again, in the 
Malayan context, education was not 
treated in isolation per se. It was part and parcel of the country's 
nation-building process. Malayan educational policy was explicit in its 
objective of making education an instrument for national development 
and towards the inculcation of a common Malayan identity (The Razak 
Report, para. la & II). The adoption of a decentralised system, while 
providing the in-built mechanism of flexibility towards implementation 
would at the same time be in contradiction to the whole national philos- 
ophy which has just been described. Secondly, the decentralised system 
itself would enhance the divergence development which the country 
intended to impede. The choice of a centralised system was therefore not 
accidental but thoroughly planned to suit the prevailing social conditions 
of the Malayan plural society. 
Finally, it should also be emphasised that all along, the demands 
were for the implementation of the national education policy and not for 
a change in the policy. The onus therefore lay solely on the implementors 
and in a centralised system it was "the man in charge" that was respons- 
ible. As to the question of why the policy was not implemented in 1967 
or earlier rather than in 1969, it called for the understanding of 
the 
politics and political conditions, and also the man who managed 
the affairs 
of education during that time. 
Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
As has been described in the previous chapters, the development of 
education in Malaya between 1955-1970 was one which was punctuated by 
uncertainty and shrouded with the atmosphere of suspicion, disappointment 
and frustration, and this to some extent resulted in the "Armageddon" 
of 1969. 
The intricacies of the link between educational issues, ethnicity 
and the course of Malayan politics has also been shown. In fact, the 
Malayan plural society dictated the direction of the political system 
in which the nation's educational policy had to be accommodated. For 
instance, the Razak Report which was supposed to be instrumental in the 
country's nation-building programme and at the same time pave the way for 
national integration, failed to get fully implemented for reasons which 
were essentially political rather than educational or national. 
In the first place, the premise on which independent Malaya was built 
was shrouded with unwritten formulas which became subjected to serious 
questioning by the post-independent generation. For example, certain pro- 
visions of the constitution, like the national language, the special 
rights of the Malays and the position of the Malay rulers were the by- 
products of these arrangements. Secondly, the vague and ambiguous position 
of the national language in the national school system and the Government's 
attempted policy of making the country bilingual as img? 't; i in the National 
Language Act, 1967 revealed the Government's ultimate linguistic policy 
for the country. At the same time, the opposition by the immigrant 
communities over the national language policy in schools created the 
greatest barrier towards the realisation of the objective as envisaged 
by the Razak Report. Watson (1980: 147) aptly pointed out that language 
makes "such a thorny question in multi-racial societies because it can 
become a barrier to integration if different ethnic or racial groups 
insist on maintaining their own languages as a means of transmitting cul- 
tural and social values, and if they resist the concept of a national 
language. " 
Thirdly, the national system of education which the Razak Report pro- 
posed continued the retention of the colonial educational set-up both in 
form and content. The Report, besides the structural and organisational 
changes it recommended, did not provide the much needed philosophical 
guidance and clarity, and this ultimately resulted in controversy over 
its interpretation. Under these conditions, the process of nation-building 
in which education had a prime role to play did not materialise as expected. 
The failure of the educational policy to get implemented was clear. It 
was politics and its related institutions that determined the direction of 
the educational policy. In the light of the controversy that emerged, 
the political preference was to place the issue into the position of a 
stalemate and thus stall its implementation. 
Fourthly, the lack of confidence shown in anything indigenous resulted 
in much vacillation and hesitancy in implementing the stated objective as 
had been enshrined in the Razak Report. The neo-colonial attitudes among 
the leaders not only led to the position of the national language into 
further disgrace but also enhanced the arguments raised by the immigrant 
communities that the national language was not yet prepared to take the 
place of English. Within the Malay community itself, there emerged a 
deep contradiction between the aspiration of the masses who wished to see 
the national language taking its proper place in the national school 
system and the leaders who were evasive towards the issue and preferred 
the continued retention of English. 
Until 1969, the Razak Report which was to be the cornerstone of 
Malayan education, remained the source of bitter discontent among the 
various ethnic groups of the country. The issue was always important in 
the Malayan political scene and became even more so during every national 
election. The Education Review Committee of 1960 which was supposed to 
help in reducing the grievances towards the Razak Report, further exacer- 
bated the state of the educational crisis. By enhancing the position of 
English at all levels of instruction and simultaneously withdrawing all 
forms of financial aid to any secondary school which refused to conform 
to the Educational Ordinance, 1957, enraged not only the Chinese community 
who had been demanding the recognition of their language as one of the 
official languages but it also created the feeling of extreme discontent 
among the Malays who had hoped to see the reduction of English as the 
medium of instruction in schools. 
Fifthly, the failure on the part of the colonial government to estab- 
lish a unified system of education for the country while at the same time 
being unconcerned about the growth of ethnic schools in fact laid the 
foundations of educational pluralism which the newly independent govern- 
ment found it hard to dismantle. In 1951 for instance, the Government 
set up the Barnes and Fenn-Wu Committees specifically to look into the 
problems of Malay and Chinese education respectively. In retrospect, 
the setting up of these two committees could be considered as unnecessary. 
Rather than identifying the committee with its respective ethnic group, 
it would have been wiser on the part of the colonial government to have 
set up just a single committee with the objective of looking into the 
problems of Malayan education in general. By setting up one committee 
against the other, the colonial government had ignited the fuse of ethnic 
contradiction over matters related to education. Thus, when the Razak 
Report was unveiled, there was no hesitation from the Chinese community 
to reject it outright. The opposition continued and became even more 
vocal with the publication of the Education Review Committee's Report in 
1960. The Education Review Committee which was set up to study the 
implications of the Razak Report did not provide the philosophical clarity 
that had been wanting. As such, the ambiguity of the educational policy 
remained, together with the controversies that were already latent, 
resulting in much indecisiveness and vacillation on the part of the 
Government when arriving at the point of implementation. 
The study also revealed the non-lasting effect of the Alliance 
G overnemnt's framework of consociational politics which was in the main 
based on the "behaviour of the political elites" (Lijphart, 1969: 211). 
As Li5phart (ibid.: 212) pointed out, "The leaders of the rival subcultures 
may emerge in competitive behaviour and thus further aggravate mutual 
tensions and political instability, but they may also make deliberate 
efforts to counteract the immobilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. " 
This "overarching co-operation at the elite level" (ibid. ) was clearly 
evident in the set-up of the Alliance party. It was therefore with a 
view to presenting the elite cohesion that the Razak Report emerged as 
a product of political compromise and accommodation among the component 
partners of the Alliance. Nonetheless, the middle-of-the-road consociational 
policy was always fraught with the pressures of political extremism 
and in the Malayan case, moderation had always been construed as a sign 
of political weakness and also as a "betrayal to one's own kind". 
Finally, the ethnic crisis of 1969 was to some extent developed out 
of frustration that nothing much was achieved through the prevalent 
political set-up. The incidence was in fact an attempt to dismantle the 
existing status-quo and to re-orientate the basic approach needed for a 
multi-ethnic society and thus adopting a more pragmatic way of solving 
the problems. In the realms of education in particular, the crisis of 
1969 ended the period of uncertainty and ambiguity which had been stalling 
the full implementation of the national education policy as envisaged in 
the Razak Report. The crisis also brought to the fore the various prob- 
lems and issues that had been confronting the nation ever since it 
achieved independence in 1957. The post 1969 era thus saw a more realistic 
and pragmatic approach adopted in dealing with these issues. Firstly, in 
a parliamentary democracy it was essential that the opinion of the majority 
be respected. The inability to recognise the needs of the masses, could 
result in a political conflict that could ultimately challenge 
the very 
basis of the institution itself. Secondly, the politics of compromise 
and accommodation were seen to be effective only for a short term 
basis. 
ksa strategy for a long term effectiveness, it was too strenuous for 
the leaders to bear and the masses to endure. Thirdly, for a policy to 
be effectively implemented, it needs clarity, a strong personality on 
the part of the implementor and most of all the "will to implement" among 
those who were concerned with the process of policy making and implemen- 
tation. Fourthly, in a multi-ethnic society, it is imperative that 
legislative sanction be enforced if a policy is to be effectively imple- 
mented. Finally, in a plural society it is ethnicity rather than class 
that creates divisiveness within the state. To quote Melson and Wolpe 
(1970: 118), "ethnicity remains a persistent fact of political life". 
This statement continues to hold true for Malaysia. 
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MALAYSIA 
Act of Parliament 
No-7 OF 1967 
NATIONAL LANGUAGE ACT, 1967 
An Act to provide for the use of the national language. 
(lst September, 1967) 
WHEREAS Clause (1) of Article 152 of the Constitution 
provides that the national language shall be the Malay 
language: 
AND WHEREAS Clauses (2) to (5) of the said Article 
provide for the use of the English language for purposes 
specified therein notwithstanding the provisions of 
Clause (1) for a period of ten years after Merdeka Day, 
and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides: 
AND WHEREAS in relation to the Borneo States Clause 
(1) of Article 161 of the Constitution provides that no 
Act of Parliament terminating or restricting the use of 
the English language for any of the purposes mentioned 
in Clauses (2) to (5) of Article 152 shall come into 
operation as regards the use of the English language 
in any case mentioned in Clause (2) of Article 161 until 
ten years after Malaysia Day: 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ENACTED by the Duli Yang Maha 
Mulia Seri Paduka Baginda Yang di Pertuan Agong with the 
advice and consent of the Dewan Negara and Dewan Ra'ayat 
in Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the 
same, as follows: 
1. (1) This Act may be cited as the National Language Act, 
1967, and shall come into force on the 1st day of September, 
1967. 
Short title 
commencement 
and applicat 
ion. 
(2) This Act shall not apply to the Borneo States. 
2. Save as hereinafter provided in this Act and subject to National 
the safeguards provided in Clause (1) of Article 152 of the language to 
Constitution relating to any other language and the language be used for 
of any other community in the Federation the national lan- official 
guage shall be used for official purposes. purposes. 
3. Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the 
r'ederal Government or any State Government to use any 
translation of official documents or communications 
in the language of any other community in the Federat 
ion for such purposes as may be deemed necessary in 
the public interest. 
4. The Yang di Pertuan Agong may permit the continued 
use of the nglish language for such official purposes 
as may be deemed fit. 
5. The President of Dewan Negaxa, the Speaker of the 
Dewan Ra'ayat or the Speaker of the Legislative Assemb- 
ly of any State, or other person performing for the 
time being the functions of any such office, may permit 
any member of either House of Parliament or of the 
Legislative Assembly, as the case may be, to use the 
English language in addressing, or otherwise partici- 
pating in the work of, either House of Parliament or 
the Legislative Assembly: 
6. The texts - 
(a) of all Bills to be introduced or amendments 
thereto to be moved in either House of Par- 
liament or the Legislative Assembly of any 
State; 
(b) of all Acts of Parliament and all subsidiary 
legislation issued by the Federal Government; 
(c) of all Enactments and subsidiary legislation 
issued by any State Government; and 
(d) of all Ordinances promulgated by the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong, 
shall be in the national language and in the English 
language, the former being authoritative unless the 
Yang di Pertuan Agong otherwise prescribes generally 
or in respect of any particular law or class of 
laws. 
7. (1) Nothing in section 6 shall apply to the 
amendment of any written law enacted before 
the 
commencement of this Act until such written 
law 
has been translated into the national language. 
(2) Where any written law enacted before the 
commencement of this Act has been translated 
into 
the national language the Yang di Pertuan 
Agong may 
prescribe the translation of such 
law to be autho- 
ritative. 
Use of tran- 
slation. 
Continued use 
of ngl i sh may 
be permitted. 
Use of English 
language may be 
permitted in 
Parliament and 
Legislative 
Assembly. 
Authoritative 
text of laws. 
Written laws 
enacted prior 
to this Act. 
8. All proceedings (other than the giving of evidence Language of 
by a witness) in the Federal Court, the High Court or Courts. 
any subordinate court shall be in the national language 
or in the English language or partly in the national 
language and partly in the English language: 
Provided that the Court may, either of its own mo- 
tion or on the application of any part to any procee- 
dings and after considering the interests of justice 
in those proceedings, order that the proceedings (other 
than the giving of evidence by a witness) shall be ei- 
ther wholly in the national language or wholly in the 
English language. 
( Received the Royal Assent 
on the 31st day of 
March, 1967. ) 
I 
r-I 
Cd 
4-) 
0 
E-+ 
N lf1 U1 -t [` N C` _e Oý _ep r-i 00 c'V \IO no N Oý \O -: t, "O -e r-f CO O t` CO 00 Lf1 -t K, ý -f m> U1 r-1 ri K1 r-f N lf1 NN C` N Kl 0 Kl [11 Kl K1 
0- w 
r--I r-I 
ýi 
V4 
4-) 
r-ýI 
U 
W 
a) 
U 
t[i ! ý: 
4-4 
0 
(1) bko 
Cd 
4j 
ý 
aý U 
., ý aý 
ý 
to 
4j 
aý ý 
-Fj 
rn 
4-4 0 
ti aý 
z 
Cd 
-N 
0 E-4 
0? S 
" 
to x7 
U "r1 
"rj 
19 8 
Äý 
Üý 
W Pa 
U\ 
W 
ý 
ý 
U 
ý 
ý 
ý 
v 
., ý ý 
ý 
ý 
4 
ý 
a) U 
SI 
a) 
.ý 
C) 
U) 
Ak 
co 
-N 
:3 
4-) 
ra 
UU 
aS cý 
wa 
U 
cti a) 
I1IIIIIIIII1IIIIII 
ý rn .ý rNi .... ý2 . 
r-4 N r-1 N\D M-N 
IIIIIIIIIIII 
IIIIIIIIIIII 
ON \ýO ON 
O 11\ Oý 00 00 N 
r-i HN_: t r-i 
K1 ý- lf> N N1 Kl 
ý 
r- 
NI NQN 
Uý1 
ý 6ý 
... 
ý 
.... 00000 
III r-I tt1 Prl W1 \1O _: f N C` .f N1 L` r4l\ W1 `O to 
NO lIl C- ON %1OsO N 
N K\ Cf\ H 
ýý C*- 
ýON 0 
r-I 
00 K1 N 
. . 
ý a\ 
C` ON r-I 00 N C` 00 
NN 
....... 
Ntýrlrý ýNrý-1 ýN 
rý-1 
ýKNI N ýýKý 
1 
Lrý0ý0 
rýr1 
r-I r-I r-I 
Ol\ 00 00 
\ý 
j 
ýN r- 
000 lt1 
NN 
N1 N%4 O 01%r-I ý 
-1 rý 
ü 
r-i 
N Kl 00 `o -d' 
rn rn O ON K1 ýD 00001 L(\ 
a0 t11 Oý 00 N rn 
LC'1 \O Nl (V-7o0 
H r-1 
N (D 
tA EA 
cd 0 
ý 
X3 4-) 
ý -ri 
4-) 
zU0zU0 
O\ 00 r-I Ltl \. o ý10 \10 QN oO\ o\ orn H 4-> r--1 r-4 +. ) r-{ 
0-% 00 ." 
ý-ý 
1ýt1 
C- oN0 ul 
rH -1 0ý0 rý-1 
ý ýýiý, q 
N r-i N ! (\ rcl rý1 
r-I I'D N C- N --d- 
r-4 C` r-I r-1 ON r-I 
ýN ý 
.". """ 
ON O OýC` 
N r-t -ýf -: t 0 00 N 111 V1N 
NN 
00 OýÖýN 
.... 
1t1 O1 ý A00 K1 
NNN cV 
rn o rn r%- cr cl rn n , -I -t ri u1 HN r-1 N rn r-1 
N a) 
(0 M 
N 
Cd 
"riý. ý rý 
ý 
r il 
4-) 0 
ýUOýÜO 
ri N 
ýÖý ü1ÖN 
K1-f i-i -.: t U1 ('V 
00 ý 
r-I NýýÖ 
CO N _: t --f 
N K1 K1 
e 00 `0 -e Oý t! -.: t Pýl 
......... 
co 00 
ON 
ý 
týt1 00 r4-1\ n 0ý0 Kl\ \Z 
N K1 
rn oý 
rn o* 
r-i +ý H r-1 4-) r-4 
G) (L) 
aS 0N 
r-=1 "r{ . t; 
\ýO rý 
. . 'ý 
2- CO 00 
N rl 
lz 
"r1 .ý r-4 
.ý +ý cd . S. L4-ý Cd o ývo ý0 
K1 -t ýO 
Oý 
ý r-14. > 
-.: I- ýUpl ýO 
r--ý r-1 4-) 
4) 
Ö 
C) 
A 
ý 
. r4 b 
SI 
C) 
ä 
ý 
r-I 
Cd 
ý 
0 E-+ 
ob 
'dý 
9 
CO "ri 
Uý 
. r1 
8Q 
0 
0" 
10 v, 0 
W P-1 
C-Il 
" 
rd 
4) 
«4: 
öZ 
a U 
ý 
rd 
W 
'ýR 
0 0 
. 1-I 
t ý 
0 
93 lbý . rq 60 
0 
W 
Y, 
G) 
C) 
0 
a) 
. r-1 
0 
U) 
3E 
ul 
-F-30 
F4 
-C 
?a 
4) 
r-i 
UU 
Cd RS 
W Pi 
V 
"rl E 
N 
rcl 
0 
v 4) 
4 P-4 
r-i ON ti\ 00 -4- H r-1 O'\ 0 u1 N ON K1 NN K1 tn ON cti! \. 0 -t Kl K1 K\ 0 tc1 ON OM-I% Cý- K1 %10 N 00 \10 L` I'O _: t OO YIN -: 1- if \10 00 r-I \D K1 U1 Cl- H L`- 00 ýwwý. ' I. "AV. w 4p. 
r-I r-I N r-I N r-1 K\ N K1 K1 K\ 
III 
ý-lfNN ý-2 0ý0 Cý-C`1ýf1 I'D O\ -e ". """ý"""""" 
Co l0 
rý-I rN-ý r-NI 
CO 
rý-I rý-I 
N 
iT NN OIN CI- r-i t! 1 "0 ON K1-t 0 K1 <` 
K01 
ýlý ý 
lýfl r-ýi 11ýý 
CO 
i-ý1 
ýýýQý ON ý ýO 
ý-, -N{ ý. 0 ý0 t11 
°ý NýO 
". 
a\ 
"....... 
Q 
. 
QQ 
K100 W\ -: t 0 ll1 _: t 0 L%- U\ ý co -r 0 
r-q 
ON --: t ý Oý 
rý ýý -: f -t OrN 0 rrN ý'D uý 0 uN ON 00 r-I 00 Cl- %lD N 
r-i 
r-I ý' 
NN 
C` Ný ON ý Ul OO CC) t` Ný 00 
ý- IY100 0\ ls- IY1 4- I'O \1D rl co N -zi- N CO 
u1Vi 
Lý 0Q r-ý ýOý Oý ý co N Oý 1' ý 00 ýý 00 
ý 
K1 -. -I' OI\ u1 -t Q\ IY1-: " \-O tI\ co U1--t -t \O Cl- K1 \1O 
h- ON _: I- _: t ON ri C` Cý ýý C` fU r-4 C'- t0 C` ON N Cý- ý U, \ Co -? 
ý 
u1 NM Or-I ý U1 Oýý N 
r*-I 
L(1 
00 0Ný 
%ý . iýco 
:f 110 -4- 1. t1 
AN-:; AN 
rn U1 NN 
AN N t11 4 
-e N 00 %D --t' tf\ 0 00 --: 1- N O\ \D 0 C- C- r-1 00 0tl K1 0 
r-i 
r-I Ul ý r-i \O ý r-I \D ý ri C` 0ý0 r-i Oý N0N 
. 
'ýf ýý ON °cý°ýoMO ýö rn -4' 00 ! `3 ýý 
ý 
.. K. ......... 
Oý`O Oý-ý" OýK\ OON OO\ N OOýN 
K1 O 00 t! 1 0 \10 r-1 r+1 K1 IO K1 0\ rl a0 0 ul U1 N 
NN ýN rINCT\ N ýrl r-iNN \10 (\j 
K\ Ký 
ý cu K\ 
ýýý! 
yý-J+ýi o0 N 00 0o 
ý K\ ýýý 
ra L` ý I7! . ý: .ý. lý ...... 
U: 
K\ Co 
Ný _: 
t N 
r-ý1 
tt\ 0NO ý cl-- N Oý \O N O\ t! 1 NO 
00 N 00 0`O --t _: t H K\ Kl K\ 
N0 U\ -ý- [, - 
0rý-0ý Co 
Ný ýO n _: t EI- ý cm 1111- 
ýýý 
r-ný1 
ýý 
r-ý 
op Qý 
r-I 
-: t-i0000u1 Irl K, ýý 4 '-ý ý4 .......... ý.. N tI\ U\ r-i 0o 
Co K\ `O C-- K\ ý0 `O K\ w %IO N u\ \O N u\ ýlO N .. t 
ýO OOO ß\ý ýO Oý. O u1C`-O 00ýp0 
O ý' 
ýC- 
N 
ýýNýý 
KN\ 
ýý 
0ý0 '"'ý Co 
ýKý\ r t3 .ýý 0ý0 
ý 
N 
ý, 4) ý , 'ý N f-ý aa N0 
93 000 9) Cd $3 
r4 0 z3 
ýýAýý 
j141 
ý 
, z, OO >-, OO 
Z OO 
r'f r'y r7 
?ýN ti 0 $4 
ri . c3 
Cd r. 
4. ) Cd 43 +1 
ýU0ýt. ý 0ZU0 
tn ý%o ýo ý cl- 00 CO ON 
ON 00 F-i 
to, Iýo \, O \O %z C` C` C` 
v\ oöý o` rnoa\ a, oa, ý a'\ ooN (TN aaý ýýý ýH rq 4.31 r-q r-I 4-) r-4 r-4 -P r-4 r. 4 -P ri 
H 
H 
N 
H 
-FJ 
ý 
., ý 
U 
4 
4--) 
IL4 
0 
pq 
N 
P4 
r-ý 
"rl 
ClS 
ý 
H 
. ri 
"n 
Cd 
; i: 
. 
G) 
U 
0 
Cj) 
ý 
Appendix E- 303 - 
Ref: K. P. 8664/(22) 
Kementerian Pelajaran, 
Rumah Persekutuan, 
Kuala Lumpur. 
10hb. Julai, 1969 
Semua Ketua Pegawai Pelajaxan, 
Malaysia Baxat. 
Tuan , 
Surat Pekeliling Ikhtisas (Professional) 
No. 8/1969. 
Penglaksanaan mengajar semua mata pelajaran dalam Bahasa 
Malaysia di Darjah Satu di Sekolah-sekolah Rendah Jenis 
Kebangsaan Inggeris mulai daripada Januari 1970. 
Adalah seperti yang tuan telah ketahui, bahawa lima mata pelajaran, 
iaitu Pelajaran Jasmani dan Kesihatan, Seni Lukis dan Pertukangan Tangan, 
Pelajaran Tempatan dan Muzik, telah diajar dalam Bahasa Malaysia kepada 
Darjah-darjah Satu hingga Darjah-darjah Tiga dalam semua Sekolah Rendah 
Jenis Kebangsaan Inggeris sejak bulan Januari, 1968, dan hanya Ilmu Sains 
dan Ilmu Hisab masih diajar dalam Bahasa Inggeris. 
2. Sekarang Kementerian telah membuat keputusan bahawa dua lagi mata 
pelajaran iaitu Ilmu Sains dan Ilmu Hisab hendaklah diajar dalam Bahasa 
Malaysia kepada semua Darjah Satu dalam sekolah-sekolah tersebut mulai 
bulan Januari, 1970. Ajaran bagi semua mata pelajaran ini dalam Bahasa 
Malaysia akan dilaksanakan dengan beransur-maju daripada peringkat seko- 
lah-sekolah rendah ke peringkat sekolah-sekolah menengah. 
3. Jadual waktu bagi pelaksanaan mengajar semua mata pelajaran selain 
daripada Bahasa Inggeris dan Bahasa-bahasa Ibunda dalam Sekolah-sekolah 
Jenis Kebangsaan Inggeris adalah seperti berikut: 
Tahun Mata-mata pelajaran yang diajar dalam Bahasa Malaysia 
Peringkat Sekolah Rendah 
1970 Darjah 1- dal am semua mata pelajaran melainkan 
Bahasa Inggeris. 
1971 Darjah 2- sama 
1972 Darjah 3- dalam semua mata pelajaran melainkan 
Bahasa Inggeris dan Bahasa-bahasa 
Ibunda. 
Tahun Peringkat Sekolah Rendah 
1973 Darjah 4- dalam semua mata pelajaran melainkan 
Bahasa Inggeris dan Bahasa-bahasa 
Ibunda. 
1974 Darjah 5- 
1975 Darjah 6- 
sama 
sama 
Peringkat Sekolah Menengah 
1976 Tingkatan I- sama 
1977 Tingkatan II - sama 
1978 Tingkatan III - sama 
(Peperiksaan Sijil Rendah Pelajaran sahaja, 1978) 
1979 Tingkatan IV 
198 0T ingkat an V 
sama 
sama 
(Peperiksaan Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia sahaja, 1980) 
1981 Tingkatan VI (Bawah) - sama 
1982 Tingkatan VI (Atas) - sama 
(Peperiksaan Sijil Tinggi Persekolahan sahaja, 1982) 
4. Adalah ditegaskan bahawa di bawah Akta Pelajaran, 1961 Bahasa 
Inggeris adalah wajib diajar dalam semua sekolah kebangsaan. Akta 
Pelajaxan ini juga memerlukan bahawa kemudahan-kemudahan bagi mengajar 
Bahasa Cina atau Bahasa Tamil hendaklah diadakan sekiranya ibu-ibu 
bapa lima belas orang murid-murid dalam sebuah sekolah memohon supaya 
mata pelajaran itu diajar. 
5. Sebagai dimaksudkan di dalam Surat Pekeliling "Professional No. 
7/1979 dan No. 8/1969, mata-mata pelajaran yang perlu diajar dala. m 
Bahasa Malaysia dalam Darjah-darjah Satu hingga Darjah-darjah Enam 
di Sekolah-sekolah Rendah Jenis Kebangsaan Inggeris dalam tahun 1970 
adalah ditunjukkan dalam Lampiran A yang berkelat. 
6. Sila sampaikan kandungan-kandungan surat pekeliling ini kepada 
perhatian Guru-guru Besar semua Sekolah Jenis Kebangsaan Inggeris. 
Saya yang menurut perintah 
(Kum Boo) 
b. p. Setiausaha Tetap, 
(Bahagian Sekolah - sekolah) 
Kementerian Pelajaran. 
Salinan: Setiausaha Tetap Kementerian Pelajaran. 
Ketua Penasihat Pelajaran. 
Timbalan Setiausaha. 
Pengarah (Pelajaran Tinggi). 
Ketua Nazir. 
Pengarah (Latihan Guru-guru) - sila beritahu semua Maktab j 
Pusat Perguruan. 
Pengawal Peperiksaan. 
Semua Pegawai Bahagian 1 dalam Kementeria Pelajaran. 
Pengarah Felajaran, Sabah (2 copies). Untuk makiumat. 
Pengarah Pelajaran, Sarawak (2 copies). Üntuk maklumat. 
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